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I 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, by the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, which was 
entered on June 8, 2011 and certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of ' 
Civil Procedure, and from the ancillary and related rulings and orders on which the 
Judgment depends. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-3-102(3)(j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issues Raised in ClearOne's Appeal 
1. Whether the district court erred in granting Strohm and Dorsey's motion for partial 
summary judgment and ordering that Susie Strohm is entitled to indemnification 
from ClearOne under Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-903, 905, and 907. This Court 
reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness. Glenn v. 
Reese, 2009 UT 80, \ 6, 225 P.3d 185 (Utah 2009). This issue corresponds to 
issue (b) in ClearOne's Statement of the Issues. 
2. Whether the district court erred in granting Strohm and Dorsey's motion for 
summary judgment on their claim for breach of ClearOne's contractual obligations 
to pay Dorsey's fees. This issue comprises two sub-issues: 
a. Whether the district court erred in finding there was no genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to the intended terms of the parties' agreements, and that 
those agreements obligated ClearOne to pay Dorsey's fees incurred in defending 
Strohm in the Criminal Case, fees incurred in seeking enforcement of this 
contractual obligation, and interest thereon. This issue subsumes issues (c), (d), 
and (f) in ClearOne's Statement of the Issues. 
b. Whether the district court erred in concluding the intended terms of the 
parties' agreements were enforceable. This issue subsumes issues (a) and (e) in 
ClearOne's Statement of the Issues. 
This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, 
determining "only whether the district court erred in applying the governing law 
and whether the district court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
1 
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material fact." Salt Lake County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45,f14, 234 
P.3d 1105 (Utah 2010) (alterations omitted). 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in making an award of fees and 
expenses in accordance with its earlier grants of summary judgment. This Court 
reviews the district court's fee award for abuse of discretion. Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). This issue subsumes issues (g), (h), 
(i), and (j) in ClearOne's Statement of the Issues. 
Issues Raised in Dorsey and Strohm's Cross-Appeal 
1. Whether the district court erred in declining to award Dorsey's attorneys' fees and 
expenses incurred in representing Strohm after February 27, 2009, the date of the 
jury verdict. This issue was preserved at R.2982, and presents a question of law 
that this Court reviews for correctness. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 
115, 116 (Utah 1998). 
2. Whether the district court erred in unilaterally establishing August 10, 2010, as the 
date on which Dorsey's attorneys' fees and expenses would cease to be 
reimbursed in the Collection Case. This issue was preserved at R.2983, and 
presents a question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. Meadowbrook, 
LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998). 
3. Whether the district court erred in declining to award Dorsey the contractually 
agreed-upon 18 percent interest on fees incurred in the Collection Case. This issue 
was preserved at R.2983, and presents a question of law that this Court reviews for 
correctness. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998); see 
also Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutes and rules whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or are of 
central importance to the appeal are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-902 
Utah Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-903 
Utah Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-905 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-907 
These statutes and rules are set out verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
2 
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i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
i 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a Judgment entered by the Honorable 
Robert K. Hilder on June 8, 2011, awarding damages to Appellees and Cross-Appellants 
Susie Strohm ("Strohm") and Dorsey & Whitney LLP ("Dorsey"), against Appellant and ' 
Cross-Appellee ClearOne Communications, Inc. ("ClearOne"). Judge Hilder entered this 
Judgment based on two previous orders granting summary judgment for Strohm and 
Dorsey, which established overlapping legal bases for the recovery of fees and costs 
incurred in Dorsey's successful defense of Strohm, ClearOne's former Chief Financial 
Officer, against federal criminal securities fraud charges. 
Summary Judgment: Mandatory Indemnification 
On August 12, 2009, Dorsey and Strohm sought partial summary judgment on the 
theory that Strohm was entitled to mandatory indemnification under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 16-10a-903, 905, and 907. Strohm, a former officer of the company, had been 
acquitted of seven of eight counts in the federal criminal case. (R. 1812,1850). 
ClearOne opposed the motion and filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment. 
(R.2027-2050). 
On November 19, 2009, the district court entered an order granting Dorsey and 
Strohm's motion and denying ClearOne's cross-motion. (R.2771). The district court 
ruled that the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-903 and 907 compelled 
ClearOne to indemnify Strohm for the defense of those claims with respect to which she 
was successful. (R.2772). The court also found that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-905(l) 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compelled ClearOne to pay Strohm's "reasonable expenses incurred in order to obtain 
court-ordered indemnification." (R.2772). 
Summary Judgment: Engagement Agreements 
Early in the case, Dorsey and Strohm sought partial summary judgment on their 
claim that defense of the federal criminal case was covered under the plain language of 
the engagement agreement between ClearOne, Strohm, and her attorneys, which had been 
contained in two separate letter agreements. (R.501). On December 19, 2008, the district 
court held a hearing, and soon after entered an order essentially denying ClearOne's 
motion to dismiss and Dorsey and Strohm's motion for summary judgment, stating the 
scope of the engagement agreements was ambiguous and discovery was required to 
determine the "intention of the parties." (See R.0758, 5348, 5402). 
After discovery by both parties, including ClearOne's own testimony {see 
R.2698), Dorsey and Strohm renewed their motion for partial summary judgment based 
on the engagement agreements on November 5, 2009. (2645, 2650). ClearOne brought a 
cross-motion for summary judgment (R.2794, 2886). 
On March 2, 2010, Judge Hilder entered his Ruling and Order on the summary 
judgment motions regarding the engagement agreements. (R.2956). The district court 
granted Dorsey and Strohm's motion and denied ClearOne's motion, holding that the 
engagement agreements provided an alternative obligation for ClearOne to pay Strohm's 
reasonable legal fees, as all the relevant extrinsic evidence supported that "ClearOne 
intended to provide Ms. Strohm a full defense, civil and criminal, and they intended to 
retain [Dorsey] for that purpose." (R.2962). The court further held that "Plaintiffs are 
4 
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also entitled to judgment for interest and fees incurred in seeking to recover under the 
[engagement] agreements." (R.2968). 
Order on Reasonable Fees and Expenses and Appeal 
During these proceedings, the trial court deferred consideration of the amount and 
reasonableness of any expenses, including attorney's fees. Accordingly, on July 30, 
2010, Dorsey and Strohm filed a petition for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
(R.2975-3150). After extensive briefing and hearings on the reasonableness of the fees, 
on January 24, 2011, the district court issued its Ruling and Order concerning the 
reasonableness of the rates charged by Dorsey and the overall reasonableness of the fees 
to be awarded for Strohm's criminal defense and for collecting her fees. (R.5149-5184). 
On June 8, 2011, the District court entered its Judgment concerning that award. (R.5310-
5312). 
5 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ClearOne, a public company located in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a manufacturer of 
video-conferencing equipment. (See R.0055). On January 15, 2003, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission initiated a civil securities fraud investigation into certain 
accounting practices at ClearOne ("the SEC Action"). (R.1574). The SEC Action also 
focused on Fran Flood, ClearOne's Chief Executive Officer, and Susie Strohm, its Chief 
Financial Officer. (See R. 1573-75, R. 1967). Strohm was employed by ClearOne from 
February 1996 until December 2003, holding the CFO position at the time relevant to the 
SEC allegations. 
In early 2003, while the SEC Action was pending, the U.S. Attorneys' Office for 
the District of Utah ("Utah USAO") impaneled a grand jury to begin a criminal 
investigation to parallel the SEC Action. (R.1834). On January 28, 2003, the Utah 
USAO informed ClearOne that it "had begun an investigation stemming from the 
complaint in the SEC action described above." (R.2692). 
A. The 2003 Engagement Agreement 
On January 29, 2003—the day after the Utah USAO formally notified ClearOne of 
its parallel criminal investigation—ClearOne and Strohm executed an engagement 
agreement with Milo Steven Marsden, who was then employed as a partner at the law 
firm of Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, PC (the "2003 Engagement 
Agreement"). (R.0042-44). Michael Keough, who was the interim CEO of ClearOne at 
that time, executed the 2003 Engagement Agreement for ClearOne. (Id.; R.2704). 
Within two months, Keough was named CEO of ClearOne. (Id.) 
6 
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4 
In the 2003 Engagement Agreement, ClearOne engaged Marsden and his firm "to 
represent Susie Strohm's interests in connection with the SEC civil complaint, referenced 
above, and in connection with further related investigations and litigation" (R.0042) 
(emphasis added). In the 2003 Engagement Agreement, ClearOne further agreed: 
3. Billing . . . ClearOne will pay the full amount of [the] bill 
within thirty days after receipt. . . Any amount billed and 
unpaid after such thirty day period shall bear and accrue 
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date billed 
until paid. 
7. Attorney Fees . . . [Marsden and his firm] shall be entitled 
to recover all reasonable costs expended in connection with 
collecting amounts due under this Agreement, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees. 
B. The 2003 Joint Defense Agreement 
Faced with the SEC Action, a criminal investigation, and the possibility of future 
criminal indictments, on February 7, 2003, ClearOne, Strohm, and Flood entered into a 
"Joint Defense and Confidentiality Agreement" (the "Joint Defense Agreement"). 
(Addendum C at C-136-142). 
C. Employment Termination Agreement ("ETA") 
In December 2003, ClearOne and Strohm entered an "Employment Termination 
Agreement" (the "ETA") to resolve "disputes regarding Strohm's demand for 
indemnification." (R.0035-0040). The ETA acknowledges that Strohm was employed as 
ClearOne's CFO during the time period covered by the SEC's allegations; it recites that 
"the SEC action has spawned, and may continue to spawn, multiple related proceedings, 
7 
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including . . . a grand jury investigation being conducted by the United States Department 
of Justice . . . . " (R.0035). 
Pursuant to the ETA, Strohm made several significant concessions, including to: 
(i) resign "her employment with ClearOne, effective December 5, 2003"; (ii) cancel her 
unexercised options on approximately 268,464 shares of ClearOne stock (then worth over 
$1.2 million) and transfer to the company 15,500 shares she then owned; and (iii) 
"cooperate with the Company and its counsel in the defense and/or prosecution of the 
SEC Action and the Related Proceedings." (R.0004, R.0036-39). In exchange for those 
concessions, ClearOne agreed to, among other things, (i) "indemnify Strohm for any 
liability and for all reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by her in connection 
with the SEC Action or any Related Proceedings, whether incurred before or after the 
effective date of this Agreement." (R.0037-38). 1 
D. The 2004 Engagement Agreement 
In early 2004, Marsden left the Bendinger Crockett law firm to join Dorsey. On 
March 31, 2004, Marsden wrote to ClearOne and Strohm to inform them of this fact (the 
"2004 Engagement Agreement"). (R.0047-50). The letter states that "[o]ur engagement 
agreement needs to be updated to reflect this move." (R.0047). Keough, as CEO of 
ClearOne, executed the 2004 Engagement Agreement for ClearOne. 
1 Strohm has additionally brought claims in the district court against ClearOne for 
breach of the Employment Termination Agreement by failing to indemnify her in the 
criminal proceedings. (SeeR. 1573-74). The district court did not reach the terms of 
the Employment Termination Agreement in its decisions. Thus, this additional theory 
of recovery for Strohm's defense costs is not currently before this Court. 
8 
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In the 2004 Engagement Agreement, ClearOne confirmed that it had engaged 
Marsden and Dorsey "to represent Susie Strohm in connection with the SEC civil 
complaint. . . and in connection with further related investigations and litigation. . . ." 
(R.0047). As the "update" to the terms of the 2003 Engagement Agreement, ClearOne ' 
further agreed in the 2004 Engagement Agreement, to (1) pay Dorsey's "usual and 
customary hourly rates"; and (2) to pay Dorsey's bill "on receipt." (R.0047-48). 
E. The Criminal Case 
In May of 2007, the Utah USAO contacted Marsden and informed him that 
Strohm was a grand jury "target." Marsden promptly informed ClearOne's counsel. 
(R.2696). On July 25, 2007, the grand jury returned an Indictment against Strohm and 
Flood, with essentially the same allegations as the SEC Action. (R.0262). The 
indictment charged Strohm with one count of conspiracy, two counts of making 
materially false and misleading statements to auditors, and two substantive counts of 
securities fraud. (Id.) Thereafter, the federal grand jury returned two superseding 
indictments, adding a charge of making material misrepresentations to auditors and two 
perjury counts against Strohm, as well as more counts against Flood. (R.0272, 0283). 
Dorsey began work on the Criminal Case in May of 2007.2 ClearOne paid bills 
submitted for services rendered for the first nine months. By March 2008, however, 
ClearOne refused to pay any further invoices for Strohm's defense in the Criminal Case. 
2 In public financial filings issued at that time, ClearOne expressly admitted it was 
obligated to indemnify Strohm in the Criminal Case. (R.0052-53; R.0092 
R.0217). 
9 
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(R. 1836). Despite this unexpected development, Dorsey continued to represent its client, 
Strohm, at substantial financial risk, as evidenced by the amount of work that resulted.3 
The Criminal Case went to trial on February 2, 2009. (R. 1835). On February 27, 
2009, the jury returned its verdict acquitting Strohm on seven of the eight claims that 
were brought against her. (Id., R. 1606). Strohm was ultimately convicted of only one 
perjury count, related to testimony at a preliminary injunction hearing in the SEC Action. 
By contrast, Strohm's co-defendant was convicted of all charges. On June 2, 2010, the 
district court sentenced Strohm to 24 months probation and 150 hours of community 
service. (R.3167). On November 8, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
her perjury conviction. United States v. Strohm, No. 10-4104 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). 
F. The Collection Case 
On August 21, 2008, months before the Criminal Case went to trial, Dorsey and 
Strohm commenced the instant proceeding—the Collection Case—by filing a complaint 
in Utah's Third Judicial District Court, seeking to enforce the indemnification obligation 
of ClearOne during Dorsey's preparation of the criminal case. (R.0001, 1572). After 
Strohm was acquitted, Dorsey and Strohm filed an Amended Complaint on July 29, 2009, 
dropping their request for injunctive relief as moot and—in light of Strohm's successful 
defense—adding a claim for mandatory indemnification under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
903. (R.1572). 
3 The Criminal Case involved more than 500,000 pages of documents, two dozen pre-
trial witness interviews, the retention of a securities expert for accounting issues, the 
preparation of 49 witness kits for trial, a trial database of 1180 trial exhibits, and a 
four-week trial. (R. 1639-45). 
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• 1. Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment: Mandatory 
Indemnification 
On August 12, 2009, Strohm and Dorsey filed their Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment seeking a judgment and order that Strohm was entitled to mandatory 
indemnification from ClearOne under Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-903, 905, and 907, 
based on her being acquitted on seven of the eight counts against her in the Criminal 
Case. (R.1812). 
On November 19, 2009 the court entered its Order-Indemnification, granting 
Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. (R.2771). The Order ruled in pertinent part: 
a. Mandatory Indemnification: Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-903 and 
907, ClearOne shall indemnify Ms. Strohm for the "reasonable expenses 
incurred by her in connection with the proceeding or claim[s] with respect 
to which she has been successful." Specifically, Ms. Strohm successfully 
defended herself against seven of the eight Counts ("claims") alleged 
against her by the United States in the federal criminal proceeding . . . 
b. Expenses to Obtain Indemnification: Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-
10a-905(l), ClearOne shall pay Ms. Strohm's "reasonable expenses 
incurred in order to obtain court-ordered indemnification," pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-903 and 907(1). (R.2772) (alterations omitted). 
2. Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment: Engagement 
Agreements 
Strohm and Dorsey filed their motion for partial summary judgment related to the 
Engagement Agreements shortly after filing their original Complaint. (R.501). In their 
motion, Dorsey and Strohm argued that the plain language of the Agreements required 
ClearOne to pay for Strohm's defense in the Criminal Case, and that ClearOne had 
breached the Engagement Agreements by refusing to pay any of Strohm's bills in 
connection with her defense since March of 2008. (R.0501, 0543). 
11 
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The district court held a hearing on Dorsey and Strohm's motion (and other 
matters) on December 19, 2008. The Court found that it could not determine "the scope 
of the agreement" based solely on the plain language of the Engagement Agreements, and 
ruled that discovery would be required on "the intentions of the parties" with respect to 
their contractual obligations. (R.2957). 
On March 17, 2009, Dorsey and Strohm noticed the deposition of ClearOne. 
(R.2748). Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Deposition 
Notice demanded that ClearOne produce "one or more of its officers, directors, managing 
agents, or other persons who are knowledgeable and consent to testify on ClearOne's 
behalf. ClearOne notified Dorsey and Strohm that it had designated Mike Keough as its 
representative for these topics, and he was deposed on October 7, 2009. (R.2698, 2755). 
In addition to being ClearOne's designated corporate representative on these topics, 
Keough had been ClearOne's CEO at the time the Engagement Agreements were signed, 
and was the signator of the agreements. (R.0042-44, 47-50). 
At the deposition, Keough testified that he understood, prior to executing the 2003 
Engagement Agreement, that the Department of Justice was investigating Strohm and 
that criminal charges could be brought as a result of that investigation: 
Q. And you also understood in 2002, early 2003 as the CEO of ClearOne, 
that a DOJ investigation was being undertaken and that could result in a 
criminal litigation and claims being brought against Strohm and Flood. 
A. Yes. 
12 
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Q. And those criminal claims that could be brought against Strohm and 
Flood would relate to or arise out of the SEC action, correct? 
A. Yes. 
(R.2706). Keough further testified that he understood the scope of Marsden's 
representation of Strohm under the 2003 Engagement Agreement included representation 
of her in any criminal case that might be brought, and that there was no discussion 
regarding a limitation on the scope of his representation: 
Q. And as I understand it, what you were telling me is that when 
[Marsden] was retained you understood, as the CEO of ClearOne, the scope 
of Mr. Marsden's representation was going to be representing Ms. Strohm 
in the SEC action, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He would represent her in the DOJ investigation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as you have told me, any and all other claims that might be 
brought against her, including any criminal indictments or criminal 
actions brought against her? 
A. Yes. 
(R.2709-2710). Indeed, Keough testified that not only did ClearOne not intend the 
engagement agreements to be limited solely to the SEC Action, it expected Marsden 
would represent Strohm in any criminal action. (R.2727-2728; see also R.2727 (with 
Keough stating that he understood the phrase "further related investigations and 
litigation" in the 2003 Engagement Agreement, to include any criminal indictments and 
criminal actions against Strohm)). Further, Keough stated that he understood the 2004 
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Engagement Letter to state that Dorsey had been engaged to represent Strohm in potential 
criminal actions, but otherwise the terms of the 2003 Engagement Agreement remained 
in force. (R.2729-30). 
With respect to interest on unpaid invoices, Keough testified that he and ClearOne 
understood, under the Engagement Agreements, that there would be 18 percent interest 
per annum on any invoice not paid within 30 days of receipt, (R.2726, 2731), and that he 
and ClearOne understood ClearOne would be obligated to pay for collection costs 
(including attorney's fees) in the event that the law firm was required to bring an action 
to collect its fees under the Engagement Agreements. (R.2727). 
With the benefit of this undisputed extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions in 
entering into the Engagement Agreements, Strohm and Dorsey filed a renewed motion 
for summary judgment on the Agreements on November 5, 2009. (2645, 2650). 
ClearOne filed a cross-motion. (R.2794, 2886). On March 2, 2010, the district court 
entered its Ruling and Order on the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on their Third Claim for Relief (Engagement Agreements), and ClearOne's 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.2956). The court granted Dorsey and 
Strohm's motion and denied ClearOne's cross-motion. (R.2967). The court stated the 
Engagement Agreements provided an "alternative basis" to require ClearOne to pay 
Strohm's reasonable legal fees incurred in (1) defense of the Criminal Case and (2) the 
Plaintiffs' collection action. (R.2967). Further, Dorsey and Strohm were held to also be 
entitled "to judgment for interest and fees incurred in seeking to recover under the letter 
agreements." (R.2968). 
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Judge Hilder expressly relied on several pieces of evidence in making his 
determination. He found that the undisputed facts, including the testimony of Keough, 
ClearOne's designated witness, and the recitals in the ETA and the Joint Defense 
Agreement, established that the scope of the Engagement Agreements included possible 
criminal proceedings, including the Criminal Case. (R.2960-61). He then closely 
examined the language in the 2004 Engagement Agreement to determine that it 
"implicitly incorporated" the terms of the 2003 Agreement, including the contractual 
claim for attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the Agreements and the 18 percent interest 
terms that were first included in the 2003 agreement (all of which was consistent with 
Keough's testimony). (R.2963-64). Finally, the district court rejected ClearOne's 
argument that this Court's decision in Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996) precluded recovery, stating that: 
ClearOne is not a client, but simply a third-party payor. The 
rights of Ms. Strohm under the applicable agreement cannot 
be vindicated unless she has competent counsel to assert those 
rights. This circumstance bears no resemblance to the case 
where a law firm represents a client, charges a fee apparently 
well in excess of the agreed cap, and more than the benefit 
received by the client, after which the firm uses its power to 
and expertise to enforce collection. 
(R.2966-67). The court reserved decision on the amount, reasonableness, and allocation 
of fees and expenses. 
3. Determination of Reasonableness of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. 
On July 30, 2010, Dorsey and Strohm filed their "Petition for an Award of 
Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs." (R.2975-3150). The Petition was supported by 
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the Declaration of William Michael Jr. (R.3151-3383); Supplemental Declaration of 
Loren E. Weis (R.3384-3406); Declaration of David A. Greenwood (3407-3416); and 
Declaration of Milo Steven Marsden (R.3417-3629). On August 17, 2010, ClearOne 
filed its opposition and its supporting affidavits, and yet another cross-motion. (R.3678-
3787; 4276-4876). 
On September 23, 2010, the Court held a hearing on Dorsey and Strohm's Petition 
and ClearOne's cross-motion. (R.5359). On January 24, 2011 the Court issued its 
Ruling and Order and made a determination concerning the reasonableness of the rates 
charged by Dorsey and the overall reasonableness of the fees to be awarded in the 
Criminal Case and the Collection Case. (R.5149-5184). On June 8, 2011, the District 
court entered its Judgment concerning the award of reasonable attorneys' fees in the 
Criminal Case and the Collection Proceeding . (R.5310-5312). 
The Judgment granted fees and costs to Dorsey and Strohm with the following 
included: (i) Judgment was entered in Dorsey's favor for breach of the Engagement 
Agreements; (ii) Judgment was entered in Strohm's favor on mandatory indemnification; 
(iii) Plaintiffs were awarded all hours and expenses billed and paid by ClearOne through 
the invoice that closed on March 31, 2008, with no adjustment or reimbursement; (iv) 
Plaintiffs were awarded reasonable fees and expenses incurred in the Criminal Case from 
April 1, 2008 through February 27, 2009; (v) Plaintiffs were awarded prejudgment 
interest on the Criminal Case fees and expenses at a rate of 18 percent; (vi) Plaintiffs 
were awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in the Collection Case through 
August 10, 2010. (R.5311-5312). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dorsey and Strohm on 
two counts of their First Amended Complaint that establish overlapping legal bases for 
ClearOne's obligation to pay Dorsey's fees, expenses, and interest incurred both in 
defending Strohm in the Criminal Case and in pursuing the present Collection Case. 
First, the district court concluded that Strohm is entitled to mandatory indemnification 
from ClearOne under Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-903 and -907 because she successfully 
defended herself against seven of eight criminal counts in the Criminal Case. Second, 
after considering uncontradicted extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent in the 
Engagement Agreements, the district court held as a matter of law that ClearOne was 
contractually obligated to pay Dorsey's fees, expenses, and interest in both the criminal 
and collection proceedings. The district court then carefully examined the relevant 
considerations to calculate a reasonable fee award. 
From this straightforward case ClearOne seeks to construct an appeal of 
intimidating complexity. The Court should not be misled. Despite the number of 
arguments ClearOne raises, the case remains a simple one. In the end, ClearOne's appeal 
raises only four major questions; Dorsey and Strohm's cross-appeal raises one. 
First, ClearOne argues that the district court erred in concluding that Strohm is 
entitled to mandatory indemnification under the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
because ClearOne has a bylaw that prohibits indemnification of directors who did not 
meet a certain standard of conduct. (ClearOne's issue (b) and section III of its argument). 
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This argument baldly ignores the plain language of both the indemnification statute and 
ClearOne's bylaws. The statute only allows a corporation to limit mandatory 
indemnification in its articles of incorporation—not bylaws—and in any case the bylaw 
ClearOne points to explicitly applies to directors, not officers like Strohm. The district 
court correctly concluded Strohm is entitled to mandatory indemnification. 
Second, ClearOne raises a host of issues with the district court's interpretation of 
the Engagement Agreements, seeking by any means possible to retroactively change the 
terms to which it knowingly and voluntarily agreed. (ClearOne's issues (c), (d), and (f), 
and sections IV-VI and IX of its argument). All of these arguments fail for one simple 
reason: The district court held the Agreements were ambiguous, and their interpretation 
is thus a question of fact. The only significant evidence of the parties' intent in entering 
into the Agreements came from ClearOne's own designated 30(b)(6) witness—its former 
CEO Michael Keough, who actually signed the Agreements on behalf of ClearOne— 
evidence ClearOne fails to address in its brief. Keough's testimony stands unrebutted 
and unequivocally establishes that ClearOne knowingly and intentionally agreed to pay 
Strohm's defense fees and costs, fees incurred in enforcing that obligation, and interest. 
ClearOne does not point to a single piece of evidence in the record to contradict these 
facts, and its semantic quibbling and grasping at canons of interpretation are 
consequently irrelevant. Moreover, even if the Court were to entertain ClearOne's 
interpretive arguments, each of them fails on its own terms. The district court correctly 
found the contractual terms by which the parties intended to be bound. 
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Third, unable to controvert the parties intent concerning the scope of the 
Agreements, ClearOne attacks their enforceability. It argues that this Court's prior 
decision in Jones Waldo prohibits Dorsey from recovering its fees as a pro se litigant, that 
Utah public policy prohibits indemnification of Strohm because of her single count of 
conviction, and that the provision for interest on unpaid fees is unenforceable as a matter 
of public policy. (ClearOne's issues (a) and (e), and sections I, II, and VIII of its 
argument). Each of these arguments fails. The indemnification statutes establish no 
policy that would prohibit indemnification of Strohm because they explicitly allow for 
indemnification under some circumstances where a corporate officer or director has not 
met the statutory standard of conduct. Jones Waldo does not apply to this case—as the 
district court properly recognized—most centrally because Dorsey represents a client, 
Susie Strohm (not ClearOne), and is not proceeding solely pro se. Finally, ClearOne 
points to no applicable statute or public policy preventing enforcement of the contractual 
interest provision in a fee agreement, which was entered into knowingly by the parties. 
The district court correctly concluded that the Engagement Agreements were fully 
enforceable as the parties intended. 
Fourth, having raised every conceivable issue with the legal grounds for the 
district court's fee award, ClearOne attacks every imaginable aspect of the award itself, 
contending that the district court abused its discretion by awarding rates higher than 
typical Utah rates, that it improperly allocated fees among claims in the Collection Case, 
and that Dorsey charged excessive hours and expenses. (ClearOne's issues (g), (h), (i), 
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and (j), an<3 sections X and XI of its argument). Again, ClearOne's arguments fails for 
several reasons: When a party challenges a district court's findings of fact on appeal, it 
must "first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that 
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light 
most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 76, 100 P.3d 1177 
(Utah 2004) (citation omitted). CiearOne has utterly ignored that duty, and the Court 
should not entertain its arguments. Even if the Court were to do so, however, there is 
more than ample evidence in the record to support the factual aspects of the district 
court's fee award. 
In their cross-appeal, Dorsey and Strohm raise three points, which essentially 
present a single issue: The district court erred by imposing arbitrary limits on the fee 
award that were not contemplated by the parties' Engagement Agreements. The 
Agreements contained no limitation on the time period for which CiearOne agreed to pay 
Strohm's defense fees, yet the district court declined to award any fees incurred in the 
Criminal Case after February 27, 2009, the date the jury returned its verdict. Similarly, 
the Agreements contained no time limit for recovery of fees incurred in the Collection 
Case, yet the district court arbitrarily cut off all fees incurred in this action after August 
10, 2010. Finally, the district court erroneously declined to award the contractual 18 
percent interest on fees awarded in the Collection Action, as agreed upon by the parties. 
While the district court must evaluate the reasonableness of a fee award, it must do so 
with reference to specific—largely factual—factors, and it cannot ignore or alter the 
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terms of an enforceable fee agreement. In this case the district court properly evaluated 
the reasonableness of the fees it did award, but it erred in arbitrarily limiting fees in 
contravention of the parties'Agreements. 
For the foregoing reasons, Dorsey and Strohm respectfully request that this Court 
affirm the district court's grants of summary judgment, affirm its award of attorneys' 
fees, but remand with instructions to the trial court to (1) award reasonable fees and 
expenses incurred in the Criminal Case after February 27, 2009; (2) award reasonable 
fees and expenses incurred in the Collection Case after August 10, 2010, including fees 
and expenses on this appeal; and (3) apply the contractually-agreed-upon 18 percent 
interest rate to unpaid fees in the Collection Case. 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT STROHM 
IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM CLEARONE UNDER 
THE UTAH REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT. 
(Appellant Argument Issue III). 
ClearOne contends that the district court erred in ordering mandatory 
indemnification under the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act because ClearOne's 
corporate bylaws bar it from indemnifying directors who have not met the standard of 
conduct established by § 902. See App. Br. at 18-20. The Court should reject this 
argument because it relies on misreadings of both the Act and ClearOne's bylaws. 
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A, The Statutory Scheme 
The Utah Revised Business Corporation Act establishes both permissive authority 
for corporations to indemnify officers and directors for litigation expenses, and certain 
circumstances under which they must do so. The policy underlying the indemnification 
statutes (which every state has in one form or another) is 
to promote the desirable end that corporate officials will resist what they 
consider unjustified suits and claims, secure in the knowledge that their 
reasonable expenses will be borne by the corporation they have served if 
they are vindicated, and to encourage capable [men and women] to serve in 
the knowledge that expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty 
and integrity as directors will be borne by the corporation they serve. 
Baker v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 264 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Chamison v. 
Healthtrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 925 n.45 (Del. Ch. 1999)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). To that end, the Act establishes both permissive and mandatory 
indemnification, and also grants courts discretionary authority to order indemnification 
when they deem proper. 
Utah Code Ann. § 902 establishes the outer bounds of permissive indemnification, 
providing that a corporation "may indemnify an individual made a party to a proceeding 
because he is or was a director" if, generally speaking, the director conducted himself in 
good faith and reasonably believed his conduct was lawful and not opposed to the 
corporation's interests. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902(l) (emphasis added). 
Section 903, in contrast, establishes mandatory indemnification, providing that 
Unless limited by its articles of incorporation, a corporation shall 
indemnify a director who was successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the 
defense of any proceeding, or in the defense of any claim, issue, or matter 
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in the proceeding, to which he was a party because he is or was a director of 
the corporation, against reasonable expenses incurred by him in connection 
with the proceeding or claim with respect to which he has been successful. 
Id. § 16-10a-903 (emphasis added). Section 905 establishes the mechanism for 
enforcement of indemnification rights, providing that a director may apply for court-
ordered indemnification, and that the court "shall order indemnification" as well as 
"reasonable expenses incurred to obtain court-ordered indemnification" if the director 
demonstrates entitlement to mandatory indemnification under § 903. Id. § 905(1). 
Section 905(2) establishes separate authority for court-ordered indemnification 
independent of the other statutory standards. It empowers the court, in its discretion, to 
order indemnification if it "determines that the director is fairly and reasonably entitled to 
indemnification in view of all the relevant circumstances, whether or not the director met 
the applicable standard of conduct set forth in Section 16-10a-902." Id. § 905(2). 
Finally, section 907 governs indemnification of officers, as opposed to directors. 
It provides that officers are entitled to mandatory and court-ordered indemnification "in 
each case to the same extent as a director," id. § 16-10a-907(l), and that a corporation 
"may also indemnify . . . an officer . . . who is not a director to a greater extent, if not 
inconsistent with public policy," id. § 907(3). 
Read together, the Act's indemnification provisions create a coherent scheme that 
establishes minimum standards of mandatory indemnification, sets outer limits on 
permissive indemnification, and grants courts discretion to order indemnification where it 
is justified. Consistent with the policy of providing reasonably certain protection to 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
directors and officers, the statutes only allow a corporation to limit mandatory 
indemnification through its articles of incorporation. 
B. ClearOne's Argument Relies On Misreadings of the Act and 
ClearOne's Bylaws. 
ClearOne contends that it is not obligated to indemnify Strohm because of a 
limitation in its bylaws that applies to directors. This argument is based on a plain 
misreading of the Act. Sections 903, 905, and 907 do allow a corporation to limit its duty 
of indemnification, but only by means of a provision in "its articles of incorporation" 
(emphasis added). ClearOne assumes that this plain statutory restriction on corporate 
power is not meaningful. It admits that there is no restriction on mandatory 
indemnification in its Articles of Incorporation. Instead, ClearOne argues for a limitation 
from a more general category of "corporate governance documents." App. Br. at 19. 
But ClearOne has offered no basis to suggest that the statute means anything other 
than what its plain language says. Where the legislature "includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that [the legislature] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion 
or exclusion." Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). In other portions of the 
Act, the Utah Legislature has referenced both "articles of incorporation" and "bylaws." 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-907(3). It is accordingly clear that the Legislature's 
reference solely to "articles of incorporation" in § 903 is meant to exclude other corporate 
governance documents like bylaws. Because ClearOne cannot point to any provision of 
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its articles of incorporation limiting Strohm's right to indemnification, the district court 
did not err in ordering mandatory indemnification.^ 
ClearOne's argument also requires a plain misreading of its own bylaws. The 
bylaw on which ClearOne relies to attempt to limit its duty to indemnify an officer (§5.1) 
by its terms applies only to directors. Section 5.1—not co incidentally entitled 
"Indemnification of Directors"—states: "The corporation shall not indemnify a director 
under this section unless" he meets certain standards. (R.2077, App. Br. at 19) (emphasis 
added). In fact, ClearOne has a separate bylaw that applies specifically to 
indemnification of officers. That bylaw, § 5.3, contains none of the limitations of § 5.1. 
Rather, it tracks the language of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-907, providing that the "board 
of directors may indemnify and advance expenses to any officer . . . who is not a director 
of the corporation to any extent consistent with public policy." (R.2078). Of course, 
Strohm was a ClearOne officer, not a director. 
ClearOne avoids all reference to Bylaw § 5.3 in its brief, nor does it attempt to 
address the statute's exclusive reference to "articles of incorporation." It simply glosses 
over these crucial differences between the treatment of corporate directors and officers. 
The Court should not be misled. By its plain language, the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act does not allow a corporation to limit its duty to indemnify by way of 
bylaws; any such limitation must be in the articles of incorporation. Even if a bylaw 
4 For the same reason, ClearOne cannot rely on a post-hoc resolution by its Board of 
Directors to limit its duty of indemnification. See App. Br. at 20. Only a limitation in 
the articles of incorporation is effective. 
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were enough, ClearOne relies on a bylaw that, by its terms, does not apply to Strohm and 
ignores the relevant bylaw regarding officers, which would allow indemnification. 
Third, even if ClearOne's arguments were otherwise correct (which they are not), 
§ 905(2) of the Act gives the trial court broad residual authority to order indemnification 
when it deems proper, "in view of all the relevant circumstances." Section 905(2) 
provides: 
[I]f the court determines that the director [or officer, in accordance with § 
907,] is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all the 
relevant circumstances, whether or not the director met the applicable 
standard of conduct set forth in Section 16-10a-902 or was adjudged liable 
as described in Subsection 16-10a-902(4), the court may order 
indemnification as the court determines to be proper . . . . 
As the statutory language makes clear, this section grants the district court broad, 
discretionary authority. It specifically sets aside other statutory standards, simply 
directing the court to consider "all the relevant circumstances" and to craft a remedy "as 
the court determines to be proper." The Official Commentary to the Act bolsters this 
view, explaining that "the court has general power to grant indemnification under this 
section." See Addendum B, Official Commentary to the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act 397. 
Because of the discretionary nature of the remedy, an indemnification order under 
section 905(2) should be reviewed for abuse of discretion rather than legal error. See, 
e.g., Ehlinger v. Hauser, 785 N.W. 2d 328, 364 (Wis. 2010) (Prosser, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (applying Wis. Stat. § 180.0854(2)(b), which, like section 
905(2), allows court-ordered indemnification if "the director or officer is fairly and 
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reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all the relevant circumstances"); 
Myakka Valley Ranches Improvement Assoc., Inc. v. Bieschke, 610 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1992) (applying similarly-worded Florida statute). 
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
Strohm was entitled to indemnification. Judge Hilder considered not only the statutory 
standard for mandatory indemnification, but also ClearOne's multiple agreements to pay 
Strohm's attorney's fees. He reviewed clear testimony of the parties' understandings and 
intentions in entering into those agreements, as well as evidence of their subsequent 
course of conduct. He ultimately concluded that in light of Strohm's near-complete 
success in defending against the criminal charges against her, "the indemnification 
statutes for officers, and the engagement agreements," ClearOne had "both a statutory 
responsibility and a contractual obligation it voluntarily incurred" to indemnify Strohm. 
(R.5153). Thus, the district court's indemnification decision ultimately rested on a 
constellation of factors—legal, equitable, and factual—reflecting a sound exercise of 
discretion in light of all relevant circumstances.5 
Accordingly, this Court should decline ClearOne's invitation to reexamine each 
and every aspect of the district court's decision for legal error. ClearOne can point to no 
5 For this reason, this Court can and should review the district court's decision for 
abuse of discretion under section 905(2), even though the court may not have 
explicitly cast its order as arising under that portion of the statute. Cf. Ehlinger, 785 
N.W.2d at 364 (Prosser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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portion of the record showing an abuse of discretion by Judge Hilder, and the Court 
should accordingly affirm. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON DORSEY AND STROHM'S CONTRACT CLAIMS. 
The district court's Judgment was also based on its determination that the 
Engagement Agreements required ClearOne to pay for Strohm's defense in the Criminal 
Case (including reasonable attorneys' fees), and required ClearOne to pay interest on 
unpaid invoices. (R.2967-2968). 
ClearOne attacks these determinations by the district court with a series of 
interpretive and "policy" arguments. Reduced to their essence, these arguments are 
simply that the court erred in its interpretation of the Engagement Agreements, or that the 
Agreements could not be enforced as written. What ClearOne's arguments avoid, 
however, is any discussion of the procedure the trial court followed in granting summary 
judgment, or any discussion of the undisputed evidence presented to the court in 
connection with summary judgment. 
A. The District Court Correctly Determined There Was No Genuine Issue 
of Material Fact About the Intention and Meaning of the Engagement 
Agreements. 
1. ClearOne Offers No Evidence to Demonstrate a Genuine Issue of 
Material Fact. (Appellant Argument Issues IV, V, VI, IX). 
This Court can and should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment 
without delving into the details of ClearOne's interpretive attacks. Early in this case the 
district court determined that the Engagement Agreements were ambiguous as to material 
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matters. (R.2957). Having determined that the Engagement Agreements were 
ambiguous, the court allowed the parties to conduct discovery. After the close of 
discovery, Dorsey and Strohm renewed their motion for summary judgment on the 
Engagement Agreements, and presented undisputed evidence of the parties' intentions 
and understanding of the Agreements. 
The district court's summary judgment order was based on that extrinsic evidence 
of the parties' intent—and because that evidence stood uncontradicted, the district court 
properly granted summary judgment. In arguing before the district court, and this Court, 
ClearOne has largely agreed with the determination that the Engagement Agreements are 
ambiguous. See, e.g., App. Br. at 20-22, 36. ClearOne's "interpretive" attacks on the 
district court's order are based on the unstated assumption that the court should ignore the 
undisputed extrinsic evidence in favor of ClearOne's interpretive principles. This 
approach is clearly contrary to Utah law, as set forth in detail below. In this appeal 
ClearOne does not attack the district court's determination that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact. And, in any event, ClearOne has failed to point to any record 
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could reach a conclusion contrary to the 
district court's, and each of its arguments thus fails as a matter of law. 
As this Court recently reiterated, a "'contract's interpretation may be either a 
question of law, determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, 
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent.'" Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't 
ofTransp., 2011 UT 35, ^ 63, —P.3d™ (Utah 2011) (quoting Kimball v. Campbell, 699 
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P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) (emphasis in Meadow Valley). Contractual interpretation 
becomes a question of fact when the court determines that the contract is ambiguous. See 
id., ]f 64. In this case, the district court concluded that the parties' Agreements were 
facially ambiguous. (R.2957). Consequently, the proper interpretation of the 
Agreements became an issue of fact, and the court correctly turned to extrinsic evidence 
to determine the parties' intent. (R.2960). 
The most crucial evidence was the deposition testimony of Michael Keough— 
ClearOne's CEO at the time both engagement letters were signed and, as the district court 
noted, "the only witness [ClearOne had] identified on the critical engagement agreement 
issues." (R.2958). Keough's testimony was the only evidence probative of ClearOne's 
intent in entering into the engagement agreement with Dorsey. (R.2709). 
Based on Keough's testimony (and other extrinsic evidence offered), the district 
court determined that (1) the two engagement letters formed "one agreement, the latter 
updating and supplementing the former" (R.2964); (2) the Agreements bound ClearOne 
to pay for Strohm's defense in the Criminal Case (R.2967); (3) the Agreements required 
ClearOne to pay 18 percent interest on unpaid fees in the Criminal Case (R.2966); (4) the 
Agreements bound ClearOne to pay attorneys' fees and costs incurred in any action to 
collect unpaid fees (R.2968); and (5) Dorsey and Strohm were entitled to "judgment for 
interest" in the Collection Case. (Id.). 
Because there was no evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to those conclusions, the district court correctly entered summary judgment. 
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See Utah R. Civ. P. 56. This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, Tj 6, 225 P.3d 185 (Utah 2009), examining 
"only whether the district court erred in applying the governing law and whether the 
district court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Salt Lake 
County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, f 14, 234 P.3d 1105 (Utah 2010) (alterations 
omitted).^ Moreover, when a "contract is ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to find 
facts respecting the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then [the 
appellate court's] review is strictly limited." Meadow Valley Contractors, 2011 UT 35, \ 
63 (citation and alteration omitted). In attacking the district court's decision, ClearOne 
bears the burden of pointing to record evidence sufficient to raise material issues of fact. 
See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1078 (Utah 1997) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment because of appellant's "utter failure . . . to 
demonstrate the existence of any genuine issues of material fact"); see also Hamilton v. 
Parkdale Care Ctr.f Inc., 904 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("When challenging 
a trial court's grant of summary judgment . . . the moving party bears the burden of (1) 
identifying the disputed issue(s) of fact; and (2) demonstrating how such facts are 
material.). ClearOne has completely failed to carry that burden. 
6 Whether the engagement agreement is ambiguous is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness, Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ^ 10, 182 P.3d 326 (Utah 
2008), but ClearOne does not take issue with the district court's conclusion on this 
point. In fact, ClearOne argues extensively that the agreement is ambiguous; it 
simply criticizes the district court's resolution of that ambiguity. See, e.g., 
Appellant's Br. at 20-22. 
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ClearOne argues, for example, that the Engagement Agreements should be 
construed against Dorsey, see App. Br. at 21, and contends that the district court ignored 
the putative plain meaning of certain terms in the letters, such as "litigation" {id. at 22) 
and "updated" {id. at 26). Arguments such as these wholly miss the mark because the 
district court's grant of summary judgment was based on factual evidence of the parties' 
intent, not its own legal interpretation of the Agreements' language. See Meadow Valley 
Contractors, 2011 UT 35, ^ f 63. At no point in attacking the district court's interpretation 
of the Agreements does ClearOne confront the explicit, unrebutted testimony of Michael 
Keough—the sole evidence of ClearOne's understanding and intent in entering into the 
Engagement Agreements with Dorsey and Strohm. Because ClearOne has failed to raise 
any genuine issue of material fact, this Court should affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
2. ClearOne's Interpretive Arguments Fail. (Appellant Argument 
Issues IV, VI, IX) 
Even if the Court countenances ClearOne's various arguments about the correct 
interpretation of the parties' Agreements—notwithstanding that they fail to raise any 
issue of material fact—each of ClearOne's arguments fails on its own terms. 
a) The Agreements Should Not Be Construed Against Dorsey.. 
ClearOne contends that the district court erred in concluding the Engagement 
Agreements included Strohm's criminal proceedings because the engagement letters 
should have been construed against their attorney-draftsman. See App. Br. at 20-23. The 
district court considered and rejected this precise argument in the proceedings below, 
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(R.2959), and rightly so, as it is squarely foreclosed by the decisions of this Court. In 
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, the Court explained: 
"If [a] contract is ambiguous, we seek to resolve the ambiguity by looking to extrinsic 
evidence of the parties' intent. If extrinsic evidence does not resolve the ambiguity and 
uncertainty remains, only then will we resolve the ambiguity against the drafter." 2011 
UT 35, ^  64, 69 (emphasis in original) (citing cases). Because the district court was able 
to resolve the ambiguity in the engagement letters based on extrinsic evidence, it properly 
declined to employ the "last resort" device of construing the agreement against Dorsey. 
Express Recovery Servs. Inc. v. Rice, 2005 UT App 495, f 3 n.l, 125 P.3d 108 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2005)7 
b) The District Court Correctly Determined that the Two 
Engagement Letters Formed a Single Agreement. 
ClearOne argues that the district court "conclusorily ruled" that the 2004 
Engagement Agreement (the Dorsey engagement letter) incorporated the terms of the 
earlier 2003 Engagement Agreement (the Bendinger letter), including the provisions for 
attorneys' fees and interest. It contends that the district court ignored the true meaning of 
7 To the extent they are inconsistent with the clear principle set forth in Meadow Valley, 
the earlier cases on which ClearOne relies cannot control. In any event, they are 
distinguishable. In Phillips v. Smith, while the Court recited the principle that 
contracts are strictly construed against the drafter, it never employed that principle to 
resolve an ambiguity in the contract; it simply reached an interpretation as a matter of 
law. See 768 P.2d 449, 451-52 (Utah 1989). In Ellsworth v. Am. Arbitration Assoc, 
2006 UT 77, 148 P.3d 983 (Utah 2006), the issue was not interpretation of the terms 
of an agreement, but whether the party against whom the contract was to be enforced 
had assented to it at all. See id. at f 13. The Court's decision ultimately turned on the 
fact that there was no evidence of intent. See id. at ^ 13, 17-18. 
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the word "update," App. Br. at 26, and that the 2004 Engagement Agreement was not 
sufficiently clear because "[n]o recipient of the Dorsey engagement letter would 
reasonably understand . . . what terms actually governed Dorsey's representation." App. 
Br. at 25. The primary failing of these arguments is that Michael Keough—the actual 
recipient of the Dorsey letter, who signed it on behalf of ClearOne as its CEO, and wrhom 
ClearOne designated as its most knowledgeable corporate representative to testify on this 
issue—explicitly testified that he understood it to incorporate the material provisions of 
the 2003 Agreement: 
Q: So when Mr. Marsden is stating in the first paragraph in [the 2004 
Engagement Agreement], where he says, "The rest of this letter is intended 
to serve as the update," did you understand that the purpose of the [2004 
Engagement Agreement] was to sort of amend or update certain terms of 
[the 2003 Agreement] and leave the rest unchanged? 
A: Yes. 
* # # # 
Q: I'll rephrase it. Did you then consider [the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement] and [the 2004 Engagement Agreement] to be essentially 
combined as one agreement [the 2004 Agreement] merely updating [the 
2003 Agreement]? 
A: Yes. I think "update" is the correct word. 
* * * * 
Q: Okay. And so terms that were not changed or modified in [the 2004 
Agreement] would remain terms in [the 2003 Agreement] that ClearOne 
agreed to, going forward still with Mr. Marsden representing Susie Strohm. 
Would that be fair? 
[Objection omitted] 
A. That would have been my expectation, yes. 
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(R.2730); (see also R.2730-31). Because the Agreements were ambiguous, the district 
court properly relied on this evidence to discern the parties' intent. ClearOne's semantic 
arguments seek to ignore their own witness' testimony and are irrelevant. 
c) The Terms of the Agreements Did Not Allow ClearOne to 
Terminate Dorsey's Representation of Strohm. 
ClearOne argues that it terminated its obligation to pay Dorsey's fees in November 
2009 by instructing Dorsey to withdraw from its representation of Strohm. As the district 
court properly concluded, however, the terms of the Engagement Agreements did not 
grant ClearOne the power of unilateral termination. 
First, ClearOne contends that the district court's interpretation improperly assigns 
two different meanings to the word "your." ClearOne argues that if "your" refers to 
Strohm and ClearOne in the phrase "your engagement of Dorsey & Whitney," (R.0047) 
then it must also refer to both parties when it says "we will withdraw from representation 
upon your request." (R.0048); see App. Br. 33-34. This argument fails by its own logic. 
If, as ClearOne contends, "your" means both ClearOne and Strohm, then both parties 
must request that Dorsey withdraw in order for the request to be effective. Strohm has 
never made any such request. 
More fundamentally, ClearOne's argument ignores the context and the evident 
meaning of the Agreements construed as a whole. In interpreting a contract, the Court's 
paramount purpose is of course to ascertain the parties' intent, and in doing so it must 
"consider each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward 
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giving effect to all and ignoring none." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f 
17, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) (alteration in original). Read as a whole, the Engagement 
Agreements make clear that the power to terminate rested with the client, Strohm, alone. 
The 2004 Agreement explicitly states that Dorsey would "represent Susie Strohm" and 
that "ClearOne understands and accepts that all [Dorsey's] professional responsibilities 
under applicable law are owed solely to Strohm." (R.0047-48). ClearOne simply agreed 
to be "jointly and severally responsible for payment of all amounts billed." (R.0048). 
Thus, as Judge Hilder correctly concluded, it is "crystal clear from the [2004] letter that 
Dorsey represented Susie Strohm, and ClearOne's role was as third-party payor for those 
services." (R.5151). 
Furthermore, as the district court noted, under ClearOne's reading the 2004 
Dorsey letter violates the Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility. Such constructions 
are to be avoided. See Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 199 (Utah 2000). Allowing 
ClearOne power to force Dorsey to withdraw from representing Strohm would violate 
Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.16(b)8 It would also violate Rule 1.8(f), which provides that an 
attorney cannot accept compensation for representing a client from a third party unless 
"there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with 
the client-lawyer relationship." 
8
 See R.5151 (stating that under Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.16(b), "Dorsey was probably not 
ethically permitted to withdraw given the status of the case without leave of Court"). 
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ClearOne's only response to this concern is to assert that it "never suggested . . . 
that it could force a severing of the attorney-client relationship between Strohm and 
Dorsey." App. Br. at 33. But that is exactly what ClearOne demanded. ClearOne wrote: 
"ClearOne requests that you withdraw from any further representation under the Dorsey 
Engagement Letter immediately." (R. 4872). The district court properly concluded that 
ClearOne lacked the power to unilaterally terminate the attorney-client relationship in 
this way. 
ClearOne also complains that, unless it is allowed to terminate its obligations 
unilaterally, it will be at Strohm's mercy, as she will continue the fight in the Criminal 
Case endlessly: through rehearing, petitions for certiorari, and so on. Of course, this 
concern is belied by Strohm's actual conduct, particularly her decision not to seek further 
appeals from her conviction. 
Moreover, to the extent the Court is concerned about the parties' incentives, 
ClearOne's are significantly more troubling than Strohm's. Throughout this litigation, 
ClearOne has made plain its erroneous view that anything less than a complete acquittal 
of Strohm relieves it of any statutory or contractual liability for her defense. In light of 
this, it is no wonder that ClearOne would repudiate its contractual obligations, in the hope 
of damaging Strohm's ability to exonerate herself. The Court should not enable it to do 
so by adopting an untenable interpretation of the Engagement Agreements.^ 
9 ClearOne also argues that the agreement must be read as granting it the power to 
unilaterally terminate because the engagement letter must be strictly construed against 
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B. The District Court Correctly Concluded the Agreements are 
Enforceable (Appellant Argument Issues I, II, VIII). 
ClearOne argues on appeal, just as it did before the district court, that various 
terms of the parties' agreement are unenforceable for reasons of public policy. First, it 
contends that Dorsey cannot recover fees attributable to its efforts to collect the fees 
owed under the Engagement Agreements because Utah public policy prohibits recovery 
of fees by a pro se litigant. It then argues that Utah public policy prohibits use of 
corporate funds to indemnify Strohm for fees attributable to her perjury conviction. 
Finally, it argues that an 18 percent interest rate in an attorney fee agreement is 
unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. Each of these arguments fails for the reasons 
set forth below. 
1. Jones Waldo Does not Prohibit Recovery of Dorsey's Fees. 
ClearOne contends that its obligation to pay Dorsey's fees incurred in enforcing 
the Engagement Agreements is not enforceable under this Court's decision in Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996). ClearOne is 
mistaken. As the district court correctly recognized, several crucial factors distinguish 
this case, and Jones Waldo accordingly does not control. 
Dorsey. As set forth in Part II.A.2.a above, however, ClearOne misstates the law on 
this point. The Court only construes a contract against its drafter if ambiguity cannot 
be resolved by extrinsic evidence of intent. See Meadow Valley Contractors, 2011 
UT 35, Tf| 64, 69. In this case the district court did not rule that the withdrawal term 
was ambiguous, see R. 5150-5151, but even if it had done so, ClearOne has pointed to 
no extrinsic evidence supporting its interpretation. 
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In Jones Waldo the plaintiff law firm had represented the defendant in a divorce 
proceeding. Shaw, the attorney who handled the case, had initially told Dawson, his 
client, that his fees would total approximately $15,000-$ 18,000. Id. at 1368. By the time 
of trial, however, he had billed her for $33,901 and she had fallen behind in her 
payments. Id. at 1369. When Dawson's ex-husband appealed from the divorce 
judgment, Shaw ran up another $12,586 in fees, filed an attorney's lien on Dawson's 
house and alimony payments, then withdrew from representation for nonpayment. Id. 
When Dawson hired substitute counsel, Shaw refused to transfer her file "as a lien 
against her unpaid fees." Id. The Jones, Waldo firm then sued Dawson to recover its 
fees (which well exceeded the value of the recovery it had obtained for her in the 
underlying action), as well as fees and costs incurred in the collection action. See id. at 
1368-69. 
Taking account of these "disturbing" circumstances, id. at 1375, this Court held 
that the Jones, Waldo firm could not recover its attorney's fees as a litigant representing 
itself in a collection action against its own client. The decision rested on several factors: 
(1) the "general rule that pro se litigants should not recover attorney fees," id. at 1374; (2) 
a concern over incentivizing litigation, id. at 1375; and (3) the "most serious" concern 
that a pro se litigant has no incentive to limit the fees it incurs in a collection action, see 
id 
As this Court has subsequently made clear, however, Jones Waldo and the case on 
which it primarily relied, Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992), do not establish 
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a "blanket prohibition of attorney fee awards to pro se litigants." Softsolutions, Inc. v. 
Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, f t 42, 44, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000). Instead, 
Utah courts are required to consider the facts and circumstances of each case in light of 
the underlying policy concerns to determine whether the rule applies. See Softsolutions, 
2000 UT 46, f 44 (distinguishing Jones Waldo). As Judge Hilder correctly recognized, 
several key facts and considerations distinguish this case, rendering the rule of Jones 
Waldo inapplicable. 
Most importantly, Dorsey is not solely proceeding pro se. Dorsey represents a 
client in this case, Susie Strohm, and the primary purpose of its representation is, and 
always has been, to vindicate her rights. The Complaints in this action (and this appeal) 
involve several claims that are Strohm's alone. Moreover, the claim for collection costs 
under the Engagement Agreement is in all relevant respects Strohm's claim as much as it 
is Dorsey's. Although ClearOne is the third-party payor, who agreed to be primarily 
liable for payment under the Agreements, Strohm is "jointly and severally responsible" 
for unpaid fees, including those incurred in the collection action. (R0043, 48). 
Accordingly, in seeking its fees from ClearOne, Dorsey is also representing the interests 
of its client. In contrast, each of the lawyer-litigants in Batchelor and Jones Waldo 
represented only his own interests. See Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 469; Jones Waldo, 923 
P.2d at 1369. The distinction is material for two major reasons. 
First, because Dorsey represents Strohm in this case and not ClearOne, the policy 
concerns underlying the Court's decision in Jones Waldo are largely ameliorated. Dorsey 
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is not operating without client control, and there are meaningful constraints on the scope 
and goals of its representation. Cf Jones Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375. And, because Dorsey 
is acting in furtherance of Strohm's rights under the engagement agreement, it cannot be 
said that it is pursuing litigation "as a way to generate fees rather than to vindicate 
personal claims." Id. These factors establish natural and meaningful limits on Dorsey's 
fees. 
Indeed, application of the Jones Waldo rule in this case would have an effect 
precisely opposite the one intended—it would promote duplication of legal work and 
increases in legal fees. Dorsey attorneys are positioned to most efficiently pursue 
Strohm's claims in action because they are familiar with the underlying facts and 
proceedings. If Dorsey cannot at the same time pursue its parallel claims, pro se, it 
would be encouraged to retain its own outside counsel to do so. The fees of Dorsey's 
outside counsel would then be recoverable, but the total fees incurred would be 
multiplied. One of the central concerns articulated in Jones Waldo—the "incentive to 
limit the total fee"—thus supports recovery of fees in this case. 923 P.2d at 1375. 
Second, as this Court clarified in Softsolutions, the crucial element on which the 
rule of Jones Waldo turns is whether the pro se litigant "incurs" attorney's fees. In 
Batchelor and Jones Waldo, the Court explained, "neither the law firm nor the attorney-
litigant actually paid or became liable to pay consideration in exchange for legal 
representation and thus did not incur attorney fees in the action." Softsolutions, 2000 UT 
46, U 43. In this case, however, Strohm is jointly and severally liable along with 
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ClearOne, and she will "bec[o]me liable to pay" Dorsey's fees to the extent Dorsey is 
unable to collect from ClearOne. Id. Thus, Strohm has "incurred" attorney's fees in the 
collection action and she is accordingly entitled to recover them in accordance with the 
terms of the Engagement Agreements and the rule of Softsolutions. See 2000 UT 46, f 
44, 46.1 0 
There is another crucial distinction between this case and Jones Waldo. In Jones 
Waldo, the plaintiff law firm was suing its own unsophisticated client, after encumbering 
virtually all of her available assets and retaining her file. See 923 P.2d at 1368-69. The 
Court was therefore concerned to avoid enhancing the law firm's advantage over its 
client even further. See id. at 1374. No such concerns are present here. Dorsey is not 
suing its own client and has no unfair advantage over ClearOne—a large, well-funded 
public company with entire teams of its own lawyers. None of the material 
considerations underlying the decision in Jones Waldo is present here, and there is 
accordingly no reason to extend the rule of Jones Waldo to this case. 
2. Strohm's Conviction Does Not Prohibit Enforcement of the 
Dorsey Engagement Agreement. 
ClearOne insists that Utah public policy requires that it be freed of its knowing 
and voluntary contractual obligation to pay Dorsey's fees because Strohm was convicted 
10 Indeed, the Revised Business Corporations Act recognizes that officers and directors 
ordinarily incur fees and costs in seeking indemnification, which is why Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10-905(1) mandates that such expenses be awarded when a director or 
officer succeeds in obtaining court-ordered indemnification. 
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of one count of perjury. See App. Br. 14-17. It bases this argument on Utah Code Ann. § 
16- 10a-902, which provides: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4), a corporation may indemnify an 
individual made a party to a proceeding because he is or was a director, 
against liability incurred in the proceeding if: 
(a) his conduct was in good faith; and 
(b) he reasonably believed that his conduct was in, or not opposed to, the 
corporation's best interests; and 
(c) in the case of any criminal proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to 
believe his conduct was unlawful." 
ClearOne contends that it is "literally without authority" to indemnify an officer who 
does not satisfy this standard of conduct. App. Br. 16 (emphasis in original). It claims 
that Strohm's perjury conviction necessarily means she did not meet the statutory 
standard of conduct, and public policy prohibits enforcement of its agreement to pay her 
attorney's fees. For several simple reasons, ClearOne's self-serving reading of the statute 
cannot be adopted. 
First, and most obviously, § 902 applies by its terms to directors, not officers. As 
an officer, Strohm's claim is governed by § 907, not § 902. Section 907 does indeed link 
indemnification of officers with that of directors, but it explicitly establishes broader 
authority for indemnification of officers without reference to statutory standards of 
conduct. Section 907(3) provides that—in contrast with indemnification of directors—a 
"corporation may . . . indemnify and advance expenses to an officer . . . who is not a 
director to a greater extent, if not inconsistent with public policy, and if provided for by 
its articles of incorporation, bylaws, general or specific action of its board of directors, or 
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contract." (emphasis added). The Official Commentary to § 907 removes any doubt 
about the intended meaning of this provision: 
Section 907(3) authorizes indemnification for officers, employees, 
fiduciaries and agents who are not directors, but neither requires nor 
prescribes standards for their indemnification and expressly states that 
their indemnification may be broader than the right of indemnification 
granted to directors. 
Addendum B, Official Commentary 398 (emphasis added). The district court properly 
relied on the statutory language and the Official Commentary to conclude that "there is ... 
no absolute public policy bar to ClearOne's indemnification or reimbursement of Susie 
Strohm's fees." (R.5152). 
ClearOne makes no reference to § 907(3) or the Official Commentary in this 
appeal, nor does it criticize the district court's reliance on those sources. Instead, it 
simply inserts the phrase "or officer" into its quotation from § 902 and asserts that the 
statute applies to Strohm, once again attempting to rely on sleight of hand to make out its 
statutory argument. See App. Br. 14. The district court correctly rejected this argument 
below, and this Court should do so as well. 
Second, even if § 902 did directly apply here, ClearOne's argument would still fail 
because it failed to show that Strohm did not meet the statutory standard of conduct. 
ClearOne argues in essence that Strohm failed to meet the standard of conduct by 
definition, simply because she was convicted of perjury. But again, ClearOne omits from 
its discussion a crucial portion of the statute. Section 902(3) provides: "The termination 
of a proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo 
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contendere or its equivalent is not, of itself, determinative that the director did not meet 
the standard of conduct described in this section."! 1 ClearOne must accordingly point to 
some affirmative evidence beyond the mere judgment of conviction that would establish 
Strohm's lack of good faith. It has utterly failed to do so. ClearOne now offers nothing 
but a bare assertion that Strohm acted in bad faith, and its argument must fail 
Moreover, even if it were determined that Strohm did not meet the statutory 
standard of conduct, it would not render unenforceable ClearOne's agreement to pay her 
attorney's fees. Section 902 cannot be interpreted as establishing an absolute public 
policy against indemnification whenever the statutory standard is not met, because 
another section of the statute—§ 905(2)—explicitly authorizes indemnification "whether 
or not the director met the applicable standard of conduct." It follows that public policy 
allows indemnification in at least some cases where the director has not met the statutory 
standard of conduct. 
Finally, independent—and very clear—public policy counsels against the rule 
ClearOne advocates. If accepted, ClearOne's argument would establish a contingent fee 
arrangement for criminal representation, which is strictly prohibited by Utah R. Prof. 
Cond. 1.5(d)(2). 
11 Again, the Official Commentary removes any doubt about the intention behind the 
statutory language: "The purpose of section 902(3) is to reject the argument that 
indemnification is automatically improper whenever a proceeding has been 
terminated on a basis that does not exonerate the director claiming indemnification." 
Addendum B, Official Commentary 396. 
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Even if Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902 applied to Strohm—which it does not— 
ClearOne has failed to establish that Strohm did not meet the statute's standard of 
conduct. And even if it had done so, the statute does not establish any public policy that 
excuses ClearOne from its contractual obligations. The Court should accordingly affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
3- The Agreed-Upon Interest Rate of 18% Is Enforceable. 
Finally, ClearOne argues that the Engagement Agreements' provision for 18 
percent interest on unpaid fees cannot be enforced as a matter of public policy because it 
is unreasonable under Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.5. ClearOne is mistaken. Rule 1.5 does not 
authorize the courts to rewrite attorney fee agreements. 
The reasonableness of attorneys' fees under Rule 1.5 is committed to the "broad 
discretion" of the trial court and reviewed for abuse of that discretion. See Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). In this case the district court made a 
reasonableness determination, which ClearOne has also attacked at length, and which is 
discussed in detail below. 
Whether the interest provision of the Agreements is enforceable, on the other 
hand, is a separate question of contract law. As this Court has made clear, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, parties may contract freely and will be bound by the terms 
upon which they voluntarily agree. It "is not for the courts to assume the paternalistic 
role of declaring that one who has freely bound himself need not perform because the 
bargain is not favorable." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983). 
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This principle applies with equal force to attorney fee agreements. See Dixie State Bank, 
764 P.2d at 988; see also Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded in 
accordance with the terms of that contract [and] such an award is a matter of legal right.") 
(citing id). 
It bears emphasis that ClearOne does not argue that the interest provision is 
unconscionable. 12 Absent such an argument, there is no basis for a court to alter the 
Agreements, and indeed, ClearOne cites no authority for its contention that Utah R. Prof. 
Cond. 1.5 allows the district court to delete a provision from a fee agreement. Nor could 
it, for this Court has steadily reiterated that "[i]f a contract provides for attorney fees, the 
award 'is allowed only in accordance with the terms of the contract.'" Softsolutions, 
2000 UT 46, H 41.13 
With respect to contractual interest provisions, Utah has no usury law, and parties 
may agree to any rate. See, e.g., Lewis, 2010 UT App 40,1f 3 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 
12 Unconscionability is a question separate from reasonableness under Rule 1.5. See, 
e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360-61 (Utah 1996) (discussing unconscionability 
inquiry). ClearOne did argue in the proceedings below that the interest provision was 
unconscionable, and the district court correctly rejected that argument. (R. 5160-61). 
ClearOne has not pursued its unconscionability argument on appeal, and that issue is 
accordingly not before the Court. 
13 The courts certainly police attorney fee agreements with additional sensitivity, 
particularly in order to ensure that the unique dynamics of the attorney-client 
relationship do not generate an unfair advantage over the client. In this case, of 
course, ClearOne is not Dorsey's client, but a sophisticated, well-funded, and fully 
represented corporate entity. 
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15-1-1(1)). As the district court noted, "18% interest is an extremely common interest 
rate in collection matters in the state of Utah," and "much higher rates are charged and 
enforced on a daily basis." (R.5161). More importantly, ClearOne knowingly and 
voluntarily agreed to pay 18 percent interest on Dorsey's unpaid fees. Michael Keough 
testified unequivocally that when he signed the 2004 Engagement Agreement on behalf 
of ClearOne, he understood that "any invoices that were sent by Marsden at his new firm, 
Dorsey & Whitney, that remained unpaid after 30 days would bear interest at a rate of 18 
percent per annum from the date billed until paid." (R.2731). 
While the overall reasonableness of Dorsey's fees is subject to inquiry, the district 
court correctly recognized that the interest term in the Engagement Agreements was an 
enforceable contractual provision, as the parties intended it to be. (R.2966, 5160-61). 
Consequently, the district court was right to award 18 percent interest on unpaid fees 
incurred in the Criminal Case. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
CALCULATING ITS REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARD. 
Once the district court found that ClearOne had legal obligations to indemnify 
Strohm under both the Act's indemnification provisions and the Engagement 
Agreements, the court turned to calculating a reasonable award of those attorney's fees 
and costs. (R.5162). ClearOne now challenges that calculation on appeal by arguing that 
Dorsey's fees were (1) excessive in the Criminal Case, and (2) not properly tailored in the 
Collection Case. (App. Br. at 37, 43). ClearOne's arguments fail, however, because 
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ClearOne failed to properly marshal the evidence supporting these factual findings, and, 
the district court's findings are well-reasoned and supported by the evidence. 
A. ClearOne Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence Regarding the 
District Court's Factual Findings. 
ClearOne's appeal on the reasonableness of the fee award fails to marshal the 
evidence, and therefore all factual findings made by the district court must be accepted as 
true. As stated above, in order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact, a party must 
"marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence." Mountain States Broadcasting, 783 P.2d at 553 (internal 
quotations omitted). The marshaling requirement is "rigorous and strict," Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 79 (2004), a "heavy burden" that "appellants often overlook or 
disregard." Mountain States Broadcasting, 783 P.2d at 553. When the duty to marshal is 
not properly discharged, appellate courts refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the 
findings, and accept the factual findings as valid. Id. at 553-54 (listing cases). Following 
this Court's guidance, the Utah Court of Appeals has noted that a challenge to a fee 
award must marshal the evidence, as a trial court's determination that an attorney's fee 
award is reasonable "is necessarily dependent on the underlying facts and circumstances 
involved." See Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361,1f 46, 246 P.3d 
131,146-47. 
In ClearOne's challenge to the Criminal Case fee award, ClearOne only cites to 
two paragraphs of Dorsey's declarations, makes an irrelevant observation about Snow 
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Christensen's work, and refers broadly to its own expert's declaration. (App. Br. at 40, 
42). In calculating the fees for the Criminal Case, however, the district court relied on a 
far broader range of evidence: the complexity of the Criminal Case, the nature and 
amount of work needed, and an evaluation of the skill and experience of the lawyers 
involved compared to similarly-skilled Salt Lake City lawyers, and it further examined 
the time descriptions submitted by Dorsey. (R.5166-69, 5171 -72). These findings were 
based on multiple, detailed declarations and supporting documents submitted with 
Dorsey's Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, (see R.3151 (Declaration 
of William Michael Jr., summarizing experience of attorneys and work performed in the 
Criminal Case); see also R.2975, 3151, 3384, 3407, 3417, 3629), evidence that ClearOne 
not only fails to marshal, but totally misconstrues by citing only two broad paragraphs 
from Dorsey's expert declarations. (App. Br. at 40). ClearOne's argumentative 
assertions are in no way a recitation of the evidence that was "in support of the findings," 
and therefore ClearOne cannot now challenge the district court's findings on the merits. 
B. The District Court's Calculation of Attorney's Fees is Supported by the 
Evidence. (Appellant Argument Issue X). 
Even though ClearOne's challenges to the reasonableness of the fee awards 
necessarily fail because of ClearOne's failure to marshal the evidence, those challenges 
also fail because the district court's decision on these items is supported by ample 
evidence. The "trial court has 'broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and [appellate courts] will consider that determination against an abuse-
of-discretion standard.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (quoting 
50 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
Dixie State Bank 764 P.2dat 991. Under an abuse-of discretion standard, atrial court's * 
ruling will not be reversed unless the ruling "was beyond the limits of reasonability." 
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,^21, 190 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2008) (quoting Jensen v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, f 57, 82 P.3d 1076) (Utah 2003). 
1. The reasonableness of the Criminal Case fee award is supported 
by the evidence. 
• , i 
ClearOne challenges the reasonableness of the district court's Criminal Case fee 
award for reasons including: (1) certain lawyers' rates were set too high; (2) unnecessary 
travel expenses were required for the counsel retained; and (3) excessive hours were 
spent on the Criminal Case. However, the evidence fully supports the district court's 
decisions with regard to these issues, which are well within the "limits of reasonability," 
and should therefore be affirmed by this Court. 
Regarding the appropriateness of the billing rates set for each lawyer, Judge Hilder 
made a detailed inquiry into the experience level of the lawyers at issue, finding, for 
example, that William Michael's "skill, experience—and results in this case— 
persuasively place him in the upper echelon of criminal lawyers handling complex 
securities matters." (R.5166-67; see R.4926).14 The court then determined Michael's 
14 ClearOne erroneously argues that the district court determined that Marsden's rate 
would, "except in unusual circumstances . . . be the highest rate." (App. Br. at 38). 
However, the court's discussion at that point is not making findings regarding 
reasonable attorneys' fees, but is simply citing certain provisions from the Bendinger 
and Dorsey letters. In fact, the court expressly states that its citation to those 
provisions "is for the sole purpose of putting the parties on notice that a reasonable 
fee determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court." (R. 2965-66). 
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rate for purposes of its fee award by reference to what a Salt Lake City lawyer with 
comparable experience would charge, and also relied upon expert evidence to confirm the 
appropriateness of that rate. (R.5167; see R.5359) Considering that Judge Hilder 
undertook a similarly detailed analysis for each lawyer, the district court was well within 
the bounds of its discretion in determining the billing rates as it did. See Blum v. Stenson, 
465 U.S. 886,895 n.l 1 (1984) (stating that reasonable rates are rates "in line with those 
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 
skill, experience and reputation."). This is especially true in light of ClearOne's failure to 
acknowledge its own reliance on New York Counsel in this case. (R.5359). 
Neither did the district court abuse its discretion in determining the appropriate 
amounts of travel expenses for which Dorsey would be reimbursed. (See R.6169-71). 
Judge Hilder found that choosing a Minneapolis-based lawyer was within the 
arrangement contemplated by the Engagement Letters, again noting that Strohm's lead 
counsel, William Michael, was "eminently qualified for the task, and the results speak for 
themselves." (R 5170). However, Judge Hilder made a "reasonable accommodation" of 
ClearOne's concerns by limiting full travel reimbursement to those travel times that 
included preparation, reducing other travel time. 
Finally, the district court carefully examined the necessity of the work for which 
Dorsey requested reimbursement. (R.5163). The district court found that Dorsey's hours 
were higher than those of Snow Christensen (who represented Strohm's co-defendant) 
because the Joint Defense Agreement allowed Dorsey to utilize its resources and share its 
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work product with Snow Christensen, which not only resulted in justifiably higher hours 
by Dorsey, but resulted in a division of labor that in fact saved ClearOne money by 
avoiding the otherwise necessary duplication that would occur. (See R.5163-64; 4928-
30). The district court also looked at the complexity and seriousness of the work done, 
and the "overall excellent result." (R.5163). All of these findings were well-supported 
by the declarations and underlying documentation in the record. (See R.2975, 3151, 
3384, 3407, 3417, 3629, 4999). Further, it cannot be argued, in comparison with defense 
costs in similar litigation, that the charges at issue fall outside "limits of reasonability."15 
2. The reasonableness of the Collection Case fee award is 
supported by the evidence. (Appellant Argument Issue XI). 
ClearOne also challenges the reasonableness of the district court's fee award in the 
Collection Case, but again, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and its 
determination should not be reversed. ClearOne argues that certain fees awarded 
stemmed from work on claims in the Collection Case that the Plaintiffs have not yet won 
on summary judgment (i.e., claims based on the ETA and equity). (See Appellant's Br. 
at 43). However, the district court specifically found that, although the basis of its award 
was limited to the engagement agreements and statutory indemnification provisions, the 
court needed to construe Strohm's ETA to properly rule on intent behind and the 
15 See e.g., Sun-Times Media Group, Inc. v. Black, 954 A.2d 380, 385 (Del.Ch. 2008) 
(four corporate officers incurred $60 million defending charges of mail and wire 
fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice, racketeering, and tax violations); In 
re Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, 2008 WL 5413097, at * 1 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2008) (CFO incurred legal fees and expenses of approximately $12 million in 
securities fraud investigation and prosecution). 
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applicability of the agreements and indemnification provisions. (See R.5174). Further, 
the work on the equitable theories at issue was "closely interrelated with the work done 
regarding the successful theories including, specifically, discovery." (R.1575). Finally, 
the district court did reduce the amount of fees by five percent, to account for work that 
went toward the equitable claims. {Id.) 
ClearOne once again sets forth only argumentative assertions that it already 
argued below, failing to marshal any of the evidence that supports the district court's 
ruling. (See App. Br. at 45-50). The record, however, well supports the district court's 
conclusion that discovery concerning the ETA claim, the equitable claims, the 
Engagement Agreements claim, and the statutory indemnification claim are interrelated 
and involve common issues. For example, extrinsic evidence was gathered related to 
whether some payments had been made voluntarily on those Agreements, which not only 
shed light on the scope of the Agreements, but was also directly tied to several of the 
equitable claims, including unjust enrichment and estoppel. (See R.2052).16 Similarly, 
in the district court's March 2, 2010 Order, the signed ETA was held to be an integral 
component of establishing that ClearOne understood the scope of the retainer agreement 
16 ClearOne's argument that the application of the Voluntary Payment Rule was in error 
is similarly unfounded and insupportable. (See App. Br. at 31). ClearOne has not 
(and cannot) identify anything that forced or compelled ClearOne to voluntarily pay 
the fees. ClearOne does not dispute that it received invoices from Dorsey, reviewed 
them, negotiated reductions, and paid fees through March 2008, but instead simply 
argues that this should be accounted for in the reasonableness award and the district 
court erred in failing to do so. (See R.5158). However, under an abuse of discretion 
standard, such unsupported arguments cannot sustain a challenge to a reasoned award. 
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in the Criminal Case, which had direct bearing on the court's indemnification findings. 
(R.2962-63). 
ClearOne tries to argue that only two depositions and no discovery documents 
were relevant to the Engagement Agreement claims, (App. Br. at 46-48), but the evidence 
does not support this assertion. ClearOne's board members testified about their lack of 
knowledge of the Engagement Agreements in their depositions, making Keough's 
testimony all the more relevant and important on those Agreements. (See, e.g., R.5004 
(Baldwin Dep.; Hendricks Dep.)). Similarly, ClearOne's prior counsel, Jefferson Gross, 
testified that the "related proceedings" defined in the ETA included the Criminal Case, an 
issue parallel to finding the meaning of the Engagement Agreements. {Id. (Gross Dep. at 
33-38, 43-45)). The interrelated nature of all of the claims and discovery done on behalf 
of those claims cannot be disputed, and the district court consequently did not abuse its 
discretion in its Collection Case fee award. 
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ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SETTING LIMITATIONS ON THE 
FEES TO WHICH DORSEY WAS CONTRACTUALLY ENTITLED. 
Overall, as described above, the district court's analysis and rulings in this case 
were well-reasoned and well-supported by both the facts and legal authority at issue. 
Dorsey brings its cross-appeal only because, after holding that the scope of the 
Engagement Agreements contractually obligated ClearOne to pay Strohm's fees and 
costs, the district court made three errors in interpreting the terms of the Engagement 
Agreements that cannot be harmonized with that holding, and therefore require reversal. 
In granting summary judgment on Dorsey and Strohm's claims under the 
Engagement Agreements, the court ruled that: 
[T]he two letters of January 29, 2003 and March 31, 2004, 
together form an enforceable contract, providing an alternative 
basis to require defendant ClearOne Communications to pay 
Susie Strohm's reasonable legal fees incurred in her defense of 
the federal criminal proceedings.... 
(R.2967-68). In its order on Dorsey and Strohm's fee petition, however, the court ruled 
that "from the date of [the] jury verdict [forward,] ClearOne shall not be held liable, at 
this time, to pay Strohm's fees and expenses in the criminal case post-February 27, 2009, 
all of which must be attributed to the perjury count." (R.5154). The district court also 
"expressly impose[d] August 10, 2010," as the last date for which Plaintiffs could seek to 
recover fees and costs in the Collection Case. (R.5176). In that same January 24, 2011 
order, the district court stated that the 18 percent prejudgment interest provided for under 
Strohm's contractual agreements with ClearOne could be charged for those fees awarded 
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in the Criminal Case, but could not be charged for those fees awarded in the Collection 
Case. (R.5178). 
Dorsey and Strohm now appeal the time limitations set in reimbursement of both 
the Criminal Case and Collection Case, and the district court's refusal to allow interest on 
those fees awarded in the Collection Case. These three issues, as will be further detailed 
below, involve the district court's interpretation df specific terms of the Engagement 
Agreements, which had already been found to invoke ClearOne's contractual obligation 
to pay attorneys' fees and costs. Once attorneys' fees are found to be contractually 
provided, those fees must be awarded "only in accordance with the terms of the contract." 
Softsolutions, Inc., 2000 UT 46,141; see also Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, fflf 13-
17, 38 P.3d 1001, 1004-06 (2002) (stating that courts interpreting contractual terms 
providing for attorneys' fees must give effect to the terms of the contract). ClearOne has 
never argued, nor has the district court ever found, that the actual payment terms under 
the Engagement Agreements are ambiguous, only the applicable scope of those 
Agreements. Thus, once the district court had determined that the Agreements provided 
for fees, it was bound by the terms of the contract in interpreting to what extent those fees 
were due, an interpretation this Court reviews for correctness. See Meadowbrook, LLC v. 
Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998) ("We review a trial court's conclusions of law 
[regarding attorney fees] for correctness, granting no deference to the trial judge's legal 
determinations."); see also Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const, Inc., 1999 UT 69, f 6, 983 P. 
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2d 575, 577-78 (finding that interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness). 
A, The District Court Erred in Limiting the Reimbursement of Dorsey's 
Fees in the Criminal Case until only February 27, 2009. 
The applicable provisions of the 2003 Engagement Agreement provide that 
Marsden was engaged "to represent Susie Strohm's interests in connection with the SEC 
civil complaint.. . and in connection with further related investigations and litigation." 
(R.0042-43). The 2004 Engagement Agreement updated the earlier one, again providing 
that Dorsey was engaged "to represent Susie Strohm in connection with the SEC civil 
complaint, referenced above, and in connection with further related investigations and 
litigation." (R.0047-48). 
Once the district court determined that Dorsey was entitled to fees under the 
Engagement Letters, it could not change the contract terms to then limit those fees by 
time or based on the success of that representation. After the district court correctly 
found that the Engagement Agreements created an enforceable contract that required 
ClearOne to reimburse Dorsey for its fees, it then decided, without reference to any term 
of the Agreements, that February 27, 2009—the date of the jury verdict—would be the 
last date for which Dorsey and Strohm could recover fees. This was an abuse of 
discretion. Nothing in the plain language of the Agreements refers to a limitation for 
reimbursement on only those claims on which Strohm was successful. Dorsey's 
representation of Strohm in her Criminal Case extended until November 8, 2011, when 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the perjury conviction and Strohm elected 
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not to seek further review. Accordingly, all such fees must be reimbursed under the 
Engagement Letters. 1 ^  
B. The District Court Erred by Arbitrarily Limiting the Fee Award for 
Those Fees Incurred in the Collection Action. 
As stated above, once a contract is found to provide for attorneys' fees, Utah 
courts must award attorneys' fees according to the terms of that contract. See 
Softsolutions, Inc., 2000 UT 46, \ 41; Chase, 2001 UT App 404, Iffi 13-17. This includes 
in a collection action, when the contract so provides, and Utah courts have held that such 
collection fees can extend up through even an appeal similar to this, as long as such fees 
are requested by the party. See Chase, 2001 UT App 404, ^ 17 n.5. 
The Engagement Agreements provide that Dorsey would be entitled to recover 
"all reasonable costs expended in connection with collecting amounts due under this 
Agreement, including reasonable attorneys' fees." (R.0043). The district court, however, 
imposed the arbitrary date of August 10, 2010, as the end date for collecting fees in the 
Collection Case because it was the date of the last services billed before argument on the 
motions decided by its January 24, 2011 Order. (R.5176). The district court did so 
17 Significant work was done after the jury verdict on February 27, 2009, not only on the 
Tenth Circuit appeal, but also in post-trial motions and Strohm's highly-contested 
sentencing, all of which occurred before the federal district court. The importance of 
this work is highlighted by the fact that the government sought 60 months 
incarceration for Strohm based on her perjury conviction, but, through Dorsey's work 
in the sentencing phase, Strohm was only sentenced to probation and community 
service. (R.3166-67). 
59 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because "the ever accruing charges must stop at some point," having also expressed that 
it was troubled by the "overall costs of this litigation." (R.5175-76). 
Once the district court determined that Dorsey was entitled to fees under the 
Engagement Letters, it could not set an arbitrary time limitation on the contract terms. 
Such a limitation was not within the district court's purview once it had concluded that 
the Engagement Agreements compelled ClearOne to pay Dorsey's fees incurred in the 
Collection Action. The district court can properly limit the fees—as it did in this case— 
but it must do so according to specific, generally factual, factors, e.g., the reasonable of 
the rates and the necessity of work. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988), The district court did not rely on such factors in setting this arbitrary date 
limitation, and cannot be allowed to so insert itself into the parties' contract. To hold 
otherwise would encourage ClearOne in this case, and other non-prevailing parties in 
future cases, to drag out litigation and appeals to burden the prevailing party, forcing 
undeserved settlements and keeping those parties from payments to which they have been 
ruled to be entitled. Dorsey therefore requests all reasonable fees it has occurred in the 
Collection Case, up until and through the current appeal. 
C. The District Court Erred by Failing to Apply the Contractual Interest 
Term to the Collection Action From the Start of that Action. 
Finally, the Engagement Agreements provide that any amount due to Dorsey, 
which remains unpaid thirty days after it is billed, will "accrue interest at the rate of 18% 
per annum from the date billed until paid." (R.42). The district court correctly held that 
this provision was enforceable and applied it to the fees awarded in the Criminal Case. 
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Although earlier the district court had held that "Plaintiffs are also entitled to judgment 
for interest and fees incurred in seeking to recover under the [engagement] agreements." 
(R.2968), the district court arbitrarily refused to apply the interest provision to the fees 
incurred in the Collection Case, however, and thus abused its discretion. (R.5180). 
When prejudgment interest is provided for under a contract, that interest should be 
calculated for all money owed on that contract, from the date it becomes due until the 
date it is paid or an offer of judgment is made. See, e.g., State Drywall v. Rhodes Design 
& Dev., 127 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Nev. 2006). If that is not the rule, non-prevailing parties to 
such a contract again are incentivized to delay litigation and their payment on collection 
case fee awards, as the value of that payment continues to decrease with the further 
passage of time (as has happened throughout the litigation here). See id. 
In this case the district court's refusal to award interest in the Collection Case at 
the agreed-upon rate of 18 percent cannot be squared with its other holdings under the 
Agreements. The district court properly recognized that the Engagement Agreements 
obligated ClearOne to pay attorneys' fees incurred in seeking unpaid fees. (R.2968). It 
held that Dorsey and Strohm were entitled to interest on fees in the Collection Case. 
(R.2968). And it held that the 18 percent interest provision applied to amounts owed but 
unpaid under the Engagement Agreements, and was fully enforceable. (R.2966). 18 
Eighteen percent was the only interest rate upon which the parties had agreed. Once the 
18 As stated, under Utah law, "parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the 
subject of their contract." Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1). 
61 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
district court determined that Dorsey and Strohm were entitled to interest under the 
Engagement Agreements, it could not change the contract terms to then limit that interest 
to only the Criminal Case. The district court abused its discretion by arbitrarily declining 
to award the agreed-upon interest for fees incurred in the Collection Case. 
V, CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Dorsey and Strohm respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects, except for its rulings 
limiting (1) reimbursement in the Criminal Case until only February 27, 2009; (2) 
reimbursement in the Collection Case until only August 10, 2010; and (3) collection of 
the contractual 18 percent interest to the Criminal Case fee award. With respect to those 
limited issues only, Dorsey and Strohm requests that the Court reverse the district court's 
findings and remand the case to the district court for recalculation of a fee award in 
accordance with the parties' governing Agreements. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of January, 2012. 
DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP 
/ l / ; ^ 
Milo Steven Marsden 
Cameron M. Hancock 
William Michael Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees Susie 
Strohm and Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 16-10a-902 Page 1 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 16. Corporations 
^Chapter 10 A. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act I 
*1 Part 9. Indemnification 
-•-+ § 16-10a-902. Authority to indemnify directors 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4), a corporation may indemnify an individual made a party to a proceeding 
because he is or was a director, against liability incurred in the proceeding if: 
(a) his conduct was in good faith; and 
(b) he reasonably believed that his conduct was in, or not opposed to, the corporation's best interests; and 
(c) in the case of any criminal proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. 
(2) A director's conduct with respect to any employee benefit plan for a purpose he reasonably believed to be in or 
not opposed to the interests of the participants in and beneficiaries of the plan is conduct that satisfies the require-
ment of Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) The termination of a proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or 
its equivalent is not, of itself, determinative that the director did not meet the standard of conduct described in this 
section. 
(4) A corporation may not indemnify a director under this section: 
(a) in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation in which the director was adjudged liable 
to the corporation; or 
(b) in connection with any other proceeding charging that the director derived an improper personal benefit, 
whether or not involving action in his official capacity, in which proceeding he was adjudged liable on the basis 
that he derived an improper personal benefit. 
(5) Indemnification permitted under this section in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation 
is limited to reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding. 
CREDIT(S) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Agricultural cooperative associations, equivalent powers and rights, see § 3-1-13.4. . • 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Corporations €=>308(1). 
Westlaw Topic No. 101. 
C.J.S. Corporations §§ 577 to 579, 625 to 626, 628, 632. 
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Current through 2011 Third Special Session. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 16-10a-903 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 16. Corporations 
*il Chapter 10A. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
*H Part 9. Indemnification i 
• * ^ § 16-10a-903. Mandatory indemnification of directors 
Unless limited by its articles of incorporation, a corporation shall indemnify a director who was successful, on the 
merits or otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding, or in the defense of any claim, issue, or matter in the proceed-
ing, to which he was a party because he is or was a director of the corporation, against reasonable expenses incurred 
by him in connection with the proceeding or claim with respect to which he has been successful. 
CREDIT(S) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Agricultural cooperative associations, equivalent powers and rights, see § 3-1-13.4. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Corporations €=>308(1). 
Westlaw Topic No. 101. 
C.J.S. Corporations §§ 577 to 579, 625 to 626, 628, 632. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-10a-903, UT ST § 16-10a-903 
Current through 2011 Third Special Session. 
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 16. Corporations 
*li Chapter 1QA. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
*H Part 9. Indemnification 
-fr-* § 16-10a-905. Court-ordered indemnification of directors 
Unless a corporation's articles of incorporation provide otherwise, a director of the corporation who is or was a party 
to a proceeding may apply for indemnification to the court conducting the proceeding or to another court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. On receipt of an application, the court, after giving any notice the court considers necessary, may 
order indemnification in the following manner: 
(1) if the court determines that the director is entitled to mandatory indemnification under Section 16-10a-903, the 
court shall order indemnification, in which case the court shall also order the corporation to pay the director's rea-
sonable expenses incurred to obtain court-ordered indemnification; and 
(2) if the court determines that the director is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all the rele-
vant circumstances, whether or not the director met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in Section 16-10a-
902 or was adjudged liable as described in Subsection 16-10a-902(4), the court may order indemnification as the 
court determines to be proper, except that the indemnification with respect to any proceeding in which liability has 




Agricultural cooperative associations, equivalent powers and rights, see § 3-1-13.4. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Corporations ©=*308(1). 
Westlaw Topic No. 101. 
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< 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 16. Corporations 
*li Chapter 10A. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
*H Part 9. Indemnification I 
• * ^ § 16-10a-907. Indemnification of officers, employees, fiduciaries, and agents 
Unless a corporation's articles of incorporation provide otherwise: 
(1) an officer of the corporation is entitled to mandatory indemnification under Section 16-10a-903, and is entitled to 
apply for court-ordered indemnification under Section 16-10a-905, in each case to the same extent as a director; 
(2) the corporation may indemnify and advance expenses to an officer, employee, fiduciary, or agent of the corpora-
tion to the same extent as to a director; and 
(3) a corporation may also indemnify and advance expenses to an officer, employee, fiduciary, or agent who is not a 
director to a greater extent, if not inconsistent with public policy, and if provided for by its articles of incorporation, 
bylaws, general or specific action of its board of directors, or contract. 
CREDIT(S) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Agricultural cooperative associations, equivalent powers and rights, see § 3-1-13.4. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Corporations ©=>308(1). 
Westlaw Topic No. 101. 
C.J.S. Corporations §§ 577 to 579, 625 to 626, 628, 632. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-10a-907, UT ST § 16-10a-907 
Current through 2011 Third Special Session.
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PREPARED BY THE UTAH BUSINESS ACT REVISION COMMITTEE OF THE 
BUSINESS LAW SECTION OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Introductory Note 
The Utah Revised Business Corporation Act adopted in 1992 (the "Revised Act") replaces 
the Utah Business Corporation Act originally enacted in 1961 (the "Prior Act"). The drafting of 
the Revised Act for initial presentation to the Utah legislature was accomplished through the 
efforts of the Utah Business Corporation Act Revision Committee (the "Committee") established 
through the Business Law Section of the Utah State Bar, in cooperation with Representative 
Nancy Lyon and the Legislative Research and General Counsel's Office. The Revised Act 
follows generally the 1984 Revised Business Corporation Act, as subsequently modified (the 
"Model Act"), adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Business Law Section of the 
American Bar Association. In preparing the Revised Act, the Committee modified various 
Model Act provisions to address concerns and issues raised by Committee members, to retain 
certain Prior Act provisions considered to be appropriate, to incorporate statutory provisions that 
have been proposed in Colorado and adopted in other states, and to respond to comments 
received by interested Utah companies and individuals. 
The Model Act is accompanied by Official Comments that were considered, approved and 
adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws. We believe that such a commentary can be 
helpful to business persons and legal practitioners trying to understand, interpret and comply 
with the provisions of the Revised Act, and the availability of such a commentary was a 
motivating factor in enacting a corporations code based on the Model Act. Accordingly, the 
commentary to the Model Act has been reproduced, revised and adapted for use with the Revised 
Act. This action has been taken with the consent of Prentice Hall Law & Business, the publisher 
of the Model Act and related Official Comments. Since the following commentary has been 
revised from the form of Official Comments published with the Model Act, in order to address 
matters of interest to Utah practitioners and to reflect significant changes made from the Model 
Act and the Prior Act, this Committee takes full responsibility for the form and content of the 
commentary. Neither the ABA Committee on Corporate Law, nor the publisher of the Model Act 
and the associated Official Commentary has reviewed or approved the following commentary. 
This commentary is intended to provide an explanation of the meaning, purpose, application 
and historical development of referenced sections of the Revised Act. It also describes some of 
the substantive decisions made in the drafting of the Revised Act and highlights certain 
differences between the Model Act, the Revised Act and the Prior Act. The Utah legislature has 
endorsed the use of this commentary as an aid in understanding and interpreting the Revised Act, 
and directed that it be published as a companion to the Revised Act. 
The numbers set forth below correspond to the sections of the Revised Act to which the 
comments relate. 
As the Revised Act was put into bill form by the Legislative Research and General Counsel's 
office, a number of minor modifications were made so that the statutory language would be more 
consistent with the statutory format and organizational and grammatical constructions preferred 
by that office. These changes were not intended to modify the substantive meaning of the 
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affected provisions of the Revised Act. Accordingly, a person comparing the language of the 
Revised Act to the language of the Model Act should not assume that any minor wording or 
grammatical differences were intended to modify the meaning of the statute. The types of 
changes made by the Legislative Research and General Counsel's office include the elimination 
of subheadings, the removal of parenthesis, deletion of uses of the word "such," and changing of 
references to the words "shall," "may" and "will". Many of the language changes that were 
intended to affect the statutory meaning are identified in the following commentary. 
Part 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A Short Title, Definitions and Powers of Division 
B Filing Documents 
The sections of Part 1 have been rearranged from the order in which they appear in the 
Model Act. We have also omitted a provision intended to give the legislature the power to 
amend or repeal all or part of the Revised Act. That provision was determined to be unnecessary, 
as the Utah Constitution includes a provision mandating the reservation of power to amend or 
modify corporate statutes (Utah Const. Art. XII, Section 1). For this reason, similar statutory 
language found in earlier versions of the Model Act was left out of the Prior Act. We understand 
there is currently an effort in progress to update and simplify the provisions of the Utah 
Constitution relating to corporations. If the above-referenced language is deleted from the Utah 
Constitution, appropriate language should be added to the Revised Act to clarify the legislature's 
ability to amend or modify the Revised Act from time to time. 
Subpart A. 
Short Title, Definitions and Powers of Division 
§ 101. Short Title 
§ 102. Definitions 
§103. Notice 
§ 104. Powers of Division 
§ 120. Filing Requirements 
§ 121. Forms 
§122. Fees for Filing and Related Services 
§123. Effective Time and Date of Filed Documents 
§ 124. Correcting Filed Document 
§ 125. Filing Duty of Division 
§ 126. Appeal from Division's Refusal to File a Document 
§ 127. Evidentiary Effect of Copy of Filed Document 
§ 128. Certificates Issued by Division 
§ 129. Penalty for Signing False Documents 
The index and headings of the Model Act are divided into Chapters and Subchapters. For 
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review administrative actions. 
§ 902. Authority to Indemnify Directors 
z. Section 902(1). 
The standards for indemnification of directors contained in this part define the outer limits 
for which voluntary indemnification is permitted under the Revised Act. Conduct which does not 
meet these standards is not eligible for voluntary indemnification under the Revised Act, 
although court-ordered indemnification may be available under section 905(2). Conduct that falls 
within these outer limits does not automatically entitle directors to indemnification, although 
many corporations have adopted or may adopt bylaw provisions that obligate the corporation to 
indemnify directors to the maximum extent permitted by statute. Absent such a bylaw provision, 
section 903 defines a much narrower area in which the directors are entitled as a matter of right 
to indemnification. 
Some state statutes provide separate, but usually similarly worded, standards for 
indemnification in third-party suits and indemnification in suits brought by or in the name of the 
corporation. The Revised Act establishes a single uniform test to make clear that the outer limits 
of conduct for which indemnification is permitted should not be dependent on the type of 
proceeding in which the claim arises. To prevent circularity in recovery, however, section 902(5) 
limits indemnification in connection with suits brought by or in the name of the corporation to 
expenses incurred and excludes amounts paid to settle or satisfy substantive claims. 
The standards of conduct described in sections 902(1) — that a director's conduct in his or her 
official capacity be in "good faith" and in or not opposed to the corporation's "best interests" -
are closely related to the basic standards of conduct imposed by section 840, but the two sets of 
standards are not identical. No attempt is made to define "good faith," a term used in both section 
840 and section 902. The concept of good faith involves a subjective test, which would include 
"a mistake of judgment," in the words of the commentary to section 840, even though made 
unwisely by objective standards. But the affirmative requirement of section 840 — that the care 
of "an ordinarily prudent person in a like position" be exercised — is not included in the standard 
of conduct for indemnification. While section 840 requires that the director have a reasonable 
belief that his or her conduct is in the best interests of the corporation, section 902 requires that 
the director have a reasonable belief that the conduct is "in or not opposed to" the best interests 
of the corporation. Section 902 also requires in the case of any criminal proceedings, that the 
director have no reasonable cause to believe the conduct was unlawful. Because of the 
differences in the two sets of standards, it is possible that a director who has not acted "with the 
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances," 
as required by section 840, could nevertheless be indemnified if the standard of section 902 were 
met. As a corollary, it is clear that a director who has met the section 840 standards of conduct 
would be eligible in virtually every case to be indemnified under section 902. 
The Model Act standard for indemnification requires that in the case of conduct in an official 
capacity, the director must reasonably believe his or her conduct to be in the best interests of the 
corporation. The Revised Act requires only a reasonable belief that the conduct be "in or not 
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opposed to" such interests, preserving the general standard applicable under the Prior Act. 
b. Section 902(2). 
This section makes clear that a director who is serving as a trustee or fiduciary for an 
employee benefit plan under ERISA meets the standard for indemnification under section 902(1) 
if the director reasonably believes the conduct was in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
participants in and beneficiaries of the plan. This standard is a specific application of the more 
general test that conduct not in official corporate capacity is indemnifiable if it is "at least not 
opposed to" the best interests of the corporation. 
c. Section 902(3). 
The purpose of section 902(3) is to reject the argument that indemnification is automatically 
improper whenever a proceeding has been terminated on a basis that does not exonerate the 
director claiming indemnification. Even though a final judgment or conviction is not 
automatically determinative of the issue whether the minimum standard of conduct was met, any 
judicial determination of substantive liability would in most instances be entitled to considerable 
weight. By the same token, it is clear that the termination of a proceeding by settlement or plea 
of nolo contendere should not of itself create a presumption either that conduct met or did not 
meet the standard of section 902. On the other hand, a final determination of nonliability or 
acquittal automatically entitles the director to indemnification of expenses under section 903. 
Section 902(3) applies to indemnification expenses in derivative actions as well as to 
indemnification in third party suits. The most likely application of this subsection to derivative 
actions will be to settlements since a judgment or order would normally result in liability to the 
corporation and thereby preclude all indemnification under section 902(4). In the rare event that 
a judgment or order entered against the director did not include a determination of liability to the 
corporation, the entry of the judgment or order would not be determinative that the director 
failed to meet the requisite standard of conduct. 
d. Section 902(4). 
This subsection makes clear that indemnification is not permissible under section 902 in the 
face of a finding of improper conduct either because liability is imposed in favor of the 
corporation in a suit brought by or in its name or because there is a finding that the director 
improperly received a personal benefit as a result of his conduct. Indemnification under this 
subsection is prohibited if a director is adjudged liable in a derivative suit because it is believed 
that there should be no indemnification in this situation unless a court first finds it proper. 
Section 905 permits a director found liable to the corporation to petition a court for a judicial 
determination of entitlement to indemnification. Voluntary indemnification is also prohibited if 
there has been an adjudication that a director improperly received a personal benefit, even if, for 
example, the director acted in a manner not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. 
Improper use of inside information for personal benefit should not be an action for which the 
corporation may provide indemnification, even if the corporation was not thereby harmed. 
Although it is unlikely that a person found liable for receiving an improper personal benefit 
would be found to have met the statutory standard of conduct set forth in section 902(1 )(b) this 
limitation is made explicit in section 902(4)(b). Recourse to a court under section 905 may also 
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be appropriate in some improper benefit cases for example, where it would be unfair for a small 
personal benefit to foreclose indemnification in an expensive and complicated matter, 
e. Section 902(5). 
This subsection limits indemnification in suits brought by or in the right of the corporation to 
reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding. Its purpose is to avoid 
circularity that would be involved if a corporation seeks to indemnify a director for payments 
made in settlement by the director to the corporation. This subsection applies only to settlements 
(or the rare event that a judgment or order entered against a director does not include a 
determination of liability) since all indemnification is prohibited by section 902(4)(a) - subject 
to the right to seek judicially approved indemnification under section 905 -- in cases where a 
director is "adjudged" liable to the corporation. 
§ 903. Mandatory Indemnification 
Section 902 determines whether indemnification may be made voluntarily by a corporation if 
it elects to do so. Section 903 determines whether a corporation must indemnify a director for his 
or her expenses; in other words, section 903 creates a statutory right of indemnification in favor 
of the director who meets the requirements of that section. Enforcement of this right by judicial 
proceeding is specifically contemplated by section 905, which also gives the director a statutory 
right to recover expenses incurred in enforcing the statutory right to indemnification under 
section 903. 
The basic standard for mandatory indemnification is that the director has been "successful., 
on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding, or in the defense of any claim, 
issue, or matter in the proceeding. . . ." This provision has been modified from the Model Act 
language to preserve a director's right to indemnification, as was available under the Prior Act, 
against expenses and fees incurred in connection with the successful defense of any claim, issue 
or matter in any proceeding to which the director was a party by reason of being a director of the 
corporation. The Model Act language provides for mandatory indemnification only if the 
director is "wholly" successful in the defense of an entire proceeding. Thus the Model Act would 
not entitle a director to partial mandatory indemnification if the director succeeded to obtain a 
dismissal of some but not all counts of an indictment. Under the Model Act language, a 
defendant would be "wholly successful" only if the entire proceeding were disposed of on a basis 
involving a finding of nonliability. Both the Model Act and the Revised Act retain the language 
of earlier versions of the Model Act and of many other state statutes (including the Prior Act) 
that the basis of success may be "on the merits or otherwise." While this standard may result in 
defendants becoming entitled to indemnification because of procedural defenses not related to 
the merits - e.g., the statute of limitations or disqualification of the plaintiff, it is unreasonable to 
require a defendant with a valid procedural defense to undergo a possibly prolonged and 
expensive trial on the merits in order to establish eligibility for mandatory indemnification. 
§ 904. Advance of Expenses for Directors 
It is often critically important to a director who is made a party to a complex proceeding that 
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the corporation have power to make advances for expenses at the beginning of and during the 
proceeding. Adequate legal representation and adequate preparation of a defense may require 
substantial payments of expenses before a final determination, and unless the corporation may 
make advances for expenses, a defendant may be unable to finance the defense. This problem is 
complicated by reason or the fact that during the early stages of a proceeding (when advances are 
often needed) the facts underlying the claim cannot be fully evaluated and the board of directors 
therefore cannot accurately ascertain the ultimate propriety of indemnification. 
Section 904 establishes a workable standard: indemnification is permitted if the facts then 
known to those making the determination do not establish that indemnification would be 
precluded under section 902. The directors (or special legal counsel) making the determination 
under section 904(3) would normally communicate with counsel and the person or persons 
monitoring the matter for the corporation in order to gain familiarity with the status of the 
proceeding and the relevant facts that have emerged, but it is not required (or expected) that any 
form of independent investigation be undertaken for purposes of the determination. Thus, an 
advance may be made under section 904 unless it becomes clear, from the facts at hand, that 
indemnification under section 902 cannot be provided. As additional facts become known, a 
different determination may be required. 
This section is a compromise between the view of some that advances should be made 
automatically at the claimant's request and at any time before the litigation is terminated and the 
view of others that a special investigation should be made before each advance. 
In addition to the requirement that the facts then known to those acting on the request for an 
advance do not preclude indemnification, section 904(1) requires a written affirmation of the 
director's good faith belief that the director has met the standard of conduct necessary for 
indemnification by the corporation and a written undertaking by or on behalf of the director to 
repay the advance if it is ultimately determined that the director has not met the standard of 
conduct. Under section 904(2), the undertaking need not be secured and financial ability to repay 
is not a prerequisite. The theory underlying this subsection is that, in advancing expenses, 
wealthy directors should not be favored over directors whose financial resources are modest. 
The limitations of section 904 apply only to persons who are directors at the time the 
advance is made. Thus the corporation may advance the expenses of former directors without 
obtaining the undertaking otherwise required by section 904(l)(a) or (b).. 
§ 905. Court-Ordered Indemnification of Directors 
Section 905 permits court-ordered indemnification in two situations: (1) a director entitled to 
mandatory indemnification may enforce that entitlement by judicial proceeding; and (2) a 
director who claims to be fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all the 
circumstances may request the court to order appropriate indemnification. In either case, the 
court must satisfy itself that the person seeking indemnification is properly entitled to it. 
A corporation may limit the right of a director under section 905 by a provision in its articles 
of incorporation. In the absence of such a provision, however, the court has general power to 
grant indemnification under this section. 
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§ 906. Determination and Authorization of Indemnification of Directors 
Section 906 provides the method for determining whether a corporation should voluntarily 
indemnify directors under section 902. In this section a distinction is made between a 
"determination" and an "authorization." A "determination" involves a decision whether under the 
circumstances of the particular case the person seeking indemnification has met the requisite 
standard of conduct under section 902 and is therefore eligible for indemnification. This decision 
may be made by the persons or groups described in section 906(2). In addition to a favorable 
"determination," the corporation must "authorize" indemnification and advance of expenses. The 
authorization would be based on a review and evaluation of the reasonableness of expenses, the 
financial ability of the corporation to make the payment, and the judgment whether limited 
financial resources should be devoted to this or some other use by the corporation. Of course, if 
the bylaws require indemnification to the extent permitted by statute, authorization will already 
exist. Except in this case, section 906(4) provides that "authorization" of indemnification may be 
made only by the board of directors, by a committee of the board, or by the shareholders. While 
special legal counsel may make the "determination" of eligibility for indemnification, such 
counsel may not "authorize" the indemnification. 
Section 906(2) establishes a procedure for selecting the person or persons who will make the 
determination of eligibility for indemnification. Even though directors who are parties to the 
proceeding may not participate in the decision determining eligibility for indemnification, they 
may, if necessary to permit valid action by the board of directors, participate in the decision 
establishing a committee of independent directors or selecting special legal counsel. Directors 
who are parties may also participate in the decision to "authorize" indemnification on the basis 
of a favorable "determination" if necessary to permit action by the board of directors. This 
limited participation of interested directors in the decision is justified by a principle of necessity. 
Legal counsel authorized to make the required determination is referred to as "special legal 
counsel." In earlier versions of the Model Act, and in the statutes of many states, such counsel is 
referred to as "independent" legal counsel. The word "special" is felt to be more descriptive of 
the role to be performed and is not intended to indicate that the counsel selected should not be 
independent in accordance with governing legal precepts. "Special legal counsel" should 
normally be counsel having no prior professional relationship with those seeking 
indemnification, should be retained for the specific occasion, and should not be either inside 
counsel or regular outside counsel. It is important that the selection process be sufficiently 
flexible to permit selection of counsel in light of the particular circumstances and so that 
unnecessary expense may be avoided. Hence the phrase "special legal counsel" is not defined in 
the statute. 
Determinations by shareholders rather than by directors or special counsel are permitted by 
section 906(2)(d), but shares owned by or voted under the control of directors seeking 
indemnification may not be voted on the determination of eligibility for indemnification. This 
does not affect rules governing the determination of a quorum at the meeting. 
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i 
§ 907. Indemnification of Officers, Employees, Fiduciaries and Agents 
Section 907 correlates the general legal principles relating to the indemnification of officers, 
employees, fiduciaries and agents of the corporation with the limitations on indemnification in 
part 9. This correlation may be summarized in general terms as follows: 
(1) Part 9 (except for section 907 and to the extent 907 grants indemnification rights to 
officers, agents, fiduciaries and employees, consistent with the rights granted to directors in 
sections 903 and 905) applies only to, and limits the indemnification of, directors. 
(2) An officer, agent, fiduciary or employee of a corporation who is not a director may be 
indemnified by the corporation on a discretionary basis to the same extent as though such person 
were a director, and, in addition, may have additional indemnification rights apart from part 9. 
(Section 907(2) and (3).) 
(3) A director who is also an officer, employee, fiduciary or agent of the corporation is 
limited to indemnification rights under part 9 and is therefore treated the same way as other 
directors. (Section 907(3) by negative inference.) Such an officer/director is limited to the rights 
arising under part 9 even though such person is sued solely in the capacity as an officer. 
(4) An officer of the corporation (but not employees, fiduciaries or agents generally) who is 
not a director has the mandatory right of indemnification granted to directors under section 903 
and the right to apply for court-ordered indemnification under section 905. 
a. Officers, Employees, Fiduciaries or Agents Who Are Not Directors. 
Section 907(3) authorizes indemnification for officers, employees, fiduciaries and agents 
who are not directors, but neither requires nor prescribes standards for their indemnification and 
expressly states that their indemnification may be broader than the right of indemnification 
granted to directors by this part. The rights of employees, fiduciaries or agents may derive from 
principles of agency, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or collective bargaining or other 
contractual agreement, rather than from the statute. Indemnification of employees, fiduciaries or 
agents may appropriately protect the person indemnified from liabilities incurred while serving 
at the corporation's request as a director, officer, partner, trustee, or agent of another commercial, 
charitable, or nonprofit enterprise. See the definition of "director" in section 901. But 
indemnification under section 907(3) must ultimately be "consistent with law." In effect, this 
leaves public policy determinations as to what are permissible limits, in a particular case, to the 
courts. For example, in Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d 418,423 (9th Cir. 1961), the court allowed 
indemnification of an officer and an employee, both of whom pleaded nolo contendere to an 
antitrust indictment at the corporation's request, the court reasoning that they had foregone their 
personal right to defend for the corporation's benefit. On the other hand, the court indicated in 
dictum that an agreement in advance by the corporation to indemnify anyone convicted of 
antitrust violations would be against public policy. 
The broad grant of indemnification in section 907(3) may be limited by appropriate 
provisions in the articles of incorporation. 
b. Directors Who Are Also Officers, Employees, Fiduciaries or Agents. 
Section 907 provides that officers, employees, fiduciaries or agents who are also directors are 
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subject to the same standards of indemnification as other directors. Consideration was given to 
whether these officer-directors, if acting in their capacity as an officer but not as a director, 
should have the benefit of the additional flexibility afforded by section 907(3) for officers who 
are not directors. It was concluded, however, that all directors should be treated alike; 
complications may be created if directors who are not officers have potentially less protection 
under the statute than directors who are officers. It would also be difficult in many instances to 
distinguish in what capacity an officer-director is acting. Finally, this part offers sufficient 
flexibility in indemnifying directors so that, as a practical matter, foreseeable problems for 
officer-directors can be handled within the statutory framework, 
c. Officers Who Are Not Directors. 
Section 907(1) grants nondirector officers the same mandatory rights to indemnification 
under section 903 (or to petition a court for indemnification under section 905) as are granted 
directors. Thus, the net effect of section 907 is to provide officers with no less protection than is 
provided directors (including protection for service to third parties at the request of the 
corporation) and, additionally, to permit the corporation to provide broader indemnification for 
officers who are not directors, 
§ 908.Insurance 
Section 908 authorizes a corporation to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of 
directors, officers, employees, fiduciaries or agents against liabilities imposed on them by reason 
of actions in their official capacity or arising from their service to the corporation or another 
entity at the corporation's request. Insurance is not limited to claims against which corporations 
are entitled to indemnify under this part. This insurance, usually referred to as "D&O Liability 
Insurance," provides a useful supplement to the rights of indemnification created by this part 
providing a source of reimbursement for corporations who indemnify directors and others for 
conduct covered by the insurance, and protecting the insureds against the corporation's failure to 
pay indemnification required or permitted by this part. On the other hand, policies do not cover 
uninsurable events like self-dealing, bad faith, knowing violations of the securities acts, or other 
willful misconduct. See generally Johnston, "Corporate Indemnification and Liability 
Insurance," 33 BUS. LAW. 1993 (1978); Hinsey, "The New Lloyd's Policy Form for Directors 
and Officers' Liability Insurance Analysis," 33 BUS. LAW. 1961 (1978). 
§ 909. Limitations on Indemnification of Directors 
Section 909(1) provides that a provision treating the indemnification of directors by the 
corporation in articles of incorporation, bylaws, shareholders' or directors' resolution, or contract 
(other than an insurance policy) "is valid only if and to the extent the provision is not 
inconsistent with" this part. Earlier versions of the Model Act and the statutes of many states 
provided that the statutory provisions were not "exclusive" and made no attempt to limit the 
nonstatutory creation of rights of indemnification. This kind of language Is subject to 
misconstruction, however, since nonstatutory conceptions of public policy limit the power of a 
corporation to indemnify or to contract to indemnify directors, officers, employees, or agents. 
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The language of the first sentence of section 909(1), "to the extent the provision is not 
inconsistent with this part 9," is believed to be a more accurate description of the limited validity 
of nonstatutory indemnification provisions than the "nonexclusive" provisions of earlier versions 
of the Model Act. It is important to recognize that "to the extent the provision is not inconsistent 
with" is not synonymous with "exclusive." Situations may well develop from time to time in ( 
which indemnification is permissible under section 909 but would be precluded if all portions of 
part 9 were viewed as exclusive. But indemnification provisions protecting against the 
consequences of bad faith or willful misconduct are not consistent with this part and would not 
be valid. Furthermore, they would violate well-understood principles of public policy and 
doubtless would be invalidated on that ground even under statutes purporting to make 
"nonexclusive" the statutory provisions for indemnification. To the extent the consistency 
language may preclude indemnification in circumstances where it is reasonable and violates no 
statutory policy, an escape valve is provided in section 905(2), which authorizes a court to grant 
indemnification if a director "is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all 
the relevant circumstances," even though the director may not have fully met the standards of 
conduct set forth in section 902. 
Section 909 does not preclude provisions in articles of incorporation, bylaws, resolutions, or 
contracts designed to provide procedural machinery different from that provided by section 906 
or to make mandatory the permissive provisions of part 9. For example, a corporation may 
properly obligate the board of directors to consider and act expeditiously on an application for 
indemnification or advances, or obligate the board of directors to cooperate in the procedural 
steps required to obtain a judicial determination under section 905. 
Some corporations currently commit themselves, in one form or another, to indemnify 
directors to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law. These commitments are consistent 
with part 9, subject to appropriate interpretation in light of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case. Furthermore, a commitment to maintain liability insurance for a director, 
pursuant to section 908, is consistent with this part. 
The first sentence of section 909(1) applies only to directors; it does not apply to officers, 
employees, fiduciaries or agents who are not directors. See section 907 and its related 
commentary. The inherent problems of conflict of interest and the need to encourage persons to 
serve as directors are not present to the same degree in the case of nondirector officers, 
employees, fiduciaries or agents. The standard for permissible indemnification of these persons 
in, section 907(3) is "consistent with law" without regard to this subchapter. 
Section 909(2) is designed to make clear that part 9 deals only with directors who are actual 
or prospective defendants or respondents in a proceeding, and that expenses incurred in 
connection with appearance as a witness may be indemnified without regard to the limitations of 
part 9. Indeed, most of the standards described in sections 902 and 905 by their own terms can 
have no meaningful application to a director whose only connection with a proceeding is as a 
witness. 
Part 10 
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Plaintiffs Susie Strohm ("Strohm") and Dorsey & Whitney LLP ("Dorsey") (together, 
"Plaintiffs"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby submit this: (1) memorandum in 
opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("ClearOne's Cross-Motion")1 
filed by defendant ClearOne Communications, Inc. ("ClearOne"), and (2) reply in support of the 
Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief 
(Engagement Agreements) ("Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion").2 In further support of Plaintiffs' 
Renewed Motion, the Plaintiffs state as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court ruled that the 2003 Engagement Agreement and 2004 Engagement Agreement 
(collectively the "Engagement Agreement" or "Engagement Agreements") are ambiguous as to 
their scope and that extrinsic evidence would be needed to resolve this ambiguity. Based on 
established rules of contract construction, the central issue this Court must now determine is the 
intent of the parties by examining extrinsic. The undisputed testimony of ClearOne's corporate 
30(b)(6) designee, Michael. Keough, together with contemporaneous documents drafted and 
entered into by ClearOne conclusively establish the parties intended the scope of the 
Engagement Agreements to cover potential criminal actions related to the SEC Action, including 
the Criminal Case. Unable to dispute the conclusive testimony of its corporate representative 
and its contemporaneous documents, ClearOne argues the Engagement Agreement should be 
construed against Dorsey and this Court should ignore the testimony of the person who signed 
The memorandum filed in support, of ClearOne's Cross-Motion is hereinafter referred to as "ClearOne's 
Memorandum." 
Any capitalized term not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to it in the memorandum 
filed in support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion ("Plaintiffs Memorandum"). 
-v-
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the Engagement Agreements as the CEO of ClearOne. As set forth below, ClearOne's 
arguments lack factual and legal merit and Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
In the event this Court grants Plaintiffs' renewed motion for summary judgment, 
Plaintiffs are prepared to voluntarily dismiss their remaining claims. However, if this Court 
determines that Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be denied because material 
issues of fact exist, Plaintiffs' remaining claims will not be moot as suggested by ClearOne. 
First, this Court should deny ClearOne's cross motion for summary judgment on the second and 
eighth claims for relief because the Employment Termination Agreement (the "ETA") 
unambiguously grants Strohm rights to recover attorneys' fees not allowed under her mandatory 
indemnification claims. Second, ClearOne's unjust enrichment and equitable estoppel claims are 
not moot until this Court rules that the Engagement Agreements cover the claims for attorneys' 
fees by Dorsey against ClearOne. In addition, the facts establish ClearOne bestowed a benefit 
on ClearOne and representations were made that are not included in the written agreements. 
REPLY RECONCILIATION OF THE MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required ClearOne's Memorandum 
to contain a verbatim statement of each of the Plaintiffs' facts that ClearOne contends are 
controverted and provide an "explanation for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Each fact set 
forth in the Plaintiffs' Memorandum is deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment 
unless controverted in the manner required by Rule 7(c)(3)(B). See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). 
-vi-
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ClearOne did not respond to factual paragraphs 1-3, 5-12, or 18-27 of the Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum. Therefore, these facts are deemed admitted. Furthermore, ClearOne did not 
present any "facts" supported by a citation to affidavits or discovery materials that contest the 
facts in paragraphs 4, 13-17, or 28-38, as required by Rule 7. Rather, ClearOne either presented 
legal arguments or conclusory statements that do not create an issue of fact. See ClearOne5s 
Memo, at Responses to fflj 4,13-17, and 28-38.3 Accordingly, these facts are also deemed 
admitted. 
A summary of the undisputed material facts is as follows: 
1. At the time ClearOne signed the 2003 Engagement Agreement, it knew that the 
DOJ Investigation was underway and aimed at ClearOne, Flood and Strohm. ClearOne 
also understood that the DOJ Investigation could result a criminal indictment and case 
against Strohm. See Fact Reconciliation at ffl[ 1-4, 28; Tab A - Joint Defense Privilege 
and Confidentiality Agreement. 
2. The scope of the Engagement Agreements covered potential criminal actions 
related to the SEC Action, and Mr. Marsden and Dorsey were retained to represent Ms. 
Strohm in any such potential criminal actions including the Criminal Case. See Fact 
Reconciliation at fflf 17-28. 
3. Under the Engagement Agreements, ClearOne agreed to pay Dorsey's bills "on 
receipt," and to pay interest (at 18% per annum) on any invoices that remained unpaid 
more than 30 days after receipt. Fact Reconciliation at |^ f 29-30, 
4. The Engagement Agreements entitle Dorsey to the payment of its attorneys' fees 
incurred in connection with efforts to collect amounts due under the Engagement 
Agreements. Fact Reconciliation at ffif 30-31. 
5. The 2004 Engagement Agreement was merely an amendment to the 2003 
Engagement Agreement to reflect the change of law firms by Mr. Marsden, and the terms 
of the 2003 Engagement Agreement that were not amended remained in effect. Fact 
Reconciliation at fflf 31-33. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a reconciliation of the facts in paragraphs ffif 4, 13-17, and 28-38 of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum demonstrating that ClearOne failed to controvert these facts (the "Fact Reconciliation"). 
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PLAINTIFFS9 RESPONSES TO CLEARONE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(B), the Plaintiffs hereby respond to ClearOne's statement of 
facts as follows: 
ClearOne's Statement % 1. Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey - Steve Marsden's 
law firm when his representation of Susie Strohm began - was a "litigation boutique" consisting 
of 15-22 securities and antitrust litigators and "utility iniielders [attorneys]." Marsden Dep. 
18:11-21. 
Plaintiffs' Response to If 1: The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the language from Mr. 
Marsden's deposition is accurately quoted above. Mr. Marsden, however, clearly testified, he 
handled criminal matters both before and after he was retained by ClearOne to represent Ms. 
Strohm in the Criminal Case. See Transcript of Deposition of Milo Steven Marsden (the 
"Marsden Dep.") at 19:1-8; 20:2-3; 20:8-11; 150:22-151:6. Relevant portions of the Marsden 
Dep. are attached hereto as Exhibit 2. In any event, this fact statement is irrelevant to whether 
the parties intended the Engagement Agreements to cover the Criminal Case, and does not refute 
the undisputed testimony of ClearOne's own Rule 30(b)(6) representative, Michael Keough, who 
testified several times that ClearOne unequivocally intended the scope of the Engagement 
Agreements to include the Criminal Case. See Fact Reconciliation at Iflf 28 - 33. 
ClearOne!s Statement f^ 2. As of January 2003 - when the Bendinger engagement 
letter was signed - Steve Marsden himself was not handling any white-collar criminal cases and 
does not know if anyone at Bendinger was handling a white-collar criminal case. Marsden Dep. 
19:9-22. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f^ 2: Undisputed. See Plaintiffs' Response to f 1. 
ClearOne's Statement f 3. As of January 2003, Steve Marsden had not held himself 
out as a white-collar criminal law specialist. Marsden Dep. 19:23-20:4. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f^ 3 : See Plaintiffs' Response to f 1. 
ClearOne's Statement f 4. In contrast, Fran Flood's attorney Max Wheeler "is a highly 
visible criminal law specialist" and is "known in the community as a criminal lawyer." Marsden 
Dep. 17:25-18:5. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 4: Max Wheeler's status as a criminal lawyer is undisputed. 
But see Plaintiffs' Response to f^ 1. 
-viii-
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ClearOne's Statement f 5. ClearOne's co-CEO Michael Keough did not know . 
whether Steve Marsden had any experience handling criminal matters when he signed the 
Bendinger engagement letter dated January 29, 2003 and the Dorsey engagement letter dated 
March 31, 2004 and still to this day does not know anything about Mr. Marsden's background. 
Keough Dep. 141:7-13. 
Plaintiffs' Response to ^ 5: See Plaintiffs' Response to ^ 1. The cited deposition 
testimony does not support ClearOne's contention Keough was a co-CEO. Keough testified he 
signed the 2003 Engagement Agreement. This testimony, however, does not dispute Mr. 
Keough's testimony that the scope of the Engagement Agreements included the Criminal Case. 
See Fact Reconciliation at ffl[ 28-32. 
ClearOne's Statement f 6. Keough signed the Bendinger Crockett engagement letter 
dated January 29, 2003. Keough Dep. 108:11-23. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f^ 6: Undisputed. ClearOne conveniently omits the fact that 
Keough signed the 2003 Engagement Agreement as ClearOne's CEO, that he was authorized to 
sign the 2003 Engagement Agreement, and that he read and reviewed the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement prior to signing it so he could understand its terms before signing the agreement. See 
Fact Reconciliation at Tf 30; Plaintiffs' Memorandum Supp., Ex. 5; Transcript of 30(b)(6) 
Deposition of ClearOne Communications, Inc. (the "ClearOne Dep.") (referred to by ClearOne 
as Keough Dep.) at 108:9-109:8. Relevant portion of the ClearOne Dep. are attached hereto as 
Exhibit 3. 
ClearOne's Statement % 7. Keough does not recall how the Bendinger engagement 
letter was delivered to him and does not recall what he did with the document after he signed it. 
Keough Dep. 138:22-24; 142:16-19. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 7 : Undisputed. See Plaintiffs' Responses to f^ [ 6-7. 
ClearOne's Statement f 8. Keough did not discuss the Bendinger engagement letter 
with Ms. Strohm or Mr. Marsden and was not involved in any negotiations of the terms of the 
Bendinger engagement letter. Keough Dep. 138:25-139:15. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 8: See Plaintiffs' Responses to ffl[ 6-7. 
ClearOne's Statement f 9. In fact, Keough does not recall discussing the Bendinger 
engagement letter with anyone at all. Keough Dep. 139:16-18. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f^ 9: See Plaintiffs' Responses to fflf 6-7. 
ClearOne's Statement f 10. Moreover, Keough admitted that he did not remember 
discussing the Bendinger engagement letter with anyone "because in a lot of ways when I was 
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signing here, it was what had already been decided by the board. So I'm not going to call it a 
formality, but there was nothing I was going to either really change or have a lot of input on. It 
was going to be decided by the board." Keough Dep. 142:20-143:6. 
Plaintiffs' Response to ^ f 10: See Plaintiffs' Responses to fl 6-7. Keough testified that 
the Board did not discuss limiting the scope of Mr. Marsden's representation to just the SEC 
Action and also testified his understanding regarding the scope of Mr. Marsden's representations 
were based discussions that took place with the Board. See Fact Reconciliation at ^ f 29; 
ClearOne Dep. at 89:9-90:13. 
ClearOnefs Statement f 11. Keough has no idea how Steve Marsden was selected to 
represent Ms. Strohm. Keough Dep. 141:5-6. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 11: See Plaintiffs' Responses to 1flf 6-7, 10. 
ClearOne's Statement % 12. The only thing that Keough had been told by any Board 
member or someone from Clyde, Snow - then representing ClearOne in the SEC Action - about 
Steve Marsden prior to Mr. Keough signing the January 29, 2003 Bendinger engagement letter 
was that Steve Marsden would be representing Susie Strohm. Keough Dep. 143:7-144:5. 
Plaintiffs' Response to .f 12: See Plaintiffs' Responses to ^ 6-7, 10. 
ClearOne's Statement % 13. Regarding discussions by ClearOne's Board of Directors 
with respect to the retention of Steve Marsden, Keough remembers only that Mr. Marsden - not 
a criminal lawyer - would be representing Ms. Strohm and that Max Wheeler - a criminal 
lawyer - was representing Ms. Flood. Keough Dep. 42:22-43:3. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 13: See Plaintiffs' Responses to ffl[ 2, 6-7, 10. ClearOne 
conveniently omits the fact that seven days after entering into the 2003 Engagement Agreement, 
ClearOne, Ms. Flood and Ms. Strohm entered into a joint defense agreement related to the 
defense of the DOJ investigation aimed at ClearOne, Ms. Flood, and Ms. Strohm, and any future 
criminal proceedings (the "Joint Defense Agreement"). A copy of the Joint Defense Agreement 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. See Fact Reconciliation at f 4. The Joint Defense Agreement 
was signed by ClearOne's counsel, Ms. Flood's counsel Max Wheeler, and Ms. Strohm's 
counsel Mr. Marsden. See Joint Defense Agreement at 7. 
ClearOne's Statement % 14. Keough recalls discussions by ClearOne's Board of 
Directors that if there was a criminal proceeding in the future, ClearOne may have different 
views on indemnification. Keough Dep. 158:1 -7. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 14: The Plaintiffs dispute this statement to the extent that 
ClearOne is attempting to imply that ClearOne did not agree in the Engagement Agreements to 
pay for the attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiffs in the Criminal Case and in this 
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case. ClearOne testified at length regarding this during its deposition. See, e.g., ClearOne Dep., 
at 33:2-20; 44:20-46:4; 111:10-112:2; 114:2-11; 117:8-118:4; 119:13-120:18; 122:3-10; 170:23-
171:10; 175:12-22. 
ClearOne's Statement f 15. Keough does not remember any discussion by ClearOne's 
Board of Directors with respect to the scope of Mr. Marsden's retention. Keough Dep. 45:14-19. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 15: See Plaintiffs' Responses to ffi[ 6-7, 10 and 14. 
ClearOne's Statement f 16. Keough does not recall how the Dorsey engagement letter 
dated March 31, 2004 was delivered to him. Keough Dep. 161:16-21. 
Plaintiffs' Response to ^16: See Plaintiffs' Responses to ffi[ 6-7, 10, and 14. 
ClearOne's Statement f 17. Keough signed the Dorsey engagement letter dated March 
31, 2004. Keough Dep. 123:20-25. 
Plaintiffs' Response to 5[ 17: Undisputed. The Plaintiffs note, however, that Mr. 
Keough was authorized to sign the 2004 Engagement Agreement on behalf of ClearOne as its 
CEO. ClearOne Dep. 124:1-3. 
ClearOne's Statement f^ 18. It was Keough's understanding the Mr. Marsden sent the 
Dorsey engagement letter because Mr. Marsden "was continuing to represent Susie [Strohm] but 
he was with a different firm" and the letter "felt more like just a notification than anything else." 
Keough Dep. 124:4-14. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 18: The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the selective language 
from ClearOne's deposition is accurately quoted above. Mr. Keough, however, further testified 
that ClearOne understood the 2004 Engagement Agreement updated and amended some of the 
terms of the 2003 Engagement Agreement. See Fact Reconciliation at f 38; ClearOne Dep. at 
124-27. He further testified that ClearOne understood the 2003 and 2004 Engagement 
Agreements to constitute one agreement. See id. 
ClearOne's Statement % 19. Keough did not have any discussions with Susie Strohm or 
Steve Marsden about the Dorsey engagement letter. Keough Dep. 161:22-162:4. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 19: See Plaintiffs' Responses to ffif 6-7, 10, 14. 
ClearOne's Statement % 20. Keough does not recall negotiating any of the terms in the 
Dorsey engagement letter. Keough Dep. 162:5-7. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 20: See Plaintiffs' Responses to fflf 6-7, 10, 14. 
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ClearOne's Statement % 21. In fact, Keough has no specific recollection of discussing 
the Dorsey engagement letter with anyone. Keough Dep. 162:13-15. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 21: See Plaintiffs' Responses to fflf 6-7, 10-14. 
ClearOne's Statement f 22. By signing the Dorsey engagement letter, Keough did not 
intend to give Susie Strohm any rights in addition to what she received in her Employment 
Termination Agreement. Keough Dep. 164:10-15. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 22: See Plaintiffs' Response to \ 14. ClearOne conveniently 
ignores Keough's testimony that he understood the Employment Termination Agreement 
("ETA") obligated ClearOne to pay Strohm's legal fees in the criminal action as billed by Mr. 
Marsden. See ClearOne Dep. at 67:20-72:12; 73:23-74:19; Fact Reconciliation at U 33. 
Keough's understanding that the ETA itself already obligated ClearOne to pay Strohm's fees in 
the criminal action is entirely consistent with Keough's understanding that the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement did not to expand the rights given to Strohm in the ETA. 
ClearOne's Statement f^ 23. In June 2004, Michael Keough was involuntarily relieved 
as ClearOne's CEO by Dal Bagley, ClearOne's Chairman of the Board, because of unspecified 
allegations from Mr. Keough's former administrative assistant. Keough Dep. 27:11-28:12. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f^ 23: Undisputed. 
ClearOnefs Statement % 24. Bendinger's invoices for its representation of Ms. Strohm 
from January 15, 2003 through January 14, 2004 do not make any reference to a U.S. 
Department of Justice investigation or a grand jury investigation or to any potential criminal 
issue, except for the following entries: 
01/31/03 [Aaron G. Murphy] Research re: criminal liability; research re: causes of action; 
attend joint defense meeting; conference with S. Marsden re: 
strategy and issues; call to S. Strohm. 7.70 hrs 150 /hr 
1,155.00 
04/16/03 [Aaron G. Murphy] Review letter from R. Snow re: AUSA investigation. 
.20 hrs 150/hr 30.00 
Bendinger Invoices (attached hereto as Exhibit C) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs' Response to 24: The Plaintiffs do not dispute the language contained in the 
Bendinger Crockett invoices is accurately quoted above. These entries demonstrate, among 
other things, that in January 2003 (when the 2003 Engagement Agreement was executed), Mr. 
Marsden was performing services related to potential criminal proceedings against Ms. Strohm. 
ClearOne paid these invoices without complaint thereby demonstrating that ClearOne understood 
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the scope of Mr. Marsden's engagement to include potential criminal proceedings such as the 
Criminal Case. See also Plaintiffs' Response to \ 14. 
ClearOne!s Statement f^ 25. Steve Marsden first learned about the grand jury 
investigation in January 2003. Marsden Dep. 66:10-13. 
Plaintiffs'Response to [^ 25: Undisputed. 
ClearOne's Statement % 26. Susie Strohm was not asked to appear before the grand jury 
and never received a subpoena from the grand jury. Marsden Dep. 73:25-74:3; 169:6-11. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f^ 26: Undisputed. It is common, however, for the subject of a 
grand jury investigation to not be asked to appear before the grand jury. 
ClearOne's Statement ^ 27. In connection with the U.S. Department of Justice 
investigation in 2003, there was very little for Bendinger to do because the U.S. Attorney was 
not talking to Bendinger or Ms. Strohm, and Mr. Marsden "wasn't going to talk to the U.S. 
Attorney." Marsden Dep. 74:24-75:11. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 27: The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the selective language 
from Mr. Marsden's deposition is accurately quoted above. But see Plaintiffs' Response to ^ 14. 
ClearOne's Statement f 28. When Steve Marsden was considering switching firms, he 
completed a "Dorsey & Whitney LLP Conflicts and Screening Report and Professional 
Background Information" form (hereinafter "Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report") on 
January 5, 2004. Marsden Dep. Ex. F; Marsden Dep. 151:7-24. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 28: Undisputed 
ClearOne's Statement % 29. One of the questions on the Dorsey Conflicts and Screening 
Report asked Mr. Marsden to: 
Please identify your major clients who you would expect to become 
clients of Dorsey & Whitney LLP upon your joining the firm. Please 
also identify the adverse parties in the files on which you are currently 
representing these clients. 
Exhibit G (annexed hereto) at page 1. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 29: Undisputed. 
ClearOne's Statement f 30. In Plaintiffs' Response to the above question on the Dorsey 
Conflicts and Screening Report, Mr. Marsden identified "Susie Strohm" as one of his major 
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clients and identified several "adverse parties," but he did not identify the United States or the 
U.S. Department of Justice, or the U.S. Attorney's Office as an adverse party. Ex. G, page 2. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 30: Undisputed. At the time that Mr. Marsden completed the 
Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report, however, Mr. Strohm had yet to be indicted so there was 
no adverse party to list in connection with any criminal proceedings. Furthermore, Mr. Marsden 
testified that he "listed the filed matters." Marsden Dep. at 152:17-18. Mr. Marsden further 
testified that "the purpose of the form is to clear conflicts. I didn't know the status of the 
department of justice investigation. But I did not understand the department of justice 
investigation in whatever status it was in would present a conflict problem." Id. at 155:7-12. He 
also testified that he viewed the "department of justice investigation as pending" at the time he 
completed the Form. Id at 156:2-3. See also Plaintiffs' Response to If 14. 
ClearOne's Statement f^ 31. In addition, Mr. Marsden listed the SEC Action and other 
civil litigations on the Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report, but he did not list any criminal 
investigation. Marsden Dep. Ex. F, page 2; Marsden Dep. 153:23-155:3. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 31: See Plaintiffs' Responses to fflf 14, 30. 
ClearOnefs Statement f^ 32. After his arrival at Dorsey, the first thing that led Mr. 
Marsden to believe that Ms. Strohm might actually be criminally charged was when he was 
called by Assistant U.S. Attorney Stewart "Stu" Walz in April or May 2007. Marsden Dep. 
165:24-166:11 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 32: Disputed. ClearOne has not accurately presented Mr. 
Marsden's testimony. As the cited passage makes clear, Mr. Marsden stated that the principal 
(not the first) thing after he joined Dorsey that caused him to believe that Ms. Strohm would 
actually be criminally charged was his discussion with Mr. Walz. Marsden Dep. 166:2-5 Mr. 
Marsden testified that he first learned that Ms. Strohm might be criminally charged in January 
2003. See Marsden Dep. at 66:10-13. See also Plaintiffs' Response to H 14. 
ClearOne's Statement If 33. By the Fall of 2003, ClearOne did not believe that there 
was a reasonable possibility of a criminal proceeding being brought and did not believe that any 
indictment of Susie Strohm was in the realm of possibilities. Deposition of Jefferson Wright 
Gross ("Gross Dep.") 43:14-44:20. Relevant portions of the Gross Dep. are attached hereto as 
Exhibit 5. 
Plaintiffs' Response to % 33: Disputed. On December 5, 2003 (i.e., the Fall of 2003), 
ClearOne executed the ETA with Ms. Strohm, in which it referenced the existence of "a grand 
jury being conducted by the United States Department of Justice." See ETA at 1 (Recital C) 
(emphasis added). A copy of the ETA is attached hereto as Exhibit 6. As used in this sentence, 
the phrase "being conducted" indicates a present and continuing condition, and demonstrates that 
-xiv-
Add. C-14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ClearOne knew in the Fall of 2003 that the criminal investigation was on-going and criminal 
charges were possible. 
ClearOneTs Statement f 34. By the Fall of 2003, ClearOne had made a decision to file 
a lawsuit against ClearOne's Directors and Officers liability carriers and would not have done so 
if it thought that there was a reasonable possibility of a criminal proceeding. Gross Dep. 44:12-
20. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 34: See Plaintiffs' Responses to ^ 14, 33; See also Fact 
Reconciliation at ffl[ 4, 33. 
ClearOne's Statement f^ 35. Asked at deposition about whether he was aware in 2003 
that there was a "grand jury Department of Justice investigation ongoing at that point," 
ClearOne's representative Jeff Gross responded as follows: 
THE WITNESS: Not ongoing. There were some 
subpoenas that were issued earlier in the year in 2003, and 
then it went quiet. 
Q: (By Mr. Hancock) Okay. But it didn't go away; it was 
still out there? 
A: We thought it had died. I mean, you never get a 
letter from the DOJ saying your client is in the clear or, you 
know, we're not pursuing this any further. But from 
communications with the U.S. Attorney's office, we got the 
sense that they were not going to pursue anything. That was 
the impression that we formed in 2003, in the summer and fall 
of2003. 
Gross Dep. 30:1-13 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 35: The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the language from the 
deposition of Mr. Gross is accurately quoted above. But see Plaintiffs' Responses to ^ 14, 33, 
37. 
ClearOne's Statement <[[ 36. The purpose of the indemnification provision's "subject to" 
clauses contained in Ms. Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement was to "mak[e] sure 
[ClearOne] complied with the Utah Code and bylaws to make sure that the company would not 
be subject to further derivative claims based on a disgruntled shareholder believing we provided 
either too much money or too great a benefit to either of those two persons." Gross Dep. 38:13-
19. 
Plaintiffs' Response to f 36: See Plaintiffs' Response to If 14. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Undisputed Extrinsic Evidence Establishes, As A Matter Of Law, That 
ClearOne Understood And Intended The Engagement Agreements To Extend To 
The Criminal Case. 
In its Memorandum, ClearOne largely concedes that its Rule 30(b)(6) representative, 
Michael Keough, testified just as Plaintiffs claimed he had. Over the course of his four and one-
half hour deposition, Mr. Keough repeatedly testified that (i) the Engagement Agreements 
covered potential criminal actions related to the SEC Action, including the Criminal Case (see 
ClearOne Dep., at 33:2-20; 44:20-46:4; 111:10-112:2; 114:2-11; 117:8-118:4; 119:13-120:18; 
122:3-10; 170:23-171:10; 175:12-22); (ii) ClearOne understood and agreed to pay interest (at 
18% per annum) on any invoices that remained unpaid more than 30 days after receipt (see id, at 
110:9-15; 116:9-117:3); (iii) ClearOne understood and agreed to pay attorneys' fees incurred in 
connection with efforts to collect amounts due under the Engagement Agreements (see id., at 
110:16-111:1); and (iv) the 2004 Engagement Agreement was merely an amendment to the 2003 
Engagement Agreement to reflect the change of law firms by Mr. Marsden, and the terms of the 
2003 Engagement Agreement otherwise remained in effect (see id., at 124-27). 
Given the extent and clarity of Mr. Keough's testimony, it is no surprise that the bulk of 
ClearOne's Memorandum is spent trying to persuade the Court to disregard the testimony, or 
ignore it. ClearOne first asks the Court to entirely ignore ClearOne's own testimony, in favor of 
an application of the canons of contract interpretation rejected by this Court as being improper. 
ClearOne next complains that the questions asked of its own designated representative were 
objectionable because they were "leading," and argues that the testimony is inadmissible. 
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Finally, ClearOne asks the Court to prefer a series of marginally relevant misrepresentations it 
has cobbled together over its own clear, unequivocal, and extensive direct testimony. 
None of these efforts prevent Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment from being 
granted. ClearOne designated Mr. Keough as its corporate representative, and as the person 
most knowledgeable to testify concerning the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and 
execution of the Engagement Agreements.4 MJT. Keough5 S undisputed testimony is binding on 
ClearOne. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D. N.C. 1996); Sprint 
Comrnc'ns. Co., LP. v. TheGlobe.com, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 524, 527 (D. Kan. 2006). ClearOne has 
not presented any direct evidence refuting its own unambiguous testimony. Accordingly, 
summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor on the Engagement Agreements is now appropriate. 
A. ClearOne Continues To Ignore This Court's Rulings And To Misstate Utah 
Law Concerning Contractual Interpretation. 
In its Memorandum, ClearOne argues that under Utah law the Engagement Agreements 
must be strictly construed against their drafter, and that the Court should find that the Criminal 
Case is not covered because "responsibility for Ms. Strohm's legal expenses in the criminal 
proceeding is not clearly or unambiguously expressed in the Dorsey engagement letter." See 
ClearOne Memorandum pp. 20-22. ClearOne Memorandum, at 21. ClearOne's tacit assertion 
Indeed, ClearOne admits that Mr. Keough is the only person with personal knowledge who can testify regarding 
ClearOne's understanding of the Engagement Agreements because "nobody else could be located who even 
recalled their existence." ClearOne's Memo, at 23. 
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here is that its own testimony should be disregarded in favor of application of this "strict 
construction" rule,5 
If this argument sounds familiar, it is because ClearOne has made it, and this Court has 
rejected it, on at least two previous occasions. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (served 9/26/2008), at 12 (arguing that claims based on 
the Engagement Agreements should be dismissed because ClearOne's "responsibility for Ms. 
Strohm's legal expenses in the criminal proceeding are not clearly or unequivocally expressed") 
and Order, dated 1/23/2009 (denying ClearOne's motion on this ground); see also Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Fourth Claim for 
Relief (served 4/3/2009), at 8 (arguing that "ambiguity in a contract is to be construed against the 
drafter") and Order, dated 8/20/2009 (denying ClearOne's motion). 
Contrary to ClearOne's argument, Utah law is clear that "[o]nly if extrinsic evidence does 
not resolve the ambiguity is it appropriate to construe the document against its drafter." Gen. 
Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, \ 7, 158 P.3d 1 \2\\see also U.P.C, 
Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, f 39, 990 P.2d 945 (contract will be construed 
against drafter only if ambiguity cannot be resolved using extrinsic evidence). Thus, a Utah 
In this section of its Memorandum, ClearOne spends considerable space arguing that the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement is ambiguous. See ClearOne's Memorandum at 20-22. Considering that this Court has already 
ruled that the Engagement Agreements are ambiguous, it is hard to see the point of this argument. 
As Plaintiffs have previously stated, they disagree with the Court's prior ruling that the language of the 
Engagement Agreements is not sufficiently clear to allow the Court to rule that they to extend to the Criminal 
Case, without resort to extrinsic evidence. However, Plaintiffs recognize that the Court has so ruled. 
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court will only construe a contract against the drafter if the extrinsic evidence does not clarify the 
ambiguities in a contract. 
Moreover, this Court has already rejected the argument ClearOne is advancing, and has 
articulated the established approach to resolving contractual ambiguity under Utah law: 
The letter agreements I have found them to be ambiguous. And 
then my first duty is to find evidence if it's available to give me the 
intent of the parties. And I don't think that means I just construe it 
against because then every ambiguous contract would be construed 
against in the way least favorable to the drafting party, and that's 
not our first duty to determine what the parties, in fact, agreed. 
July 1st Transcript at 29:8-15. ClearOne has given the Court no reason to reconsider this ruling. 
Here, the undisputed extrinsic evidence resolves any ambiguity as to whether the 
Engagement Agreements covered the Criminal Case. ClearOne itself testified over and over 
again that it was aware of a pending criminal investigation both in January 2003 and in March 
2004, and that it understood it was engaging Mr. Marsden and his law firms to represent Ms. 
Strohm in these investigations and in any criminal case from them. Fact Reconciliation at ^ | 2-
3, 28-33. In these circumstances, there is no reason to resort to the rule of construction that 
involves construing terms against the drafter. ClearOne's testimony and the other extrinsic 
evidence {see infra pp. 10-13) conclusively resolves any ambiguity regarding the scope and 
effect of the Engagement Agreements in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
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B. Keough's Testimony Is Admissible And Binds ClearOne Under Rule 
30(b)(6). 
ClearOne's next effort to persuade the Court to disregard Mr. Keough's testimony is to 
argue that it (i) was beyond the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) designation; and (ii) elicited on 
improper "leading" or "hypothetical" questions. These arguments are meritless. 
1. Keough *s Testimony Was Not Beyond The Scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) 
Notice and Would Remain Persuasive Even If It Was. 
Although ClearOne asserts that Keough's testimony was beyond the scope of his Rule 
30(b)(6) designation, it offers no substantive argument for its claim. ClearOne states only that 
Keough was designated "to testify about the engagement letter because nobody else could be 
located who even recalled their existence." But that is not an argument about whether the 
testimony given was within the Rule 30(b)(6) designation. 
The Deposition Notice clearly stated that ClearOne was to be deposed, among other 
topics, with respect to the "circumstances surrounding [ClearOne's] negotiation and execution" 
of the Engagement Agreements and "[communications" regarding the Engagement Agreements. 
See Deposition Notice at Topics 10-11.6 These topic designations must reasonably be read to 
include the parties' understanding of the terms of the Engagement Agreements. "Circumstance" 
is defined as "a condition, fact or event accompanying, conditioning or determining another: an 
essential or inevitable concomitant." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 242 (1988) 
(a copy of this definition is attached hereto as Exhibit 7). As ClearOne's representative, Mr. 
Keough was required to testify not only about factual matters concerning these documents, but 
A copy of the Deposition Notice is attached to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum as Exhibit 7. 
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also concerning ClearOne's "subjective beliefs and opinions" when it negotiated and executed 
the Engagement Agreement. See Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 361. Thus, Mr. Keough's testimony 
regarding ClearOne's understanding of the Engagement Agreement when they were executed 
was not only properly within the scope of Rule 30(b)(6), it was, in fact, required under the rule.7 
ClearOne's arguments regarding the scope of its testimony as elicited through Mr. 
Keough are without merit, and ClearOne is bound by its designee's testimony regarding the 
Engagement Agreements. But even if that were not the case, Mr. Keough's testimony would still 
be relevant and persuasive. Mr. Keough is, after all, the ClearOne representative who signed the 
Engagement Agreements. He was the company's CEO at the time he signed the Engagement 
Agreements. And, he testified that he read the Engagement Agreements prior to signing them in 
order to form an understanding of ClearOne's obligations and duties. ClearOne Dep. at 108:9-
109:8.8 
2. The Questions Asked Were Proper. 
Contrary to ClearOne's claim, Plaintiffs were entitled to ask leading questions of Mr. 
Keough at ClearOne's deposition. Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "[w]hen 
a party calls . . . an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party . . . , interrogation 
may be by leading question." 
ClearOne alleges that Mr. Keough only testified as to his current interpretation of the Engagement Agreements. 
See ClearOne's Memorandum at 24. ClearOne, however, does not cite to a single instance where Mr. Keough 
either testified as to his current testimony or limited his testimony to his current understanding. A review of the 
entire transcript of ClearOne's deposition demonstrates that Mr. Keough plainly testified several times 
regarding ClearOne's understanding of the Engagement Agreements at the time that they were executed. 
In any event, Mr. Keough was also deposed as a fact witness and considering that, as ClearOne declares, no 
other person could even be located who remembers the Engagement Agreements, his testimony regarding the 
Engagement Agreements stands uncontroverted. 
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In this case, leading questions were appropriate for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs 
served a deposition notice on ClearOne, an adverse party, asking for its testimony. ClearOne 
designated Mr. Keough as its representative to testify regarding the Engagement Agreements 
under Rule 30(b)(6). Accordingly, for purposes of applying Rule 611(c), Mr. Keough was 
ClearOne. That is, Mr. Keough was an adverse party - not just a "witness identified with an 
adverse party." Under Rule 611(c), the use of leading questions is absolutely appropriate with an 
adverse party.9 
Second, although ClearOne claims Mr. Keough is biased against ClearOne, it has 
presented no evidence that this is so. Mr. Keough did not testify that he harbored any "animus" 
or bias against ClearOne, only that he had been "involuntarily relieved of his position." 
ClearOne Memorandum, at 25. Since the filing of this lawsuit, Mr. Keough has in fact 
cooperated with ClearOne in defending the case. Mr. Keough agreed to function as ClearOne's 
Rule 30(b)(6) representative, and he agreed to meet with ClearOne's counsel prior to the 
deposition in order to go over documents and prepare for the deposition. ClearOne Dep. at 6:20-
7:5, 8:22-9:6. Mr. Keough had no discussions with the Plaintiffs' counsel about the deposition 
prior to the deposition, other than to arrange time and place. See id. at 164:16-165:18. In short, 
In support of its position, ClearOne cites a single unreported case from the Sixth Circuit which dealt with a 
witness "identified with an adverse party," not an adverse party as here. In that case, Gates v. City of Memphis, 
Case No. 98-5921, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6713 at *6 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2000), the court did state the truism that 
there "may be instances" where the use of leading questions with a witness identified with an adverse party may 
not be proper. Id. But the court held that leading questions were proper in the circumstances before it. Id. at 
*6, *7. The case is hardly support for refusing leading questions here. For the Court's reference, a copy of the 
case is attached hereto as Exhibit 8. 
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ClearOne has presented nothing to suggest that Mr. Keough did anything other than testify fairly 
and truthfully to the questions presented during ClearOne's deposition.10 
Third, even if asking leading questions of Mr. Keough had been improper, his testimony 
remains admissible because ClearOne did not timely object to these questions, and has therefore 
waived the objection. Under Rule 32(c)(3)(B), "[ejrrors and irregularities . . . in the form of the 
questions . . . which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly asserted are waived unless 
seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition." Utah R. Civ. P. 
32(c)(3)(B). Although ClearOne lodged numerous objected during the deposition, ClearOne did 
not object to the great bulk of Plaintiffs5 questioning. The answers to these questions 
conclusively establish that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The numerous examples from ClearOne's deposition where its testimony supports 
granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion, and where ClearOne did not object to the form of the 
question during its deposition include, among others, the following: 
• ClearOne understood that Mr. Marsden was retained to represent Ms. Strohm in the 
SEC Action, the grand jury investigation, and any related criminal actions brought 
against her. See ClearOne Dep. at 44:20-45:8. 
• ClearOne did not, upon reading the 2003 Engagement Agreement, believe it was 
limited solely to the SEC Action. See id. at 117:8-12. 
• ClearOne not only understood that potential criminal indictments could be brought 
against Ms. Strohm when it executed the 2004 Engagement Agreement, it actually 
expected that such indictments would be brought. See id. at 175:15-22. 
ClearOne's argument that Mr. Keough's testimony should be entirely disregarded on the ground that he is 
biased is not a proper argument at the summary judgment stage. Under Utah law, "'it is not the purpose of the 
summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of the parties, or witnesses, or the weight 
of the evidence.'" Best v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 2006 UT App 304, K 10, 141 P.3d 624 {quoting W.M. 
Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Res. Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981)). Thus, it is not the Court's role at this stage 
of the proceeding to weigh the credibility of Mr. Keough's testimony offered on behalf of ClearOne. 
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• ClearOne agreed to pay invoices from Mr. Marsden for services rendered in 
representing Ms. Strohm as they were billed and within 30 days after receipt. See id. 
at 110:9-15. 
• ClearOne agreed to pay interest at the annual rate of 18 percent on any amounts that 
remained unpaid after 30 days. See id. at 110:16-20. 
• ClearOne agreed to pay attorneys' fees and costs associated with any successful 
action to enforce the Engagement Agreements. See id. at 116:9-16. 
ClearOne's failure to object - during the deposition - to these questions means its form objection 
is waived. This testimony alone is a sufficient basis for granting the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion 
in its entirety and the denial of ClearOne's Cross-Motion. 
3. Keough's Testimony Is Not "Contradictory." 
ClearOne's parting shot here is the claim that Mr. Keough's testimony was 
"contradictory." To set up this argument, ClearOne cites to Mr. Keough's testimony that in 
signing the 2004 Engagement Agreement he did understand that he was giving Strohm any more 
rights than those contained in the ETA. See ClearOne Memorandum, at 25. But then, instead of 
referring to Mr. Keough's understanding of Ms. Strohm's rights under the ETA, ClearOne 
substitutes its own analysis of the ETA and, astonishingly, implies that this is Mr. Keough's 
understanding of the ETA. See ClearOne's Memo, at 25. ClearOne studiously avoids Mr. 
Keough's actual testimony concerning the scope of the ETA because it makes clear he 
understood that the ETA, like the Engagement Agreements, obligated ClearOne to pay Strohm's 
legal fees in the criminal action, and to pay them as they were billed. See ClearOne Dep. at 
67:20-72:12; 73:23-74:19. Fairly read, Mr. Keough's testimony regarding the rights granted 
under the ETA and Engagement Agreements is entirely consistent and ClearOne's attempted 
sleight-of-hand fails. 
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C. The Other Relevant Extrinsic Evidence In Fact Supports ClearOne's Direct 
Testimony That The Engagement Agreements Extend To The Criminal Case. 
ClearOne's last argument against its own clear testimony regarding the intended scope of 
the Engagement Agreements is its claim that a reasoned review of the so-called "true facts" 
shows that ClearOne did not intend the Engagement Agreements to extend to the Criminal Case. 
In fact, a "reasoned review" of the other extrinsic evidence shows that it supports ClearOne's 
direct testimony. ClearOne's arguments to the contrary are specious. 
1. ClearOne }s Alleged Belief That A Criminal Proceeding Was "Not A 
Reasonable Probability" In The Fall of 2003. 
ClearOne argues (at 27) that "by the Fall of 2003, ClearOne did not believe that there was 
a reasonable possibility of a criminal proceeding being brought against Ms. Strohm... ." 
Although it is not entirely apparent from ClearOne's brief, this "fact" is presumably offered to 
support the claim that ClearOne did not intend the 2004 Engagement Agreement to extend to the 
Criminal Case. ClearOne can make this argument only by very carefully selecting the facts it 
acknowledges. 
a. It is beyond peradventure that ClearOne's alleged belief regarding the status of a 
criminal investigation after the execution of the 2003 Engagement Agreement is irrelevant to 
determining its intent at the time that it entered into the 2003 Engagement Agreement. 
Moreover, in January of 2003 ClearOne indisputably understood that criminal charges could be 
brought against Ms. Strohm. 
- It is undisputed that the day before ClearOne executed the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement, ClearOne "was advised that the U.S. Attorney's Office had begun an investigation 
stemming from the complaint in the SEC action." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, SOF If 3 & Ex. 3 at 
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170. Furthermore, on behalf of ClearOne, Mr, Keough testified that in January of 2003 the 
company understood that criminal charges against Ms. Strohm were a possibility and that it 
entered into the 2003 Engagement Agreement with the understanding that it would be liable for 
the payment of Ms. Strohm's fees in any criminal proceeding. See, e.g., ClearOne Dep., at 33:2-
20; 44:20-46:4; 111:10-112:2; 114:2-11; 117:8-118:4; 119:13-120:18; 122:3-10; 170:23-171:10; 
175:12-22. 
- Just seven days after ClearOne signed the 2003 Engagement Agreement, it entered a 
"Joint Defense Agreement" with Ms. Strohm and Ms. Flood which similarly recites that 
ClearOne has been notified "that a criminal investigation is underway that arises out of or is 
connected to the allegations made in the SEC Action and that this investigation is aimed at both 
ClearOne and certain individual current or former employees of ClearOne." Joint Defense 
Agreement, at 1. In the Joint Defense Agreement, ClearOne agreed that it and Strohm had "a 
mutuality of interest" in defending the criminal investigation. Id. at 2. The Joint Defense 
Agreement was signed by ClearOne's counsel, Ms. Flood's counsel Max Wheeler, and by Mr. 
Marsden, as Ms. Strohm's counsel. See id. at 7. 
Thus, there can be no legitimate dispute that, at the time ClearOne executed the 2003 
Engagement Agreement, it understood that Ms. Strohm could be the subject of a criminal 
proceeding and that the 2003 Engagement Agreement engaged Mr. Marsden and his firm to 
represent Ms. Strohm in the grand jury investigation and any future criminal proceeding. 
b. Whatever ClearOne claims to have believed in "the Fall of 2003," it is undisputed 
that in December of 2003 ClearOne recognized a criminal investigation related to the SEC 
-11-
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Complaint remained ongoing, and that ClearOne knew Mr. Marsden was retained to represent 
Ms. Strohm in connection with that matter. 
- Most tellingly, on December 5, 2003., ClearOne executed the Employment Termination 
Agreement with Strohm. In that Agreement, ClearOne recited that it understood that Mr. 
Marsden had been employed "to defend [Strohm] in the SEC Action and the Related 
Proceedings," which included "a grand jury investigation being conducted by the United Stated 
Department of Justice." ETA, at 1. 
-Finally, ClearOne's direct testimony regarding its understanding of the status of the 
criminal case at the time it entered the 2004 Engagement Agreement is unequivocal: 
Q. And when you signed [the 2004 Engagement Agreement], 
nobody had informed you that the grand jury investigation was 
over and criminal actions weren't going to be brought against Ms. 
Strohm, had they? 
A. No. • 
Q. So you understood that there were still potential indictments 
that could come down and criminal action brought against Ms. 
Strohm when you signed [the 2004 Engagement Agreement], 
correct? 
A. Yes. In fact, that was my expectation. 
Q. And you understood, based on that expectation, that was still 
the scope of Mr. Marsden's representation under [the 2003 
Engagement Agreement and the 2004 Engagement Agreement], 
correct? 
A. Yes. There were no limits ever decided on that 
representation. 
ClearOne Dep., at 175 (emphasis added). 
-12-
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In addition to this is, of course, the fact that ClearOne paid Dorsey's invoices for fees 
incurred in connection with the grand jury investigation that preceded the Criminal Case, and 
that it continued to pay Dorsey's invoices for over a year after the commencement of the 
Criminal Case with total payments in excess of $1.8 million. A public company such as 
ClearOne with fiduciary obligations to its shareholders cannot, as ClearOne now suggests, have 
expended such amounts simply out of charity. 
2. Marsden's Background, The Work Done Prior to 2007, The Work Left To 
Be Done When Marsden Moved Firms, And The Like. 
ClearOne5s other "true facts" in addition to being inaccurate, are simply irrelevant. 
- ClearOne makes much of the fact that Mr. Marsden did not, and does not, hold himself 
out as a white-collar criminal specialist. ClearOne asserts that "it defies logic" to believe that 
ClearOne would commit itself to paying Marsden to defend Strohm "in a then-hypothetical and 
unanticipated federal criminal proceeding" given his background. ClearOne Memorandum, at 
26. But this "fact," simply cannot bear the weight ClearOne seeks to place on it. 
First, ClearOne has directly testified (through Keough) that at the time the Engagement 
Agreements were signed it knew a criminal investigation was ongoing, and it understood it was 
engaging Mr. Marsden to represent Strohm in connection with the investigation and any 
indictments that might come out of the investigation. See Fact Reconciliation at 27-37. Second, 
as ClearOne points out, Keough also stated he did not know whether Mr. Marsden had 
experience in handling criminal matters. But the conclusion to be drawn from ClearOne's 
-13-
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testimony is that ClearOne considered the particulars of Mr. Marsden's background to be 
irrelevant.11 
- ClearOne also makes much of the fact that prior to 2007 there are only a few time 
entries that directly reference work related to criminal liability. Again, ClearOne draws the 
wrong conclusion from these facts. The important point is that prior to 2007 Mr. Marsden (and 
other lawyers working for him) performed work that was clearly related to the grand jury 
investigation, and ClearOne paid for this work without complaint. Rather than undermining 
ClearOne's testimony, these extrinsic facts bolster the testimony that the Engagement 
Agreements were intended to extend to the Criminal Case. 
- ClearOne's argument regarding the Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report is also 
misplaced. Mr. Marsden testified that he did not list any criminal proceeding against Ms. Strohm 
because she had not been indicted when he completed the report and there was no adverse party 
to list. See Marsden Depo. at 152:7-12. Mr. Marsden also testified that he did not believe the 
grand jury investigation, regardless of its status at the time he switched firms, would present a 
conflict necessitating it being listed on the report. See id. at 155:7-12. 
-ClearOne's argument regarding the amount of work it believed remained to be 
completed on the SEC Action or any related proceedings at the time it executed the 2004 
Engagement Agreement is irrelevant to the parties' intent when they executed the 2003 
Engagement Agreement. As discussed above, the parties intended the Engagement Agreements 
ClearOne's argument regarding Mr. Marsden's background also misrepresents Mr. Marsden's actual testimony 
on this issue. Mr. Marsden specifically testified that he had handled criminal matters both before and after the 
execution of the 2003 Engagement Agreement. See Marsden Dep. at 19:1-8; 20:2-3; 20:8-11; 150:22-151:6. 
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to be treated as one contract. Furthermore, ClearOne cannot dispute that the grand jury 
investigation was ongoing at the time it executed the 2004 Engagement Agreement, considering 
that Ms. Strohm was eventually indicted. 
II. The Parties Intended For The Terms Of The 2003 Engagement Agreement To Be 
Effective Even After The Execution Of The 2004 Engagement Agreement 
A. The 2004 Engagement Agreement Was Merely An Amendment 
ClearOne's assertion that the 2004 Engagement Agreement somehow entirely supplants 
the 2003 Engagement Agreement lacks any support. ClearOne makes this argument solely by 
reference to the language of the 2004 Engagement Agreement. But this Court has already ruled 
that the Engagement Agreements are ambiguous. This means that the parties and the Court now 
must look to extrinsic evidence. 
Mr. Keough testified on behalf of ClearOne that ClearOne understood the 2004 
Engagement Agreement to merely be an update to the 2003 Engagement Agreement with all the 
terms of that earlier agreement remaining in effect. See ClearOne Dep. at 124-27. ClearOne 
clearly testified that the 2004 Engagement Agreement merely reflected the fact that Mr. Marsden 
had changed law firms. See id. Indeed, ClearOne's own counsel previously represented to this 
Court that the Engagement Agreements are intended to be treated as one agreement. See 
transcript of hearing held July 1, 2009 (the "July 1st Transcript") at 25:24-26:9. Relevant 
portions of the July 1st Transcript are attached hereto as Exhibit 9. ClearOne, however, does not 
respond to this testimony and does not cite to any extrinsic evidence at all to support its new 
position. This is not surprising given that ClearOne has acknowledged that Mr. Keough is the 
only witness on its side who can testify as to the meaning of the Engagement Agreements. See 
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ClearOne's Memorandum, at 23. Given the Court's previous ruling on ambiguity, ClearOne's 
rehashed textual arguments are irrelevant to the meaning of the Engagement Agreements, and 
Mr. Keough's undisputed testimony as ClearOne's representative conclusively establishes the 
intent of the parties. 
Furthermore, ClearOne's reasoning that the 2004 Engagement Agreement was required 
to incorporate the terms of the 2003 Engagement Agreement is backwards. As discussed, 
ClearOne has already testified that the 2004 Engagement Agreement was merely an amendment 
to the 2003 Engagement Agreement. See ClearOne Dep. at 124-27. As an amendment, the 2004 
Engagement Agreement, like any other contractual amendment, was not required to incorporate 
the terms of the agreement that it was amending. The terms of the 2003 Engagement Agreement 
remained in effect after ClearOne executed the 2004 Engagement Agreement with the only 
difference being a reflection in certain terms showing that Mr. Marsden had changed law firms. 
ClearOne's inverted assertions misunderstand the purpose of the 2004 Engagement Agreement 
and are not persuasive.12 
B. ClearOne Is Bound By The Terms Of The Engagement Agreements 
ClearOne incorrectly argues that even if the provisions of the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement are still effective, ClearOne should not have to comply with the terms to which it 
In any event, ClearOne's own arguments erode the very point it is trying to make. For example, the fact that the 
2004 Engagement Agreement did not require Ms. Strohm or ClearOne to provide a separate retainer 
demonstrates that the parties intended the 2003 Engagement Agreement, which did require a retainer, to remain 
in effect. The fact that the 2004 Engagement Agreement does not have interest or attorneys' fee provision 
likewise demonstrates that the parties meant for the terms of the 2003 Engagement Agreement to remain in 
effect. The fact that there were no substantive changes made by the 2004 Engagement Agreement demonstrates 
that the 2004 Engagement Agreement was only an amendment to the 2003 Engagement Agreement intended to 
reflect a change of law firms by Mr. Marsden. 
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voluntarily agreed. There is no basis, however, for excusing ClearOne from the agreement it 
voluntarily executed with the Plaintiffs. 
ClearOne's argument that requiring it to pay for attorneys' fees incurred by the Plaintiffs 
in this case, would "constitute a departure from the prevailing American Rule" (ClearOne's 
Memorandum, at 32) has no basis in law. Utah courts, like every other court in the United 
States, recognize that contractual provisions requiring the payment of attorneys' fees incurred in 
the enforcement of the contract are valid and enforceable.13 This "departure from the prevailing 
American Rule" is universally recognized in the American judicial system at both the state and 
federal level. ClearOne has no grounds for arguing that it would be unreasonable to require it to 
abide by the agreement it signed to pay the attorneys' fees incurred by the Plaintiffs in enforcing 
the Engagement Agreements. 
Likewise without merit is ClearOne's assertion that the 18% percent interest rate it 
agreed to pay is somehow unreasonable. ClearOne asks this Court to re-write its agreement to 
pay 18% interest because it is "significantly greater than the reasonable time value of money 
over the last 2 years." See ClearOne's Memorandum, at 32. Remarkably, ClearOne fails to cite 
to any evidence or legal authority in support of this contention. ClearOne agreed to pay 18% 
interest on past-due invoices, and it is now bound to comply with its contractual obligations.14 
Likewise, American courts universally enforce statutory provisions requiring the payment of attorneys' fees. 
See RioAlgom Corporation v. Jimco Ltd, 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) (stating that "[a] court will not, 
however, make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves"). 
-17-
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Finally, ClearOne's suggestion that Dorsey cannot bill at a rate higher than $255 per hour 
is contrary to the express terms of the Engagement Agreements.15 First, the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement, specifically explains that "billing shall be based on the normal hourly rates charged 
for employees of this firm who work on this matter." 2003 Engagement Agreement at 2. The 
2004 Engagement Agreement contains a similar provision. See 2004 Engagement Agreement at 
1 ("Our fees are ordinarily based primarily on our usual and customary hourly rates"). These are 
common provisions for attorney retainer agreements, and nothing in either of the Engagement 
Agreements suggests that rates will be capped at $255 per hour. To the contrary, both of the 
Engagement Agreements provide that the rates charged are subject to review and periodic 
adjustments. See 2003 Engagement Agreement at 2; 2004 Engagement Agreement at 1. Dorsey, 
pursuant to the Engagement Agreements, has charged its usual and customary rates in both the 
Criminal Case and in this case. Dorsey, therefore, is entitled to payment in full for the services it 
has performed and which Clear One agreed to pay. 
III. Material Issues of Fact Prevent Granting ClearOne's Cross-Motion Regarding The 
Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims 
In Points III-V of ClearOne's Memorandum, ClearOne argues that it is entitled to 
summary judgment on certain of the Plaintiffs' claims for relief either because they are now 
moot or because they provide no basis for relief.16 For the reasons discussed below, significant 
The Court has previously ruled that the issue of reasonableness of fees will be tried separately in this case. 
ClearOne's arguments regarding the rates charged by Dorsey are, therefore, not proper at this stage of the 
proceedings. Regardless, the Plaintiffs are compelled to respond to these arguments. 
1
 In the event that the Court grants the Plaintiffs Renewed Motion, the Plaintiffs in the interest of judicial 
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factual issues remain with respect to the Plaintiffs' First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Claims for Relief. Therefore, ClearOne is not entitled to summary judgment on these claims. 
A. Ms. Strohm Has Valid Claims Against ClearOne Based On The Employment 
Termination Agreement (Second And Eighth Claims) 
Despite the fact that the Court has already ruled that Ms. Strohm is entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-903, Ms. Strohm's claims based on the ETA are 
not moot because the ETA provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs that are not 
recoverable under her claim for mandatory indemnification and provides a contractual claim for 
her attorneys' fees incurred to enforce her rights under the ETA . 
Mandatory indemnification entitled Strohm to recover her fees and costs in connection 
with those claims on which she was successful in the Criminal Case and her fees and costs in 
connection with the actions to enforce her mandatory indemnification rights in this case. Ms. 
Strohm's claims under the ETA, on the other hand, would permit her to recover all of her fees in 
connection with both the Criminal Case and this current proceeding.17 Thus, the claims under 
the ETA would permit Ms. Strohm potentially to recover more of her fees and costs than she 
could under her claims for mandatory indemnification. Moreover, with respect to the 
reasonableness of fees, a different standard applies to fee awarded pursuant to a contract such as 
the ETA as opposed fees awarded pursuant to statute. Thus, the Plaintiffs' claims based on the 
ETA, if granted, could result in a recovery that differs significantly from their recovery based 
The Plaintiffs are not seeking to recover payment twice for the same fees and costs and certainly concede that 
they are only entitled to be paid once for the services rendered. 
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solely on mandatory indemnification. Ms. Strohm's claims under the ETA, therefore, are not 
m o o t . * • 
Furthermore, Ms. Strohm has a valid claim for permissive indemnification. As reflected 
in the ETA, ClearOne agreed to indemnify Ms. Strohm under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902. 
Prior to making this agreement, ClearOne formed a special committee to investigate Ms. 
Strohm's actions. The committee eventually determined that Ms. Strohm had acted in good 
faith,1 and, on that basis, ClearOne entered into the ETA to reflect its agreement to indemnify 
Ms. Strohm. Thus, ClearOne is contractually bound to indemnify Ms. Strohm in accordance 
with Section 902. 
It is undisputed that ClearOne's board resolution purporting to be conclusive on whether 
Strohm acted in good faith is based solely on the one count of perjury on which Ms. Strohm was 
convicted. Section 902(3), however, is explicit that the "termination of a proceeding by . . . 
conviction . . . is not, of itself, determinative that the director did not meet the standard of 
conduct described in this section." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902(3). Thus, ClearOne cannot 
base its determination regarding whether Ms. Strohm acted in good faith based solely on her 
minimal conviction. Moreover, the fact that Ms. Strohm was acquitted on the seven more 
substantive charges against her is strong evidence that her actions were in good faith and that she 
did meet the requisite standard under the permissive indemnification provisions. Thus, material 
issues of fact exist preventing summary judgment in favor of ClearOne on these claims. 
This determination by the special committee squarely contradicts ClearOne's claim that it has not yet made 
determination that Ms. Strohm met: the requisite standard of conduct. See ClearOne's Memorandum at 35. 
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B. Ms. Strohm's Sixth Claim Is A Viable And Alternative Claim For Relief 
Ms. Strohm's claim for permissive indemnification in her Sixth Claim is an alternative 
claim meant to seek relief should this Court determine that the ETA does not obligate ClearOne 
to indemnify Strohm under Section 902. As discussed above, ClearOne's obligation to 
indemnify Ms. Strohm under Section 902 is reflected in the ETA. If the Court, however, were to 
find that ETA does not cover any rights Ms. Strohm may have to permissive indemnification, the 
fact remains that Ms. Strohm submitted the required undertakings to ClearOne, ClearOne's 
special committee determined that Ms. Strohm had meet the requisite standard of conduct, and 
ClearOne agreed to indemnify Ms. Strohm under Section 902. Thus, the Sixth Claim remains a 
viable and alternative ground for relief should the Court at some point determine that the ETA 
does not cover ClearOne's obligations to indemnify Ms. Strohm under Section 902. 
C. The Plaintiffs' Claims For Unjust Enrichment And Promissory Estoppel 
May Be Viable Claims Depending On This Court's Ruling 
Finally, ClearOne argues that the Plaintiffs' claims of unjust enrichment and promissory 
estoppel should be dismissed because they are equitable claims that relate to subject matter 
governed by an express contract. The Plaintiffs agree that, under Utah law, if the Court 
determines that either the Engagement Agreements or the ETA govern the subject matter of the 
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel claims, these claims would no longer be 
viable. On the other hand, if the subject matter of these claims is not governed by an express 
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To the extent that these claims remain viable, the Plaintiffs have properly set forth 
allegations in the Amended Complaint establishing both of these claims. With respect to the 
unjust enrichment claim, ClearOne is incorrect that Dorsey did not confer a benefit on it. Mr. 
Keough testified that ClearOne wanted to ensure that Ms. Strohm was represented in the SEC 
Action and the Criminal Case in order to ensure her cooperation with ClearOne in the legal 
actions pending against it at that time. ClearOne Dep. at 47:12-48:6; 55:14-58:18; 73:6-74:19; 
96:23-97:12; 100:1-101:8. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that an acquittal on seven of the 
eight claims against one of its former officers conferred a benefit on ClearOne from a public 
perception standpoint. Likewise, ClearOne's statement that the Plaintiffs' claim for promissory 
estoppel relates only to promises contained in a contract is incorrect. A review of the Amended 
Complaint demonstrates that this claim is based on various promises made to the Plaintiffs and 
not just those contained in a contract. Thus, to the extent these claims are not governed by an 
express contract, they remain viable and the Court should deny ClearOne's Cross-Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs urge the Court to grant their Renewed Motion in 
its entirety. The Plaintiffs also respectfully request that the Court deny ClearOne's Cross-Motion 
in its entirety. Finally, the Plaintiffs ask for such other and further relief as is just and proper. 
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Dated this 23rd day of December, 2009. 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
/U$L.LJL-
Milo Steven Marsden 
Cameron M. Hancock 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of December, 2009, true and correct copies of the 
foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS), were 
served upon the person named below, at the addresses set out below either by mailing, postage 
prepaid, hand-delivery, Federal Express, telecopy, e-mail, or ECF as indicated below: 
James E. Magleby (7247) 
magleby@mgpclaw.com 
Jennifer Fraser Parrish (11207) 
parrish@mgpclaw.com 
Magleby & Greenwood, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3605 
• U.S. Mail 
[~1 Federal Express 
I I Hand-Delivery 
I I Telecopy 
E3 E-mail 
• ECF 
Brian S. Cousin 
bcousin@seyfarth.com 
Neil A. Capobianco 
ncapobianco@seyfarth.com 
Seyfarth Shaw LLP 
620 Eighth Avenue 
New York, New York 10018 
• U.S. Mail 
I I Federal Express 
I I Hand-Delivery 
I I Telecopy 
iXl E-mail 
• ECF 
4832-1380-1477\4 12/23/2009 9:26 PM 
/UrfLLjL-
Milo Steven Marsden 
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Exhibit 1 
RECONCILIATION OF CLEARONE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS FACTS 
The following reconciliation is filed in connection with the Plaintiffs' Memorandum In 
Opposition To Defendant's Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment And Reply In Support Of 
Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs Third Claim For 
Relief (Engagement Agreements) (the "Plaintiffs' Reply Brief). 
ClearOne did not contest several facts submitted by Plaintiffs. The following fact 
reconciliation establishes that ClearOne failed to controvert the material facts presented by the 
Plaintiffs as required by Rules 7(c)(3)(B) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs Statement of Facts 
1. Strohm was employed by 
ClearOne from approximately 
February 1996 until December 
5, 2003, and held the position 
of Chief Financial Officer 
("CFO") during the time period 
of the claims asserted in the 
Criminal Case. See Amended 
Compl. at | f 5, 8, 10; Answer 
to Amended Compl. at lfl| 5, 8, 
10. 
2. On or about January 15, 
2003, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
commenced a civil action (the 
"SEC Action") against 
ClearOne, Strohm, and Frances 
M. Flood ("Flood"), who was 
then ClearOne's CEO. 
3. In early 2003, while the 
SEC Action was pending, the 
U.S. Attorneys' Office in and 
for the District of Utah ("Utah 
AUSA") impaneled a grand 
jury to begin a criminal 
investigation that paralleled the 
SEC Action. See Transcript of 
Deposition of Milo Steven 
Marsden, October 14, 2009, at 






These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
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this transcript are attached 
hereto as Exhibit 2. On 
January 28, 2003, the Utah 
AUSA informed ClearOne that 
it "had begun an investigation 
stemming from the complaint 
in the SEC action described 
above." ClearOne 2004 Form 
10-K, at 170, relevant portions 
of which are attached hereto as 
Exhibit 3. 
4. The criminal investigation 
remained open through 2007. 
InMayof2007,theUtah 
AUSA contacted Dorsey 
lawyer Milo Steven Marsden 
and informed him that Strohm 
was a target of the grand jury. 
Mr. Marsden promptly 
informed ClearOne's counsel 
of this development. See E-
mail exchange between Mr. 
Marsden and Ray Etcheverry 
dated May 21, 2007, and May 
30, 2007 (the "Etcheverry E~ 
mail), a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 
On or about July 25, 2007, the 
grand jury returned an 
Indictment against Strohm and 
Flood making fundamentally 
the same allegations against 
Strohm as had been made in 
the SEC Action. (A copy of 
the Indictment is attached to 
the Original Complaint as 
Exhibit K). 
Response to ^[4: Denied that 
the criminal investigation 
remained open through 2007. 
By the Fall of 2003, ClearOne 
did not believe that there was 
a reasonable possibility of a 
criminal proceeding being 
brought and did not believe 
that any indictment of Susie 
Strohm was in the realm of 
possibilities. Gross Dep. 
43:14_44:20. ClearOne had 
made a decision to file a 
lawsuit against ClearOne's 
Directors and Officers 
liability carriers and would 
not have done so if it thought 
that there was a reasonable 
possibility of a criminal 
proceeding. Gross Dep. 
44:12-20. 
Moreover, in the May 2007 
E-mail exchange between Mr. 
Marsden and Ray Etcheverry, 
Mr. Marsden asked ClearOne 
to acknowledge that the grand 
jury proceeding was covered 
by Ms. Strohm's Employment 
Termination Agreement. The 
Dorsey engagement letter was 
not raised or discussed in this 




ClearOne's alleged belief that 
a criminal indictment might 
not actually occur does not 
dispute the fact that the 
criminal investigation 
remained open through 2007 
and ultimately resulted in Ms. 
Strohm and Ms. Flood being 
indicted. See Treloggan v. 
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 
(Utah 1985) (a declarant's 
unsubstantiated opinions or 
beliefs do not contest a fact). 
A review of the deposition 
testimony of Mr. Gross 
establishes he did not testify 
that he had personal 
knowledge that the criminal 
investigation had been closed. 
Accordingly, his deposition 
testimony does not dispute 
these facts. Id. (declarant's 
testimony that is not based on 
personal knowledge may not 
be considered on a motion for 
summary judgment). 
Moreover, ClearOne's hope in 
the Fall of 2003 (9-10 months 
after signing the 2003 
Engagement Agreement) that 
a criminal proceeding may not 
occur is irrelevant to 
determining the parties intent 
regarding the scope of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Engagement Agreements 
retaining Mr. Marsden to 
represent Strohm. 
At the time ClearOne entered 
into the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement, ClearOne 
understood that a criminal 
investigation was underway 
that was aimed at ClearOne, 
Susie Strohm, and Fran Flood 
(the "DOJ Action") See 
ClearOne Depo. at 50:3-52:22 
Faced with the SEC Action, 
DOJ Action, and possible 
future criminal indictments 
against Susie Strohm and Fran 
Flood, on or about February 7, 
2003, ClearOne, Susie Strohm 
and Fran Flood entered into a 
"Joint Defense Privilege and 
Confidentiality Agreement," a 
copy of which is attached to 
the Plaintiffs' Reply Brief as 
Exhibit 3. The Joint Defense 
Agreement was signed by 
ClearOne's criminal counsel, 
signed by Frances Flood's 
criminal counsel Max 
Wheeler, and signed by 
Strohm's counsel Mr. 
Marsden. See Joint Defense 
Agreement at 7. Recitals B, 
E, and F to the Joint Defense 
Agreement state as follows: 
B. ClearOne has been 
notified by the United States 
Department of Justice that a 
criminal investigation is 
underway that arises out of or 
is connected to the allegations 
made in the SEC Action and 
that this investigation is aimed 
at both ClearOne and certain 
individual current and former 
employees of ClearOne (the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"DOJ Action"). 
E. The undersigned counsel 
believe the SEC Action, DOJ 
Action, Investor Suits, and 
Anticipated Actions 
(collectively the 
"Proceedings") relate to or 
involve common issues and 
concerns of their respective 
clients and that such clients 
have a mutuality of interests in 
defending the Proceedings. 
F. As a result of the 
Proceedings, the undersigned 
counsel anticipate civil or 
criminal discovery in the form 
of interviews, testimony, 
and/or production from 
ClearOne, its current or 
former employees, its business 
partners, affiliates, agents, or 
others with whom it does or 
has done business (the 
"Discovery"). 
The clear terms of the Joint 
Defense Agreement 
establishes that ClearOne 
understood that the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's representation 
of Ms. Strohm included 
defending her against criminal 
investigations and subsequent 
criminal proceedings. See 
also ClearOne Dep. at 50-57:4 
The Joint Defense Agreement 
memorialized prior oral 
agreements. Id. at 59:6-21. 
ClearOne does not dispute that 
on May 21, 2007, Mr. 
Marsden informed ClearOne 
that Strohm had been indicted. 
ClearOne, however, fails to 
point out that the Employment 
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1 5. Thereafter, the grand jury 
returned two superseding 
indictments as a result of its 
continuing investigation. The 
first added an additional 
criminal offense for making 
material misrepresentations to 
ClearOne's auditors. The 
second added two counts of 
perjury against Strohm. 
(Copies of Superseding 
Indictments are attached to the 
Original Complaint as Exhibits 
L & M). 
6. The Criminal Case went to 
trial on February 2, 2009. 
After four weeks of trial, the 
jury returned its verdict 
acquitting Strohm on seven of 
the eight counts in the 
Indictment. (A copy of the 




("ETA") drafted by and 
entered into by ClearOne on 
December 5, 2003, a copy of 
which is attached to the 
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief as j 
Exhibit 6, states in its recitals 
that the scope of Mr. 
Marsden1 s representation of 
Strohm included the grand 
jury investigation and any 
resultant subsequent 
proceedings. See ETA at 
Recitals C & E. 
Accordingly, it is undisputed 
that several months after Mr. 
Gross's belief in September 
2003 that the criminal 
proceedings might not move 
forward, ClearOne still 
understood Mr. Marsden was 
retained to defend Strohm any 
future criminal proceedings. 
These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
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1 attached to the Amended 
Complaint as Exhibit AA). 
7. On January 29, 2003 - the 
day after the Utah AUSA 
formally notified ClearOne of 
the pendency of its criminal 
investigation - ClearOne (and 
Ms. Strohm) executed an 
engagement agreement with 
Milo Steven Marsden, who 
was then employed as a. partner 
at the law firm of Bendinger, 
Crockett, Peterson & Casey, 
PC (the "2003 Engagement 
Agreement"). (A copy of this 
agreement is attached to the 
Original Complaint as Exhibit 
B.). 
1 8. Michael Keough executed 
the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement on behalf of 
ClearOne. Id. at 3. At the 
time, Mr, Keough was "interim 
CEO" of ClearOne. See 
Transcript of deposition of 
ClearOne, October 7, 2009, 
(the "ClearOne Depo.") at 23. 
The entire transcript of the 
ClearOne Depo. is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 5. Within 
two months, Keough was 
named CEO. Id. 
9. In the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement, ClearOne engaged 
Mr. Marsden and his firm "to 
represent Susie Strohm's 
interests in connection with the 
SEC civil complaint, 
referenced above, and in 
connection with further related 
investigations and litigation." 
2003 Engagement Agreement 




These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
-6-
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1 10. In the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement, ClearOne further 
agreed: 
a. that "ClearOne will pay the 
full amount of [the] bill within 
thirty days after receipt"; 
b. that "[a]ny amount billed 
and unpaid after such thirty 
day period shall bear and 
accrue interest at the rate of 
18% per annum from the date 
billed until paid"; 
c. that Mr. Marsden and his 
firm would be entitled to 
recover "all reasonable costs 
expended in connection with 
collecting amounts due under 
this Agreement, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees"; 
and, 
d. that ClearOne would be 
jointly and severally liable with 
Ms. Strohm for payment of all 
amounts billed under the 2003 
Engagement Agreement; 
Id. at 1-2. 
11. In early 2004, Mr. Marsden 
left the Bendinger Crockett law 
firm to join Dorsey. On March 
31, 2004, Mr. Marsden wrote 
to ClearOne (and Ms. Strohm) 
to inform them that he had left 
Bendinger Crockett and had 
joined Dorsey (the "2004 
Engagement Agreement"). 
2004 Engagement Agreement 
at 1. (A copy of this agreement 
is attached to the Original 
Complaint as Exhibit C) . The 
letter states that "[o]ur 
engagement agreement needs 
No Response. 
No Response. 
These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 1 
-7-
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to be updated to reflect this 
move." Id. (The 2003 
Engagement Agreement and 
2004 Engagement Agreement 
are collectively referred to 
herein as the "Engagement 
Agreements"). 
12. Mr. Keough executed the 
2004 Engagement Agreement 
on behalf of ClearOne, Id. 
13. In the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement, ClearOne 
confirmed that it had engaged 
Mr. Marsden and Dorsey "to 
represent Susie Strohm in 
connection with the SEC civil 
complaint. . . and in 
connection with further related 
investigations and litigation. . . 
." Id. 
14. As the "update" to the 
terms of the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement, ClearOne further 
agreed, 
a. to pay Dorsey's "usual and 
No Response. 
Response to If 13: Denied as 
selectively quoted. The 
Dorsey engagement letter 
states as follows: 
In particular, this letter 
confirms your engagement of 
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP 
("the firm") to represent Susie 
Strohm in connection with the 
SEC civil complaint, 
referenced above, and in 
connection with further 
related investigations and 
litigation including, among 
others, Anderton v. ClearOne 
Communications, Inc., et al, 
Master File No. 2:03-CV-
0062-PGC; John Gorey, IRA 
v. Frances Flood, et al , Civil 
No. 030918066; and E-Bond 
Epoxies, Inc. Profit Sharing. 
Plan and Trust v. Frances 
Flood et al., Civil No. 
030906061. The letter further 
confirms our discussions and 
agreements about our services 
and charges. 
Response to 14: Denied. The 
Dorsey engagement letter 
states in relevant part as 
follows: 
As you know, I recently left 
These facts are undisputed. 
The content of the Second 
paragraph of the 2004 
Engagement Agreement is 
undisputed. 
Paragraph 14 remains 
undisputed. Interestingly, the 
portions of the 2004 
Engagement Agreement 
quoted by ClearOne establish: 
(1) ClearOne agreed to pay 
-8-
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customary hourly rates" (Id.); 
and 
b. to pay Dorsey's bill "on 
receipt" (Id.). 
the law firm of Bendinger, 
Crockett, Peterson & Casey, 
and joined the law firm of 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP. Our 
engagement agreement needs 
to be updated to reflect this 
move. The rest of this letter is 
intended to serve as the 
update. 
2. Fees, Disbursements and 
Billing. Our fees are 
ordinarily based primarily 
on our usual and customary 
hourly rates. My current 
hourly rate is $255 Our 
hourly rates are subject to 
adjustment from time to time. 
Our fees may also be affected 
by factors such as the amount 
involved in the 
representation, unusual time 
constraints, use of prior work 
product, and overall value of 
the services. 
* * * * We will submit 
monthly statements, 
describing services 
performed, and stating fees 
and other charges and total 
discounts. Payment will be 
due on receipt. 
Notably, the Dorsey 
engagement letter did not 
attempt to incorporate by 
reference any of the specific 
terms set forth in the 
Bendinger engagement letter. 
To the contrary, the Dorsey 
engagement letter recited 
detailed "Fees, 
Disbursements and Billing" 
terms that would apply to 
services performed by 
Dorsey. Significantly, Mr. 
-9-
Add 0-49 
Dorsey fees which are 
"ordinarily based primarily on 
[Dorsey's] usual and 
customary hourly rates; and 
(2) ClearOne agreed to pay 
Dorsey's bill upon receipt. 
ClearOne's remaining 
response to paragraph 14 are 
conclusory legal arguments 
that do not dispute the facts set 
forth in paragraph 14 and 
present theories irrelevant to 
this motion. See Murdoch v. 
Springville, 1999 UT 39, 982 
P.2d 65 (conclusory 
arguments do not dispute the 
facts). 
First, ClearOne's argument 
that the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement did not incoiporate 
the terms of the 2003 
Engagement Agreement is a 
legal argument that ignores (1) 
the provision in the 2004 
Engagement Agreement 
providing it was updating the 
2003 Engagement Agreement; 
and (2) Mr. Keough's 
testimony that the 2004 
Agreement was an amendment 
to the terms of the 2003 
Agreement. See Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum, f^ 38. 
Moreover, the relevant rate 
and use of out-of-town 
attorneys relates to this 
Court's future determination 
of reasonableness of the 
attorneys fees and costs to be 
awarded to Dorsey. 
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15. Pursuant to ClearOne's 
promises in the Engagement 
Agreements, Dorsey has 
represented Strohm throughout 
the Criminal Case. See 
Declaration of Milo Steven 
Marsden in Support of Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment 
filed on August 12, 2009 (the 
"Marsden Declaration") at If 
11. 
Marsden's rate is listed as 
$255 per hour - largely in 
line with his rate at 
Bendinger. The Bendinger 
engagement letter does not 
attempt to recite as a term -
much less obtain ClearOne's 
agreement upon - the 
potential use of out-of-town 
attorneys or the fact that fees 
would be affected by the rates 
charges by out-of-town 
attorneys. 
Response to Tf 15: 
Denied. Paragraph 11 of 
Mardsen's Aug. 12,2009 
Declaration states in full: 
"Dorsey represented Strohm 
throughout the Criminal Case, 
and continues to represent 
Strohm in connection with 
this matter." Plaintiffs offer 
no record support for their 
contention that such 
representation was pursuant 
to either engagement letter or 
that ClearOne made any 
promises with respect to the 
Criminal Case in either letter. 
To the contrary, in the May 
2007 E-mail exchange 
between Mr. Marsden and 
Ray Etcheverry, Mr. Marsden 
asked ClearOne to 
acknowledge that the grand 
jury proceeding was covered 
by Ms. Strohm's Employment 
Termination Agreement and 
the Dorsey engagement letter 
was not raised or discussed in 
this E-mail exchange. Pis' Br. 
Ex. 4. When the issue of the 
Dorsey engagement letter was 
first raised in William 
Michael's letter to Greg A. 
It is undisputed that Dorsey 
represented Strohm 
throughout the Criminal Case. 
ClearOne's self-serving 
statement in Mr. LeClaire's 
November 8, 2007, letter that 
the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement did not cover the 
Criminal Case does not 
dispute this fact. Moreover, 
this self-serving statement is 
irrelevant and lacks 
foundation. It is undisputed 
that Mr. Keough, as the CEO 
of ClearOne, signed both the 
2003 Engagement Agreement 
and 2004 Engagement 
Agreement. Mr. Keough 
testified that at the time he 
signed the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement and 2004 
Engagement Agreement, 
ClearOne understood that the 
relevant paragraphs defining 
the scope of the representation 
included any possible criminal 
proceedings against Ms. 
Strohm. See ClearOne Dep. at 
33:2-20; 44:20-46:4; 111:10-
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16. ClearOne paid Dorsey's 
bills for services rendered in 
the Criminal Case for the 
eleven months from May of 
2007 through March of 2008. 
; See id. at ^ 12. During this 
time, in its public filings 
ClearOne consistently 
acknowledged that it had a 
"direct financial obligation to 
advance funds related to the 
indemnification agreements 
with [Strohm] for any liability 
LeClaire dated November 8, 
I 2007 (Exhibit D at page 3), 
ClearOne responded that "the 
retainer agreements governed 
the SEC complaint and not 
the current U.S. Department 
of Justice action." Exhibit E 
at page 3. 
Response to f 16: Denied. 
ClearOne did not simply pay 
Dorsey's bills for services 
rendered from May 2007 
through March 2008. 
ClearOne repeatedly 
attempted to obtain sufficient 
information about the 
services that were actually 
being rendered and expenses 
being incurred in order to 
determine wrhat was 
reasonable. See, e.g., Exhibits 
ClearOne also entered into the 
Joint Defense Agreement that 
recognizes Mr. Marsden 
would be representing Ms. 
Strohm in the DOJ Action and 
any future criminal 
proceedings. Notably, Mr. 
LeClaire was not involved in 
signing either the 2003 
Engagement Agreement or the 
2004 Engagement Agreement. 
Accordingly, his self-serving 
letter does not dispute Mr. 
Keough's testimony. See 
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) (a 
declarant's unsubstantiated 
opinions or beliefs without 
personal knowledge does not 
contest a fact). ClearOne 
concedes that the only person 
with knowledge regarding 
ClearOne's understanding of 
the terms of the 2003 
Engagement Agreement and 
2004 Engagement Agreement 
is Mr. Keough. See 
ClearOne's Memorandum at 
23. Simply put, Mr. LeClaire 
lacks the personal knowledge 
to support the self serving 
claims in his letter. 
This fact remains undisputed. 1 
ClearOne does not dispute that 
it paid the bills from May 
2007 through March 2008. 
The statements in ClearOne's 
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and for all reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in defending against 
the charges brought by the 
United States Attorney." 
11/12/2007 FormlO-Q (for 
period ended Sept. 30, 2007), 
at 22. (A copy of this Form 
10-Q is attached to the Original 
Complaint at Exhibit F). 
D & E (annexed hereto). The 
parties ended up 
compromising their 
respective positions as recited 
in William Michael's 
December 13, 2007 letter to 
Mr. LeClaire. Exhibit F 
(annexed hereto). 
ClearOne's SEC filings never 
referred to the Bendinger or 
Dorsey engagement letters, 
but rather variously stated 
ClearOne's evolving 
understanding of what it 
understood its obligation to 
be pursuant to Ms. Strohm's 
Employment Termination 
Agreement and Ms. Flood's 
Employment Separation 
Agreement - referred to in 
the filings as "the 
indemnification agreements." 
See, e.g., Original Complaint 
Ex. D ("By virtue of certain 
provisions of the Company's 
Articles of Incorporation, 
Bylaws and indemnification 
agreements with these former 
officers, the Company has a 
direct financial obligation to 
indemnify each former officer 
for any liability and for all 
reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in defending 
against the charges brought 
by the United States 
Attorney."). 
17. However, in March of 2008 
ClearOne reversed field. 
ClearOne ceased paying the 
invoices Dorsey submitted, and 
ClearOne has paid no 
subsequent invoices. See 
Response to 17: Denied. 
Paragraph 11 of Mr. 
Marsden's Aug. 12,2009 
Declaration states in full: 
"Dorsey represented Strohm 
throughout the Criminal Case, 
and continues to represent 
Strohm in connection with 
This fact remains undisputed. 
ClearOne does not dispute that 
it previously paid Dorsey's 
invoices but ceased making 
such payments in March of 
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1 Marsden Declaration at f^ 11. 
1 18. Since that time, Dorsey has 
submitted invoices for its 
services and for costs advanced 
in the Criminal Case in excess 
of $1,000,000. 
19. On August 21, 2008, the 
Plaintiffs commenced this 
proceeding (the "Collection 
Case") by filing the Original 
Complaint. The Plaintiffs filed 
an Amended Complaint on 
July 29, 2009. In the 
Collection Case, Strohm and 
Dorsey have asserted a variety 
of theories under which they 
are seeking to recover from 
ClearOne the fees and costs 
incurred in representing 
Strohm in the Criminal Case. 
20. The Amended Complaint's 
! Third Claim for Relief alleges 
that the Engagement 
Agreements constitute a valid 
and binding contract between 
Dorsey, Strohm, and ClearOne, 
and that ClearOne has 
breached this contract "by 
failing to pay Dorsey for the 
full amount of legal services 
provided to Ms. Strohm as 
agreed." Amended Complaint 
at 23 (H 78). 
21. The Amended 
Complaint's Third Claim for 
Relief also alleges that under 
the terms of the parties' 
agreement (i) Dorsey is entitled 
to its attorney's fees incurred 
in this action (id., % 79) and (ii) 
this matter." Plaintiffs 
therefore offer no record 






These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 1 
These facts are undisputed. 1 
These facts are undisputed. 1 
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Dorsey is entitled to interest on 
these amounts at 18% per 
annum (Id.). 
22. Shortly after the Original 
Complaint was filed, Strohm 
and Dorsey filed a motion 
seeking summary judgment on 
their claims related to the 
Engagement Agreements. See 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (dated 
10/3/2008). In their motion, 
the Plaintiffs argued that the 
plain language of the 
Engagement Agreements 
required ClearOne to pay 
Strohm 5s attorney fees and 
costs incurred in the Criminal 
Case as those invoices came 
due, that Dorsey had provided 
a defense for Strohm in the 
Criminal Case, and that 
ClearOne had breached the 
Engagement Agreements by 
failing and refusing to pay any 
of Ms. Strohm's attorney fees 
and costs incurred in 
connection with her defense 
since March of 2008. See id, 
generally. 
23. The Court held a hearing 
on the Plaintiffs' motion (and 
other matters) on December 
1 19, 2008, and rejected the 
Plaintiffs' argument that the 
language of the Engagement 
Agreements was sufficiently 
plain and unambiguous in 
setting forth the scope of 
ClearOne's engagement of 
Dorsey to represent Ms. 
Strohm. See Transcript of 
Hearing dated December 19, 
2008 (the "December 19th 
Transcript") at 54 (Relevant 
No Response. 
No Response. 
These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
-14-
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portions of the December 19th 
Transcript are attached hereto 
as Exhibit 6). Instead, the 
Court found that it could not 
determine "the scope of the 
agreement" based solely on the 
plain language of the 
Engagement Agreements, and 
that discovery would be 
required on "the intention of 
the parties" with regard to this 
issue. Id. 
24. Similarly, last July in 
considering ClearOne's motion 
regarding this same cause of 
action, the Court stated that 
"the Letter agreements I have 
found them to be ambiguous. 
i And then my first duty is to 
find evidence if it's available 
to give me the intent of the 
i parties." July 1 st Transcript at 
29. The Court explained that 
the way to clear up the 
ambiguity would be to permit 
discovery on, among other 
things, the scope of ClearOne's 
engagement of Mr. Marsden 
and Dorsey under the 
Engagement Agreements. See 
id. at 55. 
25. On March 17, 2009, the 
Plaintiffs noticed the 
deposition of ClearOne (the 
"Deposition Notice"). A copy 
of the Deposition Notice is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 7. 
Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Deposition 
Notice demanded that 
ClearOne produce "one or 
more of its officers, directors, 
managing agents, or other 
i persons who are 
No Response. 
No Response. 
These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
-15-
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knowledgeable and consent to 
testify on ClearOne's behalf 
with respect to each of the 
subject matters listed" on an 
attached schedule of topics, 
including: 
10. The circumstances 
surrounding your negotiation 
and execution of the 
Employment Termination 
Agreement, the 2003 
Agreement, or the 2004 
Agreement. 
11. Communications you have 
had regarding the Employment 
Termination Agreement, the 
2003 Agreement, or the 2004 
Agreement. 
Id. 
26. On August 31, 2009, 
counsel for ClearOne notified 
the Plaintiffs by e-mail that 
ClearOne had designated Mike 
Keough as its representative to 
testify on topics 10 and 11 with 
respect to the Engagement 
Agreements. See E-mail from 
Neil Capobianco dated August 
31, 2009 (the "Capobianco E-
mail") at 1. A copy of this e-
mail is attached hereto as 
' Exhibit 8. Mr. Keough, in 
addition to being ClearOne's 
designated corporate 
representative on these topics, 
had been ClearOne's CEO at 
the time the Engagement 
Agreements were signed, and 
was the person at ClearOne 
who actually signed the 
Engagement Agreements on 
ClearOne's behalf. See 
ClearOne Depo. at 89:22-24; 
No Response. 
* 
These facts are undisputed. 
-16-
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see also Engagement Letters at 
3. 
27. On October 7, 2009, the 
Plaintiffs conducted 
ClearOne's deposition pursuant 
to Rule 30(b)(6). Mr. Keough 
appeared as ClearOne's 
representative on topics 10 and 
11, as set forth above. 
,28. At its deposition, ClearOne 
testified that it understood, 
prior to executing the 2003 
Engagement Agreement, that 
the Department of Justice was 
investigating Strohm and that 
criminal charges could be 
brought as a result of that 
investigation: 
Q. And you also understood in 
2002, early 2003 as the CEO of 
ClearOne, that a DOJ 
investigation was being 
undertaken and that could 
result in a criminal litigation 
and claims being brought 
against Strohm and Flood. 
MR. CAPOBTANCO: 
Objection to form. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And those criminal claims 
that could be brought against 
Strohm and Flood would relate 
to or arise out of the SEC 
action, correct? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Objection to form. 
Q. The same underlying 
No Response. 
Response to 1[ 28: Denied. 
These questions are 
improperly leading, 
hypothetical, and outside the 
scope of the deposition topics 
on which Mr. Keough was 
designated to testify and 
therefore, the cited testimony 
is inadmissible. Mr. Keough 
recalls only that someone told 
him that Steve Marsden 
would be representing Susie 
Strohm (Keough Dep. 143:7-
144:5), recalls no discussion 
by ClearOne's Board 
regarding the scope of Mr. 
Marsden's retention (Keough 
Dep. 45:14-19), recalls no 
Board review of the 
Bendinger engagement letter 
(Keough Dep. 119:6-12), and 
did not know whether Mr. 
Marsden had any experience 
handling criminal matters 
when he [Mr. Keough] signed 
the engagement letters 
(Keough Dep. 141:7-13). 
Moreover, Mr. Keough 
harbors animus against 
ClearOne since he was 
involuntarily relieved as 
ClearOne's CEO by 
ClearOne's Chairman in June 
2004 because of unspecified 




These facts are undisputed. 
These facts are undisputed. 
The testimony of Mr. Keough 
remains undisputed and is 
admissible for several reasons. 
First, ClearOne's claim that 
the questions are improperly 
leading lacks merit for several 
reasons. Mr. Keough was 
designated at ClearOne's 
30(b)(6) witness regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the 
negotiations and execution of 
the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement and 2004 
Engagement Agreement. The 
existence and ClearOne's 
knowledge of the DOJ 
investigation of Strohm is a 
circumstance surrounding the 
negotiation and execution of 
the Engagement Agreements. 
Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence states leading 
questions are permitted when 
a party calls an adverse party 
or a witness identified with an 
adverse party. Mr. Keough, 
as ClearOne's 30(b)(6) 
representative, is testifying on 
behalf of the adverse party -
ClearOne. Accordingly, the 
alleged leading questions were 
proper and permitted. 
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claims? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was your 
knowledge and understanding 
as the CEO in December of 
2002 when you were interim 
CEO, and early January of 
2003; is that right? 
A. Yes. 





Second, these questions 
merely summarized Mr. 
Keough's prior testimony. 
Q. In the 2004 10-K it states 
that the SEC action was filed 
on January 15, 2003. 
A. Ok. 
Q. Soifthat'sthedatethatit 
was filed, when you took over 
for Ms. Flood as the interim 
CEO in December you were at 
least aware there was an 
investigation at the time 
ongoing.. 
A. Yes. 
Q. - into those alleged 
improper revenue recognition 
issues? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And these allegations, as 
you understood it, involved 
allegations of involvement by 
Fran Flood and Susie Strohm? 
A. Yes. 
ClearOne Dep., 26:14-27:3 
Q. Okay. With respect to -
we have gone over the SEC 
action and the shareholder 
class action. There was a third 
one called Department of 
Justice Investigation of Flood 
and Strohm [Referencing the 
June 2003 Clear One 10-k]. 
Do you recall that? 
A. I recall a Department of 
Justice investigation, but -
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yes. 
Q. And what is your 
understanding of what a 
Department of Justice 
investigation, what the 
purpose is of-
A. I can't tell you I know 
exactly, but at the time I was 
aware that the SEC was a civil 
action and the Department of 
Justice could potentially be 
more on the criminal side. 
Q. Okay. So the SEC action 
that was filed in January 15, 
2003, that was the civil piece 
of litigation? 
A. Uh-huh (Affirmative) 
Q. And if I understand what 
you've told me is that you had 
an understanding as the CEO 
ofClearOnethataDOJ 
Investigation is the criminal 
side, and that's an 
investigation that could 
ultimately lead to criminal 
claims against Strohm and 
Flood, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection 
Form. 
Q. And this criminal 
investigation, the DOJ 
investigation, was it also your 
understanding as CEO that 
that investigation was related 
to and arose out of the revenue 
recognition issue that we 
talked about in the SEC 
action? 
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A. Yes. 
ClearOne did not object to Mr. 
Keough's prior testimony. As 
a result, it waived any 
objection to the question an 
answers of its 30(b)(6) 
witness. See Utah R. Civ. 
Proc. 32(c)(3)(B). Keough 
subsequently testified, without 
objection as follows: 
Q. Ok. And did you 
understand in 2002 and early 
2003 that Mr. Marsden would 
be representing Fran in both -
Mr. Marsden: Susie 
Q. Susie Strohm both in 
connection with the SEC 
action and the DOJ 
investigation? 
A. Yes. He was the only 
legal counsel I was ever aware 
of that represented Susie on 
any of this. 
ClearOne Dep. 43:4-11 
Mr. Keough testified as 
follows concerning the scope 
of the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement: 
Q. And what was your 
understanding as to what the 
term "further related 
investigations and litigation" 
meant? 
A. It was early on and I don't 
think anybody knew what 
would spawn from that. But 
effectively as the CFO of the 
Company, she was going to be 
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indemnified. 
Q. Prior to signing this on 
January 29, 2003 you 
understood that there was a 
DOJ Investigation, right? 
A. That was part of what was 
going on, yes. 
ClearOneDep. 113:8-18 
Q. And did you understand 
where it says "further related 
investigations and litigation," 
with your understanding there 
was a DOJ investigation going 
on, that the term, "in 
connection with further related 
investigation and litigation," 
would include if it happened, a 
criminal indictment and 
criminal action against Ms. 
Strohm? 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection 
to form. 
A. That would have been my 
understanding. 
ClearOneDep. 114:2-11. 
Finally, ClearOne's contention 
that Mr. Keough's testimony 
is improper and inadmissible 
because he is allegedly biased 
fails for several reasons. A 
Court does not weigh the 
credibility of a witness on a 
motion for summary 
judgment. Sandberg v. Klein, 
576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, Mr. Keough was 
designated by ClearOne as its 
30(b)(6) witness to testify on 
its behalf. ClearOne is not 
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29. ClearOne further testified 
that it understood the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's representation 
of Ms. Strohm under the 2003 
Engagement Agreement 
included representation of her 
in any criminal case that might 
be brought, and that there was 
no discussion regarding a 
limitation on the scope of his 
representation: 
Q. And as I understand it, 
what you were telling me is 
I that when [Mr. Marsden] was 
retained you understood, as the 
CEO of ClearOne, the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's representation 
was going to be representing 
Ms. Strohm in the SEC action, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Response to If 29: Denied. 
See Response to If 28. 
entitled to excluded Mr. 1 
Keough's testimony because it 
failed to prepare its witness 
and does not like the 
testimony of its 3 0(b)(6) 
designee. In addition, the 
testimony cited by ClearOne 
does not contest the fact that 
ClearOne was aware of the 
DO J investigation prior to 
entering into the 2003 
Engagement Agreement. 
Rather, the testimony 
establishes that Mr. Keough is 
the sole witness who can 
testify regarding the 
circumstances and 
understanding of ClearOne 
regarding the scope of the 
2003 Engagement Agreement 
and 2004 Engagement 
Agreement. 
These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
Q. He would represent her in 
the DOJ investigation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as you have told me, 
any and all other claims that 
might be brought against her, 
including any criminal 
indictments or criminal actions 
brought against her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was your 
understanding of what his 
retention was when ClearOne 
approved Mr. Marsden to be 




Objection to form. 
Q. Do you recall any 
discussion by any of the board 
members with respect to the 
scope of Mr. Marsden's 
retention? 
A. "Scope" meaning? Any 
limit on scope? 
Q. What it was limited to. 
A. No. 
Q. And as the 30(b)(6) 
designee on behalf of 
ClearOne, is it your testimony 
you don't recall any other 
discussions or communications 
by any board member limiting 
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A. No limitation of scope. 
Q. Then there was no 
discussion or agreement that 
his representation be limited 
solely to the SEC action? 
A. No discussion about that. 
ClearOne Depo, at 44:20-46:4 
(emphasis added). 
30. Indeed, contrary to the 
representations ClearOne's 
counsel has made to this Court, 
ClearOne testified that not only 
did it not intend the 
Engagement Agreements to be 
limited solely to the SEC 
Action, it expected Mr. 
Marsden would represent Ms. 
Strohm in any criminal action: 
Q. And after reading the 
retainer agreement, did you 
think that Mr. Marsden's scope 
of his retention in representing 
Ms. Strohm was limited solely 
to the SEC action? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have the 
understanding at that time that 
based on the DOJ action, his 
scope of representation would 
be expanded beyond civil 
litigation to include 
representing her in criminal 
actions that related to or were 
in connection with base 
allegations of revenue 
recognition in the SEC civil 
complaint? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Objection to form. 
Response to f^ 30: 
Denied. See Response to 
1128. Moreover, Mr. 
Keough's responses to the 
effect that something "would 
have been [his] expectation" 
lacks proper foundation and is 
inadmissible because such 
testimony indicates that he 
does not recall what his 
understanding was at the time 
he signed the engagement 
letters - or whether he even 
had an understanding - and 
that he was attempting to 
project counsel's current 
conclusion onto his 
speculation as what "he 
would have" thought at the 
time. 
These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 
to ClearOne's response to 
128. 
Mr. Keough testified he 
signed the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement and 2004 
Engagement Agreement as the 
CEO of ClearOne. ClearOne 
Dep. 120:12-18; 124:1-3. He 
testified he reviewed the 
agreement before signing 
them on behalf of ClearOne. 
ClearOne Dep. 109:5-8; 
162:8-19/ ClearOne has failed 
to identify how Mr. Keough 
would not have personal 
knowledge and the necessary 
foundation to testify regarding 
his understanding of the terms 
of the agreements that he 
signed in his official capacity 
as the CEO of ClearOne. 
Moreover, Mr. Keough 
testified that that was his 
understanding at the time. See 
ClearOne Dep. at 108:9-109:8 
-24-
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1 A. Yes. That would have been 
my expectation. 
Q. And that was your 
understanding? 
A. Yeah. He was the only 
counsel referenced working on 
Susie's behalf for whatever the 
issue was. 
Q. And as I understand it, as 
the CEO of ClearOne you 
understood that the scope of 
his representation was not just 
limited to civil litigation. 
A. That's correct. 
ClearOne Depo., at 117:8-
118:4. 
31. ClearOne repeatedly 
confirmed that the 2003 
Engagement Agreement was 
intended to cover the defense 
of Strohm should any criminal 
indictments be brought against 
her: 
Q. Thank you. And in the first 
paragraph - before we get 
there, if I remember correctly, 
and I just want to confirm, you 
stated earlier that it was your 
understanding, at the time that 
Mr. Marsden was retained and 
that you signed [the 2003 
Engagement Agreement] on 
behalf of ClearOne, that the 
scope of his retention would be 
the SEC action? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It would include the DO J 
action. 
Response to If 31: Denied. 
See Response to f 28. 
These facts are undisputed. 1 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Objection to form. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if I understand you, 
and you tell me if I'm wrong, it 
would include any criminal 
indictments; defending against 
those with respect to Ms. 
Strohm? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Objection to form. 
A. Yes. Nothing was 
excluded, as I remember. 
ClearOne Depo., at 111:10-
112:2; see also id. at 170:23-
171:10. 
32. Indeed, ClearOne 
specifically confirmed that it 
understood the phrase "further 
related investigations and 
litigation," as contained in the 
2003 Engagement Agreement, 
to include any criminal 
indictments and criminal 
actions against Strohm: 
Q. And did you understand 
where it says "further related 
investigations and litigation," 
with your understanding that 
there was a DOJ investigation 
going, that that term, "in 
connection with further related 
investigations and litigation," 
would include, if it happened, a 
criminal indictment and 
criminal action against Ms. 
Strohm? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Response to 1J32: 




These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing these acts. See 
Reconciliation to ClearOne5s 
response to f^ 28. 
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Objection to form. 
A. That would have been my 
understanding, yes. 
ClearOne Depo., at 114:2-11. 
33. ClearOne also testified that 
it understood that, under the 
2004 Engagement Agreement, 
Dorsey had been engaged to 
represent Strohm in potential 
criminal actions, and that it 
expected that such criminal 
action would be brought 
against Strohm: 
Q. So you understood that 
there were still potential 
indictments that could come 
down and criminal action 
brought against Ms. Strohm 
when you signed [the 2004 
Engagement Agreement], 
correct? 
A. Yes. In fact, that was my 
expectation. 
Q. And you understood, based 
on that expectation, that was 
still the scope of Mr. 
Marsden's representation under 
[the Engagement Agreements], 
correct? 
A. Yes. There were no limits 
ever decided on that 
representation. 
ClearOne Depo., at 175:12-22. 
Response to ^[33: Denied. 
See Response to f^ 28. 
Moreover, Mr. Keough has 
no specific recollection of 
discussing the Dorsey 
engagement letter with 
anyone (Keough Dep. 
162:13- 15). By signing the 
Dorsey engagement letter, 
Mr. Keough did not intend to 
give any rights to Susie 
Strohm in addition to what 
she received in her 
Employment Termination 
Agreement (Keough Dep. 
164:10-15). In fact, Mr. 
Keough was surprised when 
Ms. Strohm was ultimately 
indicted (Keough Dep. 176:3-
9). 
Furthermore, by the Fall of 
2003, ClearOne did not 
believe that there was a 
reasonable possibility of a 
criminal proceeding being 
brought and did not believe 
that any indictment of Susie 
Strohm was in the realm of 
possibilities. Gross Dep. 
43:14-44:20. ClearOne had 
made a decision to' file a 
lawsuit against ClearOne's 
Directors and Officers 
liability carriers and would 
not have done so if it thought 
that there was a reasonable 
possibility of a criminal 
proceeding. Gross Dep. 
-27-
These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 
to ClearOne's response to 
If 28. 
The fact Mr. Keough did not 
discuss the terms of the 
Engagement Agreements with 
anyone at ClearOne further 
establishes that he is the only 
person on behalf of ClearOne 
who can testify regarding 
ClearOne's understanding of 
the scope of the agreements. 
Mr. Keough testified that he 
understood the ETA obligated 
ClearOne to pay Strohm's 
legal fees in the criminal 
action as billed by Marsden. 
See ClearOne Dep. at 67:20:-
72:12; 73:23-74:19. 
Accordingly, his testimony 
regarding the rights granted 
under the ETA and 
engagement agreements is 
consistent. 
See also Reconciliation to 
ClearOne's response to % 4. 
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34. ClearOne testified that it, 
rather than Strohm, would be 
obligated under the 
Engagement Agreements to 
pay invoices submitted by 
Dorsey: 
Q. So when you say that, was 
it your understanding that if 
Ms. Strohm didn't pay the bills 
of Mr. Marsden for 
representing Ms. Strohm, 
ClearOne was obligated to pay 
them? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Objection to form. 
A. Yes. I don't remember any 
conversation about Ms. Strohm 
1 paying the bills. 
ClearOne Depo., at 122:23-
123:4. 
35. ClearOne also confirmed 
that, as stated in the 2003 
Engagement Agreement, it 
agreed to pay Dorsey's 
invoices within 30 days of 
receipt of any such invoice: 
Q. Did ClearOne agree to pay 
invoices from Mr. Marsden for 
the services he rendered in 
representing Ms. Strohm as 
they were billed within 30 days 
after receipt? 
A. Did they actually do that or 
is - -
Q. Is that what they agreed to? 
A. Yes. 
44:12-20. 
Response to [^ 34: Denied. 
See Response to K 28. The 
fact that Mr. Keough does not 
recall any discussions about 
Ms. Strohm paying Dorsey's 
invoices does not establish 
that ClearOne was 
aclcnowledging any obligation 
to pay Dorsey's invoices in 
connection with the federal 
criminal proceeding, much 
less that any such obligation 
existed pursuant to the 
engagement letters. 
Response to f^ 35: Denied. 
See Response to If 28. The 
cited testimony refers to the 
Bendinger engagement letter, 
not to the Dorsey engagement 
letter, which was not 
introduced until page 123. 
Moreover, this testimony is 
inadmissible because Mr. 
Keough - a lay witness - is 
not competent to testify as to 
the proper legal interpretation 
of the Bendinger engagement 
letter. 
These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 
to ClearOne's response to 
128. 
These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 
to ClearOne's response to 
128. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' 
Statement ofFact No. 39 
establishes ClearOne 
understood that the 2004 
Engagement Agreement 
merely updated and amended 
certain terms of the 2003 
Engagement Agreement and 
that the two agreements 
constituted one agreement. 
-28-
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1 ClearOne Depo., at 110:9-15. 
1 36. With respect to interest on 
unpaid invoices, ClearOne 
testified that it understood, 
under the Engagement 
Agreements, Dorsey would be 
entitled to receive 18% interest 
per annum on any invoice not 
paid within 30 days of receipt: 
Q. And did ClearOne also 
agree that any amount unpaid 
after the 30 days would bear 
and accrue interest at a rate of 
18 percent? 
A. If that was in the original 
draft as it is here, yes. 
Q. Okay. And is that your 
understanding of paragraph 3, 
the second paragraph where it 
says, "Any amount billed and 
unpaid after such thirty day 
period shall bear and accrue 
interest at the rate of 18 percent 
per annum for the date billed 
until paid?" 
A. Yes. 
ClearOne Depo., at 110:16-
111:1. 
37. In addition, ClearOne 
confirmed that it understood it 
would be obligated to pay for 
Dorsey's attorney's fees in the 
event that Dorsey was required 
to bring an action to collect its 
fees under the Engagement 
Agreements: 
Q. And if they weren't paid 
and Mr. Marsden had to bring 
an action to recover his fees 
Response to *\\ 36: Denied. 
See Response to 1| 35. 
Response to H 37: Denied. 
See Response to % 35. 
These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 
to ClearOne's response to 
128. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' 
Statement of Fact No. 3 8 
establishes ClearOne 
understood that the 2004 
Engagement Agreement 
merely updated and amended 
certain terms of the 2003 
Engagement Agreement and 
that the two agreements 
constituted one agreement. 
These facts are undisputed. 1 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 
to ClearOne's response to 
1128. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' 
Statement of Fact No. 3 8 
establishes ClearOne 
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| from ClearOne, was it your 
understanding ClearOne would 
pay his fees and costs in 
enforcing the terms of the 
retainer agreement? 
A. If they were found to be - -
Q. Successful? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So if ClearOne just 
decides they are not going to 
p a y -
A. Yes. 
Q. - - and they ultimately are 
found that they weren't entitled 
to stop paying, it was your 
understanding that Mr. 
Marsden would recover all of 
his reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs in getting a judgment 
to get the money for his 
attorney's fees and costs from 
ClearOne? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Objection to form. 
Q. Is that your understanding? 
A. Yes. 
ClearOne Depo., at 116:9-
117:3. 
38. Finally, ClearOne testified 
that it understood the 2004 
Engagement Agreement 
updated the parties' agreement 
to reflect Mr. Marsden's move 
to Dorsey, but that other terms 
of the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement remained in place: 
Response to [^ 38: Denied. 
See Response to ^ 28. 
Moreover, Mr. Keough's 
response lacks proper 
foundation and is 
inadmissible because his 
testimony that something 
"would have been [his] 
expectation" indicates that he 
understood that the 2004 
Engagement Agreement 
merely updated and amended 
certain terms of the 2003 
Engagement Agreement and 
that the two agreements 
constituted one agreement. 
These facts are undisputed. 
ClearOne has not presented 
any admissible evidence 
disputing the testimony of Mr. 
Keough. See Reconciliation 
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Q. Okay. Let me have you 
look at the first paragraph [of 
the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement] where Mr. 
Marsden says, "As you know, I 
recently left the law firm of 
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson 
& Casey, and joined the law 
firm of Dorsey & Whitney, 
LLP." That's pretty basic. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the next section says, 
"Our engagement agreement 
needs to be updated to reflect 
this move." 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. What did you understand 
him to mean when he was 
referencing "our engagement 
agreement"? 
A. Well, other than the 
change of firms, nothing else 
changed. It was -
# * # * 
Q. So when Mr. Marsden is 
stating in the first paragraph in 
[the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement], where he says, 
"The rest of this letter is 
intended to serve as the 
update," did you understand 
that the purpose of [the 2004 
Engagement Agreement] was 
to sort of amend or update 
certain terms of Exhibit 9 and 
leave the rest unchanged? 
A. Yes. 
* * * * 
does not recall what his 
understanding was at the time 
he signed the Dorsey 
engagement letter - or 
whether he even had an 
understanding - and that he 
was attempting to project 
counsel's current conclusion 
onto his speculation as what 
"he would have" thought at 
the time. This testimony is 
also inadmissible because Mr. 
Keough - a lay witness - is 
not competent to testify as to 
the proper legal interpretation 
of the Dorsey engagement 
letter. 
Furthermore, by signing the 
Dorsey engagement letter, 
Mr. Keough did not intend to 
give any rights to Ms. Strohm 
in addition to what she 
received in her Employment 
Termination Agreement 
(Keough Dep. 164:10-15). 
-31-
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Mr. Keough testified he 
signed the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement and 2004 
Engagement Agreement as the 
CEOofClearOne. ClearOne 
Depo. at 108:23-109:8. He 
testified he reviewed the 
agreement before signing 
them on behalf of ClearOne. 
Id. ClearOne has failed to 
identify how Mr. Keough 
would not have either the 
personal knowledge necessary 
to testify regarding his 
understanding of the terms of 
the agreements that he signed 
in his official capacity as the 
CEOofClearOne. Moreover, 
Mr. Keough testified 
regarding his understanding at 
the time he signed the 
agreements. 
This Court has ruled that the 
engagement agreements are 
ambiguous. The testimony of 
Mr. Keough, the person who 
signed each agreement on 
behalf of ClearOne, is the 
quintessential extrinsic 
evidence a Court examines 
when determining the intent of 
contracting parties. In 
contrast, ClearOne's legal 
arguments do not create an 
issue of fact or extrinsic 
evidence. 
Mr. Keough testified as 
follows regarding the 2004 
Engagement Agreement, 
without any objection by 
ClearOne: 
Q. Okay. And so I want to 
make sure one last time that I 
understand. As ClearOne's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. I'll rephrase it. Did you 
then consider [the 2003 
Engagement Agreement] and 
[the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement] to be essentially 
combined as one agreement, 
with [the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement] merely updating 
[the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement]? 
A. Yes. I think "update" is 
the correct word. 
* * * * 
Q. Okay. And so terms that 
were not changed or modified 
in [the 2004 Engagement 
Agreement] would remain 
terms in [the 2003 Engagement 
Agreement] that ClearOne 
agreed to, going forward still 
with Mr. Marsden representing 
Susie Strohm. Would that be 
fair? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: 
Objection to form. 
A. That would have been my 
expectation, yes. 
Q. And was that your 
understanding as the CEO of 
ClearOne? 
A. It was. 
Q. And as the 30(b)(6) 
designee of ClearOne, was that 




representative here testifying 
aboutExhibitslO[2004 
Engagement Agreement] and 
Exhibit 9 [2003 Engagement 
Agreement], and having 
signed it as ClearOne's CEO 
for ClearOne, both Exhibits 9 
and 10, you considered both 
Exhibits 9 and 10 to be 
combined as one agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Exhibit 10 was merely an 
amendment or update to some 




A. I knew of no other 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
understanding. So I would say 
yes. 






Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT 2 
Add. C-74 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Case No. 080917500 
Judge: Robert Hilder 
VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION OF: MILO STEVEN MARSDEN 
OCTOBER 14, 2009 
9:03 A.M. TO 5:40 P.M. 
Location: LAW OFFICES OF MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD 
170 South Main -Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Reporter: Judy A. Holdeman, RPR, CSR 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
CD ENCLOSED 
Q<vA R E P O R T I N G , I N C 
1872 South Main Street Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
801.484.2929 reporting@QAreport.com 
AHH P.-75 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Milo Steven Marsden - October 14, 2009 
A. Urn — well, I'm sure it came up with Fran Flood. 
Or it was implicit because she was there -- uh -- probably 
implicit in the meetings where Dal Bagley was present and 
where Brad Baldwin is present. But as far as a discussion 
particularly on that topic — uh -- I don't remember anybody 
else. 
Q. Did you ever speak to any ClearOne attorney other 
than Scott Hunter about the fact that you were going to be 
representing Ms. Strohm? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who? 
A. Neil Kaplan, Rod Snow, Jennifer James — uh -- who 
else did they have on their team? They had Walt Romney. 
Q. Now, do you know how it is that you ended up 
representing Susie Strohm instead of Fran Flood? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How is that? 
A. We had some -- I had participated in discussions 
where we were trying to align what I, again, will call the 
defense team. And I don't know whether I suggested it. My 
memory is I suggested it that it -- it would be -- uh --
more appropriate to have Max represent the CEO and more 
appropriate to have me with my securities and financial 
professional background represent Susie. 
Q. And what was -- what was your understanding at 
801.484.2929 Q & A Reporting, Inc. 17 
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that time of Max's, you know, area of expertise? 
A. Max is a highly visible criminal law specialist. 
He does commercial work, and he does securities work as 
well. But he was -- he's known in the community as a 
criminal lawyer. 
Q. Okay. And in 2 003, were you known in the 
community as a criminal lawyer? 
A, No, I did not hold myself out as a criminal 
specialist. As I said, I am a securities fraud -- uh --
civil fraud specialist. 
Q. And how many attorneys were there at Bendinger 
Crockett in 2003? 
A. Uh -- we varied over the course of my career there 
between 15 and 20 -- 22 so. . . 
Q. And you described it as a litigation boutique? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were there only security litigators at Bendinger? 
A. We had antitrust lawyers. And I say it's -- it's 
not fair to pigeonhole us as just securities litigators. We 
were, you know, utility infielders. We were litigation 
specialists. 
Q. Everyone in the firm was a litigation specialist? 
A. Everyone was a litigation specialist. 
Q. Did anyone at the firm handle white-collar 
criminal cases? 
801.484.2929 Q & A Reporting, Inc. 18 
A ^ I ^ r* -7-7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Milq Steven Marsden - October 14, 2009 
A. Well, we -- we started out in securities fraud. 
In this time frame, it was hard to practice in the 
securities fraud world without having white-collar 
involvement. We're at -- with -- with -- Enron and WorldCom 
and following the Sarbanes-Oxley's passage and effectiveness 
in, I want to say, mid-2002, it was hard to find a 
securities fraud case where there wasn't a criminal aspect 
to it. 
Q. So let me ask you in January of 2003, was there 
anyone at Bendinger Crockett who was handling a white-collar 
criminal case? 
• A. I don't know. 
Q. Were you? 
A. In what time frame? 
Q. January of 2 003. 
A. Well, this case. 
Q. Well, other than this case. 
A. Other than this case -- uh -- no, I don't -- I --
what I was doing immediately prior to this case was -- uh --
I was not handling a white-collar case because I was up to 
my ears in a commercial dispute involving Salt Lake 
newspapers. 
Q. Well, -at any point in your career up until 
January of 2003, had you handled a white-collar criminal 
case? 
801.484.2929 Q & A Reporting, Inc. 19 
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i 
A. Uh -- I guess I -- I don't want to stumble over 
your question with "handle." But I had been involved in 
white-collar cases. But as I said, I had not held myself 
out as a white-collar specialist. 
Q. Okay. Had anyone, to your knowledge, at Bendinger 
Crockett held themselves out as a white-collar criminal 
specialist? 
A. No. We were securities fraud and civil fraud and 
antitrust specialists. And to the extent that those matters 
ended up having criminal aspects to them, we would handle 
the criminal aspects. 
Q. Okay. What were the SEC complaint allegations 
against Susie Strohm? 
A. Well, it's a 20- or 30-page complaint. But 
broadly, the allegations related to the company's practices 
with regard to revenue recognition in - - for its financial 
statements for the years -- well, the SEC complaint actually 
focused on a little bit broader period, as early as -- if 
memory serves -- March 31 of 2001. But they were primarily 
focused on their public reports for the period June 30, 
2001, through September 30, 2002. 
Q. And what, to your recollection, was -- were the 
allegations against Susie Strohm in the SEC complaint? 
A. That -- that -- I'm sorry, I didn't — I thought I 
just answered that. 
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it shortly thereafter because I heard from Rod Snow. 
Q. Okay. I would like you to turn to Exhibit-4 0 in 
the book. This is a 10-K filing for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 2004. If you could turn -- this is just excerpts 
of that document. If you could turn to Page 170 of 193 in 
the upper right-hand corner. 
A. Okay. I'm there. 
Q. Okay. You see where it says "US Attorney's 
investigation"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it states that on January 28, 2003, the 
company was advised that the US Attorney's Office for the 
District of Utah had begun an investigation stemming from 
the complaint in the SEC action described above. 
A. I see that. 
Q. Okay. Is this something that you're relying on to 
conclude that you learned about the grand jury investigation 
in January of 2 003? 
A. No. I mean, it confirms that they did, but I'm 
relying on my memory that we had those discussions in 
January of 2 003. 
Q. And if you had those discussions, would it be in 
your billing statements? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. What did Bendinger do in connection with 
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1 the pending grand jury investigation? 
2 A. We -- it was a grand jury investigation, and we 
3 had not received a subpoena. So most of the work that we 
4 were doing in the SEC action was relevant -- was the kind of 
5 work that we could do relevant to the grand jury. 
6 . I n addition, I know that Rod corresponded with --
7 Rod Snow corresponded with me and with Max Wheeler and 
8 sought input and advice in responding to the --to the grand 
9 jury's subpoenas. 
10 Mostly — well -- I'm sorry. 
11 Q. Do you recall specific emphasis on which he was 
12 seeking your advice? 
13 A. Specific emphasis? 
14 Q. Yeah, I mean, what was he seeking your advice on? 
15 A, I remember he — he wanted -- there may be more 
16 than this. I remember seeing a letter where he had gotten a 
17 new list of priorities from the AUSA who was handling the 
18 matter. And he wanted to talk about how to address their 
19 priorities. 
20 Q. And who was the AUSA that was handling the matter 
21 at that time? 
22 A . I understood it to be a woman named Elizabethanne 
23 Stevens. 
24 Q. Okay. So aside from responding to Rod Snow's 
25 request for input and advice on responding to the grand 
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A. No. 
Q. You were handling another matter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were you trial counsel for that other 
white-collar criminal matter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And to your knowledge, did any of the other 
attorneys in Dorsey's Salt Lake City office have any 
white-collar criminal defense trial experience? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. And let me ask the same question with respect to 
the other attorneys at the Bendinger firm. Did any of the 
attorneys there have any white-collar criminal defense trial 
experience? 
A. Uh -- I don't know. 
Q. Not to your knowledge? 
A. I don't know. They -- I mean --
Q. At the time you switched from Bendinger to Dorsey, 
how many white-collar criminal defense trials had you 
handled? 
A. None. 
Q. Okay. But you said there was one that you were 
handling at the time of the switch? 
A. At the time or shortly after, there was a new 
white-collar -- what would be white-collar matter. 
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okay, let 
to bring. 








's look at the first question, "Clients you expect 
" 
Yes. 
Okay. And you have several redacted parts of this 
Right. 
So can we agree that what's redacted doesn't 
Susie Strohm or ClearOne? 
That was the intention. 
Okay. So on Page 2, you have a chart that lists 





So did. you list on this document the matters which 









I listed the filed -- I think I listed the filed 
Okay. So you listed the SEC v. ClearOne matter? 
Y e s . . • 
Which was still then pending? ; 
You know, maybe -- well -- I don't know when the 
final order was entered with respect to Susie. 
Q. 
A. 
Now, when did you complete this form? 
I -- I'm sorry, I don't know. ! 
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form, is i t ? 
A. The department of justice investigation is not 
listed on the form. 
Q. Okay. So, therefore, you did not view the 
department of justice investigation as pending when you 
joined Dorsey, did you? 
A. No, I -- that's not correct. I -- I did not 
view -- the purpose of the form is to clear conflicts. I 
didn't know the status of the department of justice 
investigation. But I did not understand the department of 
justice investigation in whatever status it was in would 
present a conflict problem. 
Q. Well, is there an adverse party in connection with 
the department of justice investigation? 
A. The United States. 
Q. So when it asks you to identify adverse parties in 
the files on which you are currently representing these 
clients, shouldn't you be disclosing that that's a file on 
which you're currently representing a client if in fact it 
was then pending? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Marsden, that you and the other 
people who constituted the defense team in the SEC action 
did not view the department of justice investigation as 
pending at the time you switched to Dorsey? 
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1 MR. SHAHEEN: Objection. Calls for speculation. 
2 A. I can answer as to myself. No, I viewed the 
3 department of justice investigation as pending. 
4 Q. Okay. When was the last time you heard that the 
5 department of justice was doing anything in connection with 
6 the investigation? 
7 A. Between when and when? Well, Stu Walz called me 
8 and told me that my client was going to be indicted. 
9 Q. I'm talking about January 5, 2004, when was the 
10 last time prior to that that you had heard that the 
11 department of justice was doing anything in connection with 
12 the investigation? 
13 A. I -- I don't know. As I testified earlier, I 
14 think I discussed it with Ray Etcheverry in the summer or 
15 fall of 2003. 
16 Q. And the discussion at that time was that the 
17 company had completed its document production and had not 
18 heard anything further from the department of justice? 
19 A. The discussion was -- I mean, I have testified 
20 about this already. The -- the -- the substance of the 
21 discussion was me inquiring what he knew. And -- and I 
22 remember the document production either being complete or 
23 being nearly complete and him having not heard a lot about 
24 interviews or other activity. But I did not hear the 
25 department of justice investigation is over. 
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Q. Mr. Marsden, when did you first reach out to a 
criminal defense attorney at Dorsey in connection with 
Ms. Strohm? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you believe after the end of 2006 that 
Ms. Strohm would be criminally charged in connection with 
the revenue enhancement scheme? 
MR. SHAHEEN: Objection. Attorney-work product. 
Q. How did you first learn that Ms. Strohm might 
actually be criminally charged? 
A. Might be criminally charged? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I --
MR. SHAHEEN: Are you -- objection asked and 
answered. Go ahead. 
A. I think I formed that judgment -- well, can you 
read the question back? 
Q. I will restate it. How did you first learn that 
Ms. Strohm might actually be criminally charged? 
MR. SHAHEEN: Objection. Vague. 
A. Uh -- the SEC filed -- started an investigation, 
Q. And that occurred when? 
A. Late 2002. 
Q. Okay. And -- well, what, if anything, happened 
after your arrival at Dorsey that lead you to believe that 
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1 Ms. Strohm might actually be criminally charged? 
2 A. Uh -- after I arrived at Dorsey? Well, the 
3 principal thing -- I don't know that it's the only thing --
4 but the principal thing is I got a call from Stu Walz, an 
5 Assistant US Attorney for the District of Utah. 
6 Q. Okay. And what did Mr. Walz tell you? 
7 A. He said that Susie was the -- was a -- was a 
8 target and wanted to know if we wanted to come in and talk. 
9 Q. Okay. And when was that? 
10 A. I'm not sure of the precise date. It's in May of 
11 2007, I think, April, May of 2007. 
12 Q. And did he identify any other targets? 
13 A. I don't remember that he did. 
14 Q. Did you know Mr. Walz prior to this call? 
15 A. I did. 
16 Q. Okay. Had you dealt with him previously in 
17 connection with Ms. Strohm? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. But he was calling you because he knew that you 
20 were Ms. Strohm's attorney? 
21 . A. That's correct or at least that's what he said. 
22 Q. Now, what, if any, work did you perform after 
23 learning of the possibility of a criminal charge? 
24 A. During what period of time? 
25 Q. Well, after learning of the possibility -- after 
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that he was ever transferred for elsewhere. I know that he 
has taught at whatever the justice department school is for 
periods of time. 
Q. Where is that located? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did Ms. Strohm have to appear before the grand 
jury? 
A. Ms. Strohm was not asked to appear before the 
grand jury. 
Q. Did she receive any subpoenas? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, to the best of your recollection, what work 
did any other attorneys in the Salt Lake office of Dorsey 
perform prior to the July 25, '07, indictment of Ms. Strohm? 
A. I don' t — I don't know. 
Q. How was it decided at Dorsey how the Strohm case 
would be staffed? 
A. I think Bill and I discussed staffing and what 
made sense. 
Q. And who was the billing attorney on the Strohm 
criminal --
A. I was the billing attorney, am the billing 
attorney. 
Q. Who sent the bills to the client? 
A. I think the -- well, I think that changed over 
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Q. So if there's objections to the form of 
the question, you can just kind of ignore that, 
that's the attorney thing, and go ahead and answer 
the question, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Any questions about the procedure? 
A. No. 
Q. Great. Okay. Were you aware that you've 
been designated as what is called a 30(b)(6) witness 
forClearOne? 
A. No, 
Q. You have never been contacted by Neil or 
any attorney for ClearOne indicating that you were 
designated as a 30(b)(6) designee? 
A. I don't know what a 30(b)(6) designee 
means. I was contacted by both the district attorney 
and ClearOne, their counsel, prior to the criminal 
trial recently, in the last year. But I don't know 
what that designation means. 
Q. Prior to today's deposition, have you had 
any contact or discussions with Neil? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And when did those take place? 
A. Last night. And then I think we talked 
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percolating. About the same time I came in to talk 
to Steve last. 
Q. Okay. Last night, how long was the 
conversation? 
A. Thirty minutes. 
Q. Thirty minutes. And what was discussed? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection. I'm going to 
have to assert the attorney/client privilege since he 
is our designee. 
MR. HANCOCK: I don't think that applies. 
He is not your counsel. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: If he is our designee, I 
think that our conversations are protected by the 
attorney/client privilege. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know what to say. 
MR. HANCOCK: Are you instructing him not 
to answer? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: I am. 
Q. (By Mr. Hancock) Okay. Are you going to 
take his instruction? 
A. Is there a risk -- I mean, I don't mind 
answering the question. I'll answer the question. 
Q. Okay. 
A. We talked about really the focus was on a 
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to me via e-mail by Neil. 
Q. When were you sent the four exhibits? 
A. In the last three or four days. 
Q. And what were the exhibits or documents? 
Do you have those? 
A. I have them with me, yeah. 
Q. Great. Thanks. 
A. I printed them out. Exhibit A, B, C, and 
D . -
MR. MARSDEN: Printed them out in color. 
A. Well, I printed them out like that because 
the black cartridge was empty, I think. 
Q. Do you by chance have a copy of the 
e-mai1? 
A. I do at home. I'd be happy to -- I could 
e-mail it to you. 
Q. That would be great. 
A. Sure. 
Q. And when was this e-mail sent to you? 
A. It would have been, like I say, within the 
last three or four days. It may have been on Monday. 
Q. Okay. During this 30 minute conversation 
that took place over the phone --
A. Yes. 
Q. - - can you t e l l me what was d i scussed? 
C i t iCou r t , LLC 
801.532.3441 
AHH r.cn 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Michael Keough * October 7, 2009 33 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you also understood in 2002, early 
2003 as the CEO of ClearOne, that a DOJ investigation 
was being undertaken and that could result in a 
criminal litigation and claims being brought against 
Strohm and Flood. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And those criminal claims that could be 
brought against Strohm and Flood would relate to or 
arise out of the SEC action, correct? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. The same underlying claims? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was your knowledge and 
understanding as the CEO in December of 2002 when you 
were interim CEO, and early January of 2003; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was also, we talked briefly about 
this, but there was a whistle blower action filed on 
February 11, 2003 in the Sarbanes Oxley? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And those would include the DOJ 
investigation? 
A. As far as I knew, yes. 
Q. And that would include any subsequent 
criminal indictments or litigation that the DOJ may 
bring down against Susie; is that your understanding? 
A. As far as I knew, yes. 
Q. And that was your understanding as the 
interim CEO of ClearOne? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was your understanding either in 
December of 2002 or early 2003? 
A. Yes. Whenever Steve was engaged, it was 
made clear he was her counsel. And again, Max was 
going to be Fran's. 
Q. Okay. I'm just trying to make sure I 
understand what your understanding of what the scope 
of his representation was going to be. 
A. Sure. 
Q. And as I understand it, what you were 
telling me is that when he was retained you 
understood, as the CEO of ClearOne, the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's representation was going to be 
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Q. He would represent her in the DOJ 
investigation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as you have told me, any and all other 
claims that might be brought against her, including 
any criminal indictments or criminal actions brought 
agai nst her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was your understanding of what his 
retention was when ClearOne approved Mr. Marsden to 
be retained to represent Susie Strohm? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
Q. Do you recall any discussion by any of the 
board members with respect to the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's retention? 
A. "Scope" meaning? Any limit on scope? 
Q. What it was limited to. 
A. No. 
Q. And as the 30(b)(6) designee on behalf of 
ClearOne, is it your testimony you don't recall any 
other discussions or communications by any board 
member limiting the scope of Mr. Marsden's 
representation? 
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Q. Then there was no discussion or agreement 
that his representation be limited solely to the SEC 
action? 
A. No discussion about that. 
Q. Okay. Who is Rod Snow? 
A. Partner at Clyde, Snow, Sessions. 
Q. Okay. And maybe this -- you told me this 
earlier but since we are on this topic, to make it 
nice and clean, why was Clyde, Snow, Sessions & 
Swenson and Rod Snow retained? 
A. I don't know specifically why. I was just 
told that they had retained Clyde, Snow, Sessions. I 
know Rod was a partner. We were represented in the 
hearing with the SEC by Neil Kaplan from Clyde Snow, 
who represented the company. So I was just told it 
was Clyde Snow. * 
Q. Okay. And was it your understanding, 
though, that Rod Snow and Clyde, Snow, Sessions 
Swenson was being retained to represent ClearOne? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They were not being retained to represent 
Susie Strohm or Fran Flood? 
A. No. 
Q. And what type of representation were they 
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A. Well, I mean, at that time they were the 
firm that was representing us through the initial SEC 
action right through the hearing with the SEC on 
whether or not a monitor would be put in place. 
Q. Okay. Were they also going to provide 
representation for ClearOne in connection with the 
DOJ investigation? 
A. At the time, I don't know that that was 
ever really discussed. My assumption was that Clyde 
Snow was the firm representing ClearOne in all 
potential legal issues at the time. 
Q. Okay. With ClearOne, at least in December 
of 2002 when you came on board, early 2003, facing 
the SEC action/criminal proceedings which at that 
time consisted of the SEC investigation and the DOJ 
investigation, did ClearOne want to get the 
cooperation of Susie Strohm and Fran Flood in helping 
to defend against these actions? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. Both in connection with the claims brought 
against ClearOne and the SEC action and the DOJ 
investigation? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall if there were discussions 
about entering into a joint defense privilege and 
confidentialityagreernent? 
A. I do remember a discussion around a joint 
defense. But specifics, I don't. 
Q. Okay. Did you have any discussions with 
Rod Snow or anyone else in connection with a joint 
defense privilege and confidentiality agreement? 
A. I recall a meeting at Clyde Snow Sessions. 
I recall several attorneys, Scott and Rod being at 
the meetings, but I don't recall that specific level 
of detail. 
Q. Okay. You've told me that as the CEO, you 
and Mr. Rand and the board of directors kind of 
oversaw and kind of coordinated ClearOne's response 
and defense in connection with the SEC criminal 
proceedings. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. You need to say yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Q. As the CEO of the company, did you receive 
copies of correspondence and pleadings in these 
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Q. And those were potential criminal actions 
and litigation that you understood, as the CEO, would 
have arisen out of or would have been related to the 
SEC action and its claims dealing with revenue 
recognition? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the purpose of this agreement, do you 
know -- do you know if it was to -- well, strike 
that. 
Let me have you turn to page 3 of Exhibit 
2. And it's Recital K. You told me earlier that you 
understood that ClearOne wanted to get the 
cooperation of both Ms. Flood and Ms. Strohm in 
defending against the DOJ action, potential criminal 
claims, and the SEC action; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
Q. And if you'd read Recital K for me. 
A. "It is the purpose of this Agreement to 
ensure that any exchange and/or disclosure of the 
Defense Materials contemplated herein does not 
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Defense Materials and does not constitute a waiver of 
any privilege or immunity otherwise available." 
Q. Okay. Is that stated purpose consistent 
with your testimony dealing with trying to get the 
cooperation of Ms. Flood and Ms. Strohm, as you 
understand it? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yeah, there was no question at the time, 
although I did not see this document, that the 
approach was to have a united front. 
Q. And this united front that you understood 
the parties were trying to put together in early 
January and February of 2003, you understood that was 
a united front for ClearOne, Ms. Strohm, and Ms. Flood 
all to get their legal defenses together jointly in 
connection with the SEC action? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. You need to say yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. And also with respect to the DOJ action? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And a l s o w i th respec t to any c r i m i n a l 
C i t iCou r t , LLC 
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indictments or criminal actions brought against 
Ms. Flood, Ms. Strohm, or ClearOne resulting from or 
relating to the SEC action; is that true also? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. At the time, yes. 
MR. MARSDEN: Let me interrupt for a 
second. I'm going to walk out right now. We have a 
conference call with the court at 11:00. I will come 
back just before to make sure --
MR. HANCOCK: Do we need to break? Are 
you going to participate in that, Neil? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Yes, I'm going to 
participate. 
MR. HANCOCK: We'll break at that point. 
Q. (By Mr. Hancock) This -- what did you 
call it? A --
A. United front. 
Q, The united front, thank you. This united 
front that you talked about was an agreement or 
understanding by ClearOne, their counsel, along with 
counsel for Strohm and also for Ms. Flood; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As you understood it? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Ci t iCou r t , LLC 
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Q. And so I just have a couple more questions 
and then we will take a break. 
A. And I think that was done based on, at the 
time, the need for both parties or all three parties 
to kind of stay in lock-step. The relationship had 
clearly changed as far as how I thought those 
individuals were treated by the board and whatnot, 
but everybody seemed to be on the same page that that 
was important that it was a united front. 
Q. And this united front was - - you wanted to 
have a united front with respect to a defense, 
production of documents, and discovery with- respect 
to the SEC action and the DOJ action and any future 
possible criminal indictments and criminal actions 
being brought. Would that be fair? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form, 
A. Yes. But I will say after Susie and Fran 
left, I never talked to them again. 
Q. I know. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Let me have you turn to page 6 of Exhibit 
2, and if you would read paragraph 12. 
A. "The Agreement memorializes prior oral 
understandings pursuant to which Defense Materials 
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MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. In terms of -- well, the understanding I 
had at the time was that they would be indemnified 
from that point early on until some future point and 
they would also stay on the company payroll. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And that issue was, I think, more specific 
to Fran because of Fran's employment agreement, where 
there was a clause in her employment agreement that, 
the only reason Fran could be terminated was for 
fraud; and that if they terminated her, that would 
blow up the D&O policy. 






To assist in the D&O policy litigation? 
The sense I had at the time was that if 
there hadn't been a D&O policy at risk, that they may 
have very well terminated them at the time. 
Q. Okay. Were you involved in any 
discussions about what steps, conditions, or 
procedures the company would have to go through to 
provide indemnification to Ms. Strohm or Ms. Flood? 
A. Nothing specific, I mean, in terms of 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Michael Keough * October 7, 2009 68 
that it was agreed that they would provide 
indemnification. 
Q. And as part of this indemnification, as 
you understood it, would that include -- for example, 
if Mr. Marsden had performed legal services and 
prepared an invoice and sent it to ClearOne, was it 
your understanding that ClearOne would pay those 
invoices? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. There was nothing that I was aware 
of that sat outside that would prevent payment in 
terms of indemnification. 
Q, So when you talk about indemnification, 
your understanding as the CEO was this concept of 
indemnification would include paying Mr. Marsden's 
invoices as he submitted them in connection with 
representing Ms. Strohm? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Was there any discussion by the 
board or yourself, or an understanding that ClearOne 
would not pay Mr. Marsden's invoices and would simply 
wait to make payment until after the SEC action was 
over or after any criminal action against Ms. Strohm 
was concluded? 
A. There were conversations about reluctantly 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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paying. But when the conversation ended, the 
decision was always that they would continue to pay. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I believe that trend continued for a 
number of years. 
Q. Okay. And as I understand it, the time 
that the board had decided to provide what you call 
indemnification to Ms. Strohm, the understanding by 
the board and that you also had in those discussions 
was that ClearOne would pay the invoices submitted by 
Mr. Marsden in representing Ms. Strohm? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that there was no discussion or 
agreement by the board that they would simply wait 
until the conclusion of what we called the SEC 
criminal proceedings to then determine if it was 
going to pay Ms. Strohm's fees? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. There were conversations at some point 
about not paying, or waiting until everything had 
settled and until we, you know, had gotten past the 
whole, I guess the whole issue, per se. But at the 
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think we continued to need the support of both Susie 
and Fran as they went through the process. 
Q. Okay? 
A. They did talk about it, but they never 
took any acti on. 
Q. Okay. What I'm trying to focus on is at 
the time that the board made the decision to 
indemnify, as you called it, Ms. Strohm with respect 
to her fees. When that decision was made, if I 
understand what you're telling me, the board made the 
decision, "We will provide this concept of 
indemnification." And as part of that concept of 
indemnification you understood that ClearOne would 
pay the invoices that Mr. Marsden submitted to 
ClearOne for representing Ms. Strohm; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. And that although there may have been 
discussions that, "Maybe down the road we might wait 
to pay," the original agreement by the board was that 
they wouldn't do that; that this indemnification 
concept that had been approved was, "We are going to 
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MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. I don't recall any deadline dates or 
we are not going to pay past a certain dollar amount. 
They didn't - - yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you have an understanding of the 
difference between the legal term "indemnification" 
versus "advancement"? 
A. Well, I could probably come up with one. 
Q. I'm just asking if you do. 
A. Well, yeah. I mean, indemnification just 
meant that they were covered by the corporation. 
That was part of being an officer. They had 
indemnification clauses or provisions, as opposed to 
advancement, to me, would be advancing somebody's fee 
that at some point may or may not get paid back. 
Yeah, they can be very different things. 
Q. So to you, advancement would be something 
where they say, "Here is $100,000. Use it for your 
defense"? 
A. Correct. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. And it's your understanding that 
indemnification, as you understood was approved by 
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there - - l e t me rephrase. 
While you were on the board, not the board 
but the CEO, and then during the time period of 2002 
until you left in 2004, did ClearOne always pay the 
bills invoiced from Mr. Marsden for representation of 
Ms . Strohm? 
A. They did. Although I would say there was 
some slow pay issues. But they did. 
Q. They did. And was it your understanding 
those payments were being made under what you 
understood was the concept of indemnification? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You weren't advancing ahead of time the 
payments, you were paying them as they were being 
billed and submitted to you? 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. Can you tell me anything else that 
was discussed by the board in connection with the 
decision to indemnify Ms. Strohm? 
A. Not really. I mean, once those decisions 
had been made, Susie and Fran almost became 
nonissues. I mean, the discussion was at that point 
really about ClearOne and the SEC. And once they 
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they were set aside - but once the decisions had been 
made that they would stay on the payroll and be 
indemnified, Susie and Fran really weren't the focus 
going forward at that point. It was really about 
ClearOne. 
Q. Okay. So I just want to make sure I 
understand your memory of what happened with respect 
to the indemnification so we have the sequence and 
the sum and substance of what the board discussions 
were . 
As I understand what you've told me, and 
you tell me if I'm not characterizing it correctly, 
the board made a decision to provide this concept of 
indemnification to Ms. Flood and Ms. Strohm and that 
was so that you could have this unified front. 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
Q. And you felt that that was a key component 
of having the unified front and providing the 
indemnification to Ms. Strohm and Ms. Flood? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. I did. 
Q. And the concept of the indemnification 
that was approved by the board was that as 
Mr. Marsden submitted invoices to ClearOne, those 
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invoices would be paid. 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. And although there may be a slow pay while 
they are reviewing the bills, the board had not 
limited the indemnification concept to saying, "We 
are going to stop paying the bills at some time in 
the future." Is that right? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the concept was that until either the 
SEC action or the criminal investigation or any 
related proceeding to the criminal action was 
concluded, your understanding was that the board had 
approved that going forward until that ended they 
would pay the invoices submitted by Mr. Marsden in 
representing Susie Strohm? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's mark this as Exhibit Number 4. 
(EXHIBIT 4 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. One last comment back on the time period 
when the board made the decision under this to 
provide this concept of indemnification that you've 
described. You don't recall any of the board members 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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review the terms of the agreement on pages 2 through 
6? 
A. Yeah. At the time, I'm fairly confident. I 
read this prior to signing it, yes. 
Q. Okay. Let me have you look at page 3, if 
you would. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. Under Section 7 there's a section called 
Cooperation in Related Proceedings. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. Does this address what you were talking 
about before where the board had decided to provide 
this concept of indemnification that you described as 
part of this unified front and getting cooperation 
from Strohm? 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
A. I can't say I recall the indemnification 
being leveraged to get them to sign or participate, 
but it was certainly part of the conversation. 
Q. And I don't mean to say it was leveraged. 
I mean more to say that --
A. That they were --
Q. In order to have a united front, the board 
felt like it was important to provide the 
indemnification to Strohm; is that right? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And prior testimony is consistent 
with paragraph 7 on page 3 of Exhibit 5; do you 
agree? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, So as you understand it, as part of 
the Employment Termination Agreement, Strohm had 
agreed to cooperate with ClearOne in connection with 
the SEC action and any related proceedings; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then let me have you turn to Section 
8, if you would, on Indemnification. This is the --
as you understand it, is this the section that 
provides for ClearOne's agreement with respect to 
this concept of indemnification for Ms. Strohm - -
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. -- that you testified about earlier? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this is the indemnification concept 
that you testified would be as invoices were 
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Q. That was sort of the agreement: You give 
us this, and we will give you the other side. Is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Those are the kind of exchanged promises. 
Strohm will get X number of dollars under the 
Employment Termination Agreement, which is $75,000 in 
S e c t i o n 3 . 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. Strohm will get the indemnification that 
you describe how you understood it in Section 8. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. . And in turn for those two items of 
consideration that Strohm would be giving ClearOne, 
ClearOne would get a release of claims by Strohm, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
Q. And ClearOne would get Strohm's 
cooperation in related proceedings, correct? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And ClearOne would get the cancellation of 
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Q. And as you understood it, as the CEO of 
ClearOne, that was the negotiated and agreed upon 
terms of the Employment Termination Agreement between 
Strohm and ClearOne. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's what you signed and agreed to as 
the CEO of ClearOne on December 5, 2003? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's mark this as Exhibit Number 6. 
(EXHIBIT 6 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. Let me have you go back to Exhibit 5, and 
Section 15 on page 5. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Section 15 states that there's a condition 
subsequent. What was your understanding of what 
S e c t i o n l 5 m e a n t ? 
A. I mean, that Susie, having been the CFO at 
the time, would sign -- that was a condition of this 
was signing settlement documents with the SEC. 
Q. Okay. And Exhibit 6f have you seen this 
document before? 
A. I don't remember seeing this one. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But I may have. 
Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not Section 
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Q. And this you testified you reviewed to 
familiarize yourself and remember what the terms 
were? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you feel that based, on that 
review, you are able to answer questions about what 
you understood the terms of Exhibit 9 were? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did ClearOne agree to pay invoices from 
Mr. Marsden for the services he rendered in 
representing Ms, Strohm as they were billed within 30 
days after receipt? 
A. Did they actually do that or is --
Q. Is that what they agreed to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did ClearOne also agree that any 
amount unpaid after the 30 days would bear and accrue 
interest at a rate of 18 percent? 
A. If that was in the original draft as it is 
here , yes . 
Q. Okay. And is that your understanding of 
paragraph 3, the second paragraph where it says, "Any 
amount billed and unpaid after such thirty day period 
shall bear and accrue interest at the rate of 18 
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A. Yes. 
MR, CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. Are 
you asking what he thinks it means now? 
MR. HANCOCK: I'm asking him with respect 
to when he signed this letter as ClearOne's CEO. 
Okay? 
Q. (By Mr. Hancock) Is that your 
understanding? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thank you. And in the first paragraph --
before we get there, if I remember correctly, and I 
just want to confirm, you stated earlier that it was 
your understanding, at the time that Mr. Marsden was 
retained and that you signed Exhibit 9 on behalf of 
ClearOne, that the scope of his retention would be 
the SEC action? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It would include the DOJ action. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if I understand you, and you tell me 
if I'm wrong, it would include any criminal 
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MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A, Yes. Nothing was excluded, as I remember. 
Q. Okay. I'm- just trying to understand what 
your understanding was of what it included, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. And you understood at that time that, 
based on the DOJ action, there was the possibility of 
criminal indictments and a criminal action against 
Ms. Strohm; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. And at the time you signed this agreement, 
you understood that Mr. Marsden's retention, as set 
forth in Exhibit 9, included representing Ms. Strohm 
in those actions, 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. Meaning the SEC action, the DOJ 
investigation, criminal indictments, and any criminal 
action against Ms. Strohm. Is that correct or not? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the first paragraph states, "This 
letter will summarize and confirm the agreement for 
my firm, Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, to 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And did you understand where it says 
"further related investigations and litigation," with 
your understanding that there was a DOJ investigation 
going on, that that term, "in connection with further 
related investigation and litigation," would include, 
if it happened, a criminal indictment and criminal 
action against Ms. Strohm? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. That would have been my understanding, 
yes . 
Q. Okay. And would that understanding be --
your understanding of the scope of Mr. Marsden's 
representation, would that be inconsistent with the 
position that he was only retained to represent her 
in the SEC action? 
A. Would you - -
Never mind. Bad question. I'll just go Q. 
on 
Okay A. 
Q. Let's go to paragraph 4. It's entitled 
Rates and Staffing. 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative), 
Q. What was your understanding as to what 
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A. My understanding is that it was as written 
here. 
Q. Okay. And as written, what was your 
understanding? I just need to make sure of your 
understandi ng. 
A. They would be paid based on the terms as 
outlined within 30 days for billable hours on the 
work that was done. 
Q. And if they weren't paid and Mr. Marsden 
had to bring an action to recover his fees from 
ClearOne, was it your understanding ClearOne would 
pay his fees and costs in enforcing the terms of the 
retainer agreement? 
A. If they were found to be --
Q. Successful? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So if ClearOne just decides they 
are not going to pay -• 
A. Yes. 
Q. -- and they ultimately are found that they 
weren't entitled to stop paying, it was your 
understanding that Mr. Marsden would recover all of 
his reasonable attorney's fees and costs in getting a 
judgment to get the money for his attorney's fees and 
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MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
Q. Is that your understanding? 
A. Yes. 
Q. After you signed and read -- prior to 
signing the retainer agreement dated January 29, 
2003, did you review each of the provisions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after reading the retainer agreement, 
did you think that Mr. Marsden's scope of his 
retention in representing Ms. Strohm was limited 
solely to the SEC action? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have the understanding at that 
time that based on the DOJ action, his scope of 
representation would be expanded beyond civil 
litigation to include representing her in criminal 
actions that related to or were in connection with 
base allegations of revenue recognition in the SEC 
civil complai nt? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. That would have been my expectation. 
Q. And that was your understanding? 
A. Yeah. He was the only counsel referenced 
working on Susie's behalf for whatever the issue was. 
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ClearOne you understood that the scope of his 
representation was not just limited to civil 
litigation. 
A. That's correct. 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
MR, HANCOCK: Just a second. What's the 
form objection? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Leading. 
MR. HANCOCK: He's your 30(b)(6) designee 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: You called him as a fact 
witness. 
MR. HANCOCK: This is the topic on which 
he was designated as a 30(b)(6). 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: I think the question is 
compound and confusing, 
MR. HANCOCK: Tell me how it is compound 
and I will fix it. 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: I'm not going to do that 
MR. HANCOCK: Okay. Then I won't fix it. 
A. Just to be clear, all of these were 
reviewed and approved by the board. And as invoices 
came in from a variety of counsel, they were all 
reviewed. There was a pattern of slow pay or no pay. 
I know in the case of Parsons, I know in the case of 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Michael Keough * October 7, 2009 119 
there was ongoing battles back and forth. Even when 
we left Clyde Snow and went to Parsons Behle, their 
final invoice was one that the board insisted on 
negotiating their fees down. So there was a pattern 
there. 
Q. (By Mr. Hancock) Was Exhibit Number 9 
presented to the board, the January 29, 2003 retainer 
agreement from Mr. Marsden, for their review? 
A. Yes. My assumption would be - - do I 
remember that? No. But they were reviewing anything 
that was legal. We were reviewing as a group, the 
board included. 
Q. Did the board, or anyone else at ClearOne, 
prior to signing or prior to you signing the January 
29, 2003 retainer agreement, state that Mr. Marsden's 
representation that they were agreeing to was limited 
in scope to only the SEC civil complaint or civil 
litigation? 
A. No. In fact, I think one of the reasons 
that they fought so hard about the D&0 issue was the 
expectation was that legal bills would be significant 
as time went on. 
Q. And '--
A. For any matter of issues, any number of 
issues, not just the SEC. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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Q. And at the time the board was concerned 
about Mr. Marsden's fees expanding, the board 
understood that there was a DOJ criminal 
investigation underway, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q, And they understood, based on those 
discussions at the board level, that they could 
expand to the defense of Ms. Strohm based on criminal 
indictments in a criminal action; is that correct? 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And with that understanding from the 
board, you were authorized to enter into and sign, on 
behalf of ClearOne, Mr. Marsden's January 29, 2003 
retainer --
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
Q. -- agreement in Exhibit 9, correct?. 
A. Yes. 
MR. HANCOCK: Is your objection as to form 
anything other than leading? 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: You are asking him to 
testify as to what the board's understanding was 
rather than any discussions he had with the board. 
MR. HANCOCK: He's a 30(b)(6) designee. 
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So it was agreed upon that this is how they were 
going to proceed. 
Q. Did the board members state and agree that 
they understood that his representation was going to 
include the DOJ investigation? 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection to form. 
A. I don't remember any separation of DOJ 
versus SEC in terms of costs and legal expense. 
Q. It was all going to be covered? 
A. At that time, yeah. Not happily, but yes. 
Q. Let me have you look at the second page of 
the January 29, 2008 letter up at the top. It 
states, "Ms. Strohm and ClearOne agree to be jointly 
and severally responsible for payment of all amounts 
billed under this Agreement." What's your 
understanding of what that meant? 
A. "Severally." That's an interesting word. 
Well, that between Susie and ClearOne, they would be 
jointly responsible for payment of all amounts. I'm 
not quite sure how to interpret "severally." 
Oh, either together or individually. 
Yeah, that makes sense. 
Q. So when you say that, was it your 
understanding that if Ms. Strohm didn't pay the bills 
of Mr. Marsden for representing Ms. Strohm, ClearOne 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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Q. And were you authorized by the board to 
sign Exhibit 10 on behalf of ClearOne? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What was your understanding as to 
why Mr. Marsden was sending to you and Ms. Strohm 
Exhibit Number 10? 
A. That he was continuing to represent Susie 
but he was with a different firm. 
Q. Okay. So prior to receiving this letter, 
had you been informed that Mr. Marsden was changing 
firms from --
A. I don't think so. I don't remember. And 
at the time, I don't think it was -- it felt more 
like just a notification than anything else. 
Q. Okay. Let me have you look at the first 
paragraph where Mr. Marsden says, "As you know, I 
recently left the law firm of Bendinger, Crockett, 
Peterson & Casey, and joined the law firm of Dorsey & 
Whitney, LLP." That's pretty basic. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the next section says, "Our engagement 
agreement needs to be updated to reflect this move." 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. What d id you understand him to mean when 
he was r e f e r e n c i n g "our engagement agreement"? 
C i t iCou r t , LLC 
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A. Well, other than the change of firms, 
nothing else changed. It was --
Q. When he says "our engagement agreement," 
did you understand him to be referring to Exhibit 9? 
A. Is this the original - -
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when he says "needs to be updated to 
reflect the move," did you understand he wanted 
Exhibit 9 updated and amended so that it would show 
that he was at a new firm? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the next sentence says, "The rest of 
this letter is intended to serve as the update." 
What did you understand that to mean? 
A. He was outlining the specifics as far as 
what he was representing and involved with as far as 
Susie. But I always felt that the relationship was 
between Susie and Steve, and not Susie and whichever 
firm he was with. 
Q. Okay. Did you understand - -
During the course of your work for 
ClearOne or for any of your other companies, had you 
ever been involved in contracts where the parties 
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contract? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you did that in your practice, 
was that amendment usually to the agreement, just 
saying, "Here are the terms of the original contract 
that we are changing. Everything else is going to 
stay the same - -" 
A. Yes. 
Q. "-- except for what we have changed in the 
amendment?" Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So when Mr. Marsden is stating in the 
first paragraph in Exhibit 10, where he says, "The 
rest of this letter is intended to serve as the 
update," did you understand that the purpose of 
Exhibit 10 was to sort of amend or update certain 
terms of Exhibit 9 and leave the rest unchanged? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And so let's look at the terms that 
were specifically changed so we can get an 
understanding of what was changed and what was left 
in. 
MR. CAP0BIANC0: Objection. 
Q. I'll rephrase it. Did you then consider 
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agreement, with 10 merely updating Number 9? 
A. Yes. I think "update" is the correct word, 
Q. So it is updating it with respect to, "I'm 
in a new firm." It updates it with respect to his 
fee disbursement and billing in paragraph 2. 
A. Yes. It was updated notification. 
Q. And it updates it with respect to other 
representation, completing services under paragraphs 
3 and 4. 
A. Yes. Correct . 
Q. Okay. So this -- if I understand, was it 
your understanding this was similar to an amendment 
to Exhibit 9? 
A. Yes. Effectively, yes. 
Q. Okay. And so terms that were not changed 
or modified in Exhibit 10 would remain terms in 
Exhibit 9 that ClearOne agreed to, going forward 
still with Mr. Marsden representing Susie Strohm. 
Would that be fai r? 
MR. C A P 0 B I A N C 0 : Objection to form. 
A. That would have been my expectation, yes. 
Q. And was that your understanding as the CEO 
of ClearOne? 
A. It w a s . 
Q. And as the 30(b)(6) designee of ClearOne, 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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Q. Was not as --
A. No. 
Q. - - constant? 
A. No. It had pretty well been put to bed. 
Q. As you sit here today do you know what, if 
any, litigation was still pending as of March 31, 
2004? 
A. No. As I sit here I can't tell you what 
litigation was still pending as of March 31, 2004. 
Q. By signing this letter, did you intend to 
give something in addition to what Susie Strohm 
received in her Employment Termination Agreement? 
A. Something in addition to it? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Now, Mr. Keough, had you met Cameron 
Hancock before today? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you spoken to him on the phone? 
A. In terms of setting up a time for 
deposi ti on, yes. 
Q. Okay. You didn't discuss anything else 
with him? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you met Steve Marsden before today? 
C i t iCour t , LLC 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall when the first time was? 
A. Well, it would probably have been early on 
in 2 003 when Susie appointed him legal counsel and we 
started to head down that path. I mean, I don't 
know, it could have been at a deposition with the SEC 
that I gave where legal counsel was there. 
Were you there for that? 
Yeah, with Susie. Because I know Fran was 
there, Max was there, and Steve was there, Susie was 
there, Martinez and her companion from the SEC were 
there. So yeah, I met Steve early on as Susie's 
desi gnated counsel. 
Q. And when was the last time that you met 
with Steve Marsden? 
A. I think it was our discussion prior to the 
c r i m i n a 1 t r i a 1. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And again, I can't give you an exact time. 
But I was asked by both sides to just come in, and I 
did. 
Q. Okay. And were you called to testify at 
trial? 
A. I was not. 
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that retainer agreement, that the reference to 
"further related investigations" referenced and 
included the DOJ investigation; is that correct? 
A. Yes. There were no limitations stipulated 
at the ti me. 
Q. And that would have been your 
understanding, that the scope of that retention 
agreement included the DOJ investigation, whether you 
knew about it before January 29 or after, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q, And at least your earlier testimony was 
that you learned, more than likely, about the DOJ 
investigation prior to January 29, 2003; just 
couldn't remember the specific date? 
A. I don't know the specific dates. There 
was a lot happening almost daily. 
Q. Okay. Now, with respect to Exhibit 10, I 
want you to look at Exhibit 10 and Exhibit 9. 
A. Okay. 





And Exhibit 5 you signed on December 5, 
2003, correct? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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Q. And in Recital C it references a grand 
jury investigation being conducted by the United 
States Department of Justice. Do you see that? 
A. Uh-huh(affirmative). 
Q. So would it be fair to say that as of 
December 5, 2003 you understood and you knew that 
there was an ongoing criminal investigation being 
conducted with respect to Strohm and Flood? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you also understood that that was 
still ongoing when you signed the March 31, 2004 
retainer agreement, Exhibit 10? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So I just wanted to help clarify that in 
connection with Neil's request whether or not you 
knew if there were any proceedings still ongoing as 
of March 31, 2004, wouldn't it be fair to say that 
when you signed the updated Exhibit 10 that was 
updating Exhibit 9, and they became the same 
agreement, as you've testified, you understood that 
the scope of that retention included the ongoing 
criminal investigation against Mrs. Strohm; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Justice; not that it's over. Correct? 
A. Oh, right. 
Q. So you understood it was still ongoing, 
hadn't finished at that point in time, correct? 
MR. CAPOBIANCO: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you signed Exhibit 10, nobody had 
informed you that the grand jury investigation was 
over and criminal actions weren't going to be brought 
against Ms. Strohm, had they? 
A. No. 
Q. So you understood that there were still 
potential indictments that could come down and 
criminal action brought against Ms. Strohm when you 
signed Exhibit 10, correct? 
A. Yes. In fact, that was my expectation. 
Q. And you understood, based on that 
expectation, that was still the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's representation under Exhibits 9 and 10, 
cor rect? 
A. Yes. There were no limits ever decided on 
that representation. 
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FEB 0 7 2003 AND CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT \i \\JJ r^ y 
BENDINQER,CROCKETT, „ ... , 
PETERSON s CASEY Recitals 
A, The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has brought a civil action 
known as Securities and Exchange Commission v. ClearOne Communications, Incu Frances M, 
Flood, and Susie Strohm alleging certain improprieties connected to the quarterly and annual 
financial statements of ClearOne Communications, Inc. ("ClearOne") involving both ClearOne 
and certain individual current or former employees df ClearOne (the "SEC Action'*). 
. B. ClearOne has been notified by the United States Department of Justice that a 
criminal investigation is underway that arises out of or is connected to the allegations made in 
the SEC Action and that this investigation is aimed at both ClearOne and certain individual 
current or fonrier employees of ClearOne. (the "DOJ Action"). 
'•••• • C5' Investor suits against ClearOne havq been filed* and may continue to be filed, 
alleging certain violations of federal 'and/or state securities laws arising out of the allegations 
made in or connected to the SEC Action or DOJ Action (the "Investor Suits").
 t 
D, Based on the existence of the SEC Action, the DOJ Action; and the Investor Suits, 
the undersigned attorneys have reason to anticipate that other investigations may arise, at either a 
state or federal level, and that other civil lawsuits may be filed based upon the allegations in or 
the existence of any or all of the SfiC Action, DOJ Action, or Investor Suits (the "Anticipated 
Actions"). 
E. The undersigned counsel believe that the SEC Action, DOJ Action, Investor Suits, 
and Anticipated Actions (collectively, the "Proceedings") relate to or involve common issues and 
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\ 7 concerns of their respective clients'and that such clients have a mutuality of interests id 
defending the Proceedings, 
F, As a result of the Proceedings, the.undersigned counsel anticipate.civil or criminal 
discovery in the form of interviews, testimony, and/or document production from ClearOne, its 
current or former employees, its business partaers, affiliates, agents, or others with whom it does 
or has done business (the "Discovery")* 
• G, The undersigned counsel wish to continue and pursue their separate but common-
interests, and to avoid any suggestion or claim of waiver of the confidentiality of or immunity of 
communications and documents protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work product-
doctrine, or any other privilege or immunity. ' ' " . 
H. It is the intention and' understanding of ,the undersigned attorneys that. 
commumcationsgmong and between the undersigned and their respective clients, and' any joint 
interviews of prospective witnesses or any interviews obtained by the undersigned counsel with 
the knowledge, consent, and on behalf of the other undersigned attorneys, are and shall remain' 
confidential' and are and shall continue to be protected from disclosure to any third party by our 
clients' attorney-client privilege and immunities, except as set forth herein. 
I. The undersigned counsel have mutually concluded, on the basis of currently 
available information, that no conflict of interest appears to exist among their clients with respect 
to the Proceedings and that the respective interests of their clients will best be served by a 
common and joint defense. 
J. In order to pursue a joint defense effectively, undersigned counsel have etf so 
concluded that, from time to time, the mutual interests of their respective clients will be best 
served by sharing documents, factual material, mental impressions, memoranda, interview 
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reports, litigation strategies, and other information-including the confidences of each client- all 
of which will be hereinafter referred to as the "Defense Materials" (but only to the extent that 
such material and/or information was not already in the possession of the recipientprior to the 
communication of such material and/or information by a signatory to this Agreement or was 
thereafter independently obtained). 
K. It is the purpose of this Agreement to ensure that any exchange and/or disclosure . 
of the Defense Materials contemplated herein does not diminish in any way the confidentiality of 
the Defense Materials and does not constitute a waiver of any privilege or immunity otherwise 
available. ' • , 
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED as follows; 
1. Except as provided herein, all Defense Materials shall remain confidential and 
shall be protected from disclosure to adverse or other parties, as a result of the attorney-client..,,. 
privilege, the work product doctrine, and/or any other applicable privileges or immunities. 
Except as provided herein, the ofal or written sharing or disclosure of Defense Materials among 
the undersigned counsels' firms, and among such firms and their respective clients, shall not 
diminish in any way the confidentiality of such materials and shall not constitute a waiver of any 
applicable privilege. 
2. * All Defense Materials shall be used solely in connection with the Proceedings and 
related matters. Defense Materials shall not be used by any party to this Agreement for any 
business purpose or against any party to this Agreement. 
3. Neither the undersigned attorneys nor. their respective clients shall disclose 
Defense Materials to anyone not a signatory to this Agreement (except that undersigned 
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counsels' employees or agents) without first obtaining the consent of all counsel who signed this 
Agreement who have rights to such Defense Materials. It is expressly understood that nothing 
contained in this Agreement shall limit the right of any of the undersigned counsel or their 
respective clients to disclose to anyone as they see fit any of their own documents or information, 
or any documents or information obtained independently and not pursuant to this Agreement by 
such counsel or clients. 
4. Allpersons permitted access to Defense Materials shall be advised that the 
Defense Materials are privileged and subject to the terms of this Agreement. 
5. To the extent feasible, Defense Materials disclosed pursuant to this Agreement 
will be marked or designed "confidential" or "highly/confidential" "Confidential7* Defense 
• Materials may be made available only to counsel receiving such. Defense Materials pursuant to 
this Agreement and thepafty represented by that ctittftsdL '"Highly confidential" Defense 
Materials may be made available only to counsel receiving such Defense, Materials pursuant to 
this Agreement. 
6. If another person or entity requests or' demands, by subpoena or otherwise, and 
Defense Materials in any forum, including bat rioi limited to the Discovery referred to in 
Paragraph F above, the recipient of such request or demand shall immediately nptify the othqr 
parties with rights in the Defense Materials, The person or entity seeking the Defense Materials 
shall be informed that such materials are privileged and may-not be disclosed without the consent 
of the party or parties that furnished them unless ordered by a Court of competent jurisdiction. 
Before any disclosure of Defense Materials in response to such a request or demand is made by a 
party to this Agreement, that party shall take steps necessary and appropriate to facilitate the 
assertion of all applicable rights and privileges with respect to such Defense Materials, including . 
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permitting all parties to this Agreement a reasonable opportunity to intervene and be heard, and 
otherwise cooperating with the other affected parties to enable them to take any other appropriate 
steps to protect their rights under this Agreement 
7. In the event that a party to this Agreement interviews ("Interviewing Party") • 
another party to this Agreement ("Interviewed Party"), all information disclosed-during the 
interview, including notes or memoranda reflecting such information, shall not be disclosed to 
anyone, including other parties to this Agreement, without the express written approval of the 
Interviewed Party,' 
. 8. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to create an attorney-client relationship 
that gives rise to a fiduciary duty between any attorney and anyone other than the client of that 
attorney. The fact that an attorney has entered into this Agreement shall not in any way preclude 
tbi^attorney froft representing any intereafthat may be construed to be adverse to any other part)' 
to this Agreement or be used as a basis for seeking to disqualify any counsel from representing 
any other party jtn the Proceedings and no attorney who has entered into this Agreement shall be 
disqualified from examining or cross-examining any plient who testifies at any proceeding, 
whether under a grant of immunity or otherwise because of such attorney's participation in this 
Agreement, and it is herein represented that each party to this Agreement has specifically advised 
his or her client of this clause, 
9. In the event that any party to this Agreement testifies in any Proceeding, that party 
expressly waives the joint defense privilege, with respect to any Defense Materials provided by 
that party, that reflects information inconsistent with the party's testimony. It is understood by 
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to waive the conflict of interest described in United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2000) 
and the waiver does not permit the testifying party to reveal, in any way, Defense Materials, 
10. Defense Materials shall not be disseminated to other counsel representing 
individuals or entities involved in the Proceedings unless all parties to this Agreement consent 
and unless such counsel has executed a copy of this Agreement, If the client(a) of any of the 
undersigned counsel retain other counsel, Defense Materials shall not be disclosed to such other 
counsel until he or she has executed a' copy of this Agreement. My disclosure in accordance 
with this paragraph shall not diminish in amy way the confidentiality of the Defense Materials 
.disclosed and shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege. 
11. Nothing in this Agreement shall obligate any signatory hereto to share or 
Communicate any Defense Materials or independently obtained or created materials with any 
other signatory to this Agreement ,„•> ' .&. »* 
12. The Agreement memorializes prior oral understandings pursuant to which 
Defense Materials have been exchanged. All Defense Materials previously exchanged among 
the undersigned counsel are subject to the provisions of this Agreement. 
13/ By executing this Agreement, each undersigned counsel certifies that counsel has 
explained the contents of this Agreement,to hig or her respective client and that the client agrees 
to be bound as a party to this Agreement, Bach counsel executing this Agreement represents that 
counsel is signing both on behalf of himself or herself and on behalf of counsel's client, 
14. Each of our clients is free to withdraw from this Agreement upon prior written 
notice to the other clients, in which case this Agreement shall no longer be operative as to the 
withdrawing client and its counsel. However, in the event of a withdrawal, this Agreement shall 
continue to protect all Defense Materials disclosed to the withdrawing client and its counsel prior 
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. to such withdrawal The withdrawing client and it's counsel shall promptly return all Defense 
' Materials and copies thereof and shall continue to be bound by this Agreement with regard to any 
information learned or obtained prior to such withdrawal and neither the party nor the party*s 
• attorney will disclose any information learned of obtained pursuant to this Agreement to any 
third party. It is further agreed that the confidentiality prescribed above will not become 
retrospectively inoperative if adversity should subsequently arise among the parties, irrespective 
of any claim that the joint defense privilege may otherwise become prospectively inoperative by 
virtue of such claimed adversity. 
15. This Agreement may be executed in individual counterparts. Modification of this • 
Agreement can be made, if such modifications are in wilting and are signed by each of the 
undersigned, • 
CLYDE SNOW- SESSIONS & SWENSON 
RODNfiYG.SNOW. 
Attorneys for 
CleaxOne Communications^  Inc.-
.SNOW,CHRISTENSEN&MARTINEAJJ ,., 
By A^^li 
MAX D. WHEELER 
Attorneys for Frances M. Flood 
Dated: 
• Dated:' 




Attorneys for Susie Strohra 
Dated:. Z-~£-ff5 
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Jefferson Wright Gross - October 13, 2009 43 
CEO, an acting CFO in order to d i s c h a r g e the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of Fran Flood and Susie Strohm. So 
that was c e r t a i n l y being discussed and evaluated as 
well . 
Q. Okay. Let rne have you look at Recital C 
on Exhibit 5. 
A. Y e s . 
Q. This is part of the settlement agreement 
where you're having defined terms, kind of common in 
s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t s . You've had e x p e r i e n c e putting 
them t o g e t h e r quite often? 
A, I suspect everyone in this room is 
fami liar with them. 
Q. Yeah. Okay, And part of the proceedings 
d e f i n i t i o n includes the grand jury i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
being c o n d u c t e d by the United States Department of 
J u s t i c e . So did you understand that that, the grand 
jury i n v e s t i g a t i o n , pursuing or i n v e s t i g a t i n g whether 
criminal i n d i c t m e n t s could be brought down was part 
of the related p r o c e e d i n g s d e f i n i t i o n ? 
A. I didn't - - you know, the language is what 
it is; it says what it says. I think at the time of 
this a g r e e m e n t we did not believe that any indictment 
of Susie Strohm was in the realm of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
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had failed to make a prima facie case of securities 
fraud v i o l a t i o n s . 
And so as c o n t r a s t i n g from Ms. Flood where 
different d e t e r m i n a t i o n s were made which we thought 
would be p e r s u a s i v e to anyone evaluating any claims 
against Ms. Flood and Ms. Strohm, we did not consider 
it really possible that Ms. Strohm would be indicted 
in c o n n e c t i o n with the SEC. 
Q. This is a recital that you helped draft 
and review in this document, right? 
A. And the language says what it says, and 
you two will go argue it in front of the court. I'm 
just telling you, as far as in the fall of 2003 that 
was our state of mind, because - - and it was a 
c a l c u l a t i o n that we made, because there was no way we 
were going to pursue the D&O action if we thought 
that there was --
Q. Sure. I understand. 
A. - - a reasonable possibility of criminal 
proceedi ngs. 
Q. I understand, Jeff. But what I'm asking 
you is, as you read that today, it provides that --
it talks about the SEC action, which is, that claim 
was based on the allegations of improper revenue 
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EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AGREEMENT 
This Employment Termination Agreement ("Agreement7') is entered into by and between 
ClearOne Communications, Inc, ("ClearOne" or the "Company") and Susie S, Strohm 
("Strohm") (ClearOne and Strohm shall sometimes be hereinafter referred to collectively as the 
"Parties"). 
RECITALS 
A. Strohm has been employed by ClearOne in a variety of positions, most recently as 
the Company's Chief Financial Officer. 
B. On January 15, 2003, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
filed a civil action against ClearOne, Strohm, and Frances M. Flood, who was then serving as the 
Company's Chief Executive Officer, alleging various improprieties and misstatements in 
connection with the Company's financial statements (the "SEC Action"). 
C. The filing of the SEC Action has spawned, and may continue to spawn, multiple 
related proceedings, including, but not limited to, multiple shareholder securities class actions, 
multiple shareholder derivative actions, a grand jury investigation being conducted by the United 
States Department of Justice, a dispute and potential litigation between the Company and its 
directors and officers liability insurers, and potential litigation between the Company and its 
former auditor, Ernst & Young (collectively, "Related Proceedings"). 
D. Soon after the filing of the SEC Action, the Company placed Strohm on a paid 
administrative leave of absence, and this paid administrative leave has continued in effect at all 
times up to the execution of this Agreement. 
E. Strohm has employed separate counsel, Milo Steven Marsden and the law firm of 
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, PC (collectively, "BCP&C7*), to defend her in the SEC 
Action and the Related Proceedings, BCP&C has also represented Strohm in connection with 
the negotiation and drafting of this Agreement. 
F. Strohm has made various demands on the Company for indemnification and for 
advancement of the attorneys' fees and costs she has incurred to date, as well as the attorneys' 
fees and costs she may subsequently incur, in connection with the SEC Action and the Related 
Proceedings and has provided the Company with written undertakings, dated August 29, 2003 
and September 3,2003, in conformity with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-904. 
G. ClearOne referred Strohm's demands for indemnification to its Special Litigation 
Committee ("SLC") comprised of two independent directors. The SLC reviewed those demands, 
as well as similar demands for indemnification made by other present or former officers and 
directors of the Company, in conjunction with its investigation of the various claims asserted in 
the multiple shareholder derivative actions filed against certain of the Company's present and 
former officers and directors, including Strohm. On October 13, 2003, the SLC completed its 
investigation concerning the derivative actions and the indemnification demands and issued its 
reports to the Company wherein it concluded, inter alia, that pursuing the derivative actions was 
not in the best interest of the Company and that the Company should attempt to negotiate a 
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settlement of Strohm's indemnification demands in the context of negotiating a global 
settlement of all potential claims and counterclaims between the Company and Strohm. In 
reliance on the SLC's conclusions and recommendations, the Company has moved to dismiss the 
derivative actions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(4)(a) and has negotiated this 
Agreement with Strohm. 
H. Strohm and ClearOne desire to resolve any and all disputes that may exist 
between them, whether known or unknown, including, but not limited to, disputes regarding 
Strohm's demand for indemnification, disputes relating to Strohm's employment with ClearOne, 
and disputes relating to the termination of that employment relationship. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants, warranties, 
and agreements set forth herein, the Parties mutually agree as follows: 
1. Effective Date, This Agreement is effective on the eighth day following Strohm's 
signing of this Agreement, provided that Strohm does not revoke her execution of this 
Agreement as provided in Paragraph 19 below. 
2. Receipt of this Agreement. Strohm acknowledges that she received a copy of this 
Agreement on December 2,2003, and that she has 21 days from the receipt of this Agreement in 
which to consider and consult with an attorney regarding this Agreement. Strohm further 
acknowledges that she has had an adequate amount of time in which to consult with BCP&C, her 
counsel of choice, with respect to the contents of this Agreement prior to signing. 
3. Payment to Strohm. Upon the expiration of the revocation period described in 
Paragraph 19 below and the unrevoked signing of this Agreement by Strohm, ClearOne shall pay 
Strohm the sum of $75,000, ITae Parties acknowledge and agree that this payment is being made 
in consideration of, inter alia, the Company's purchase of Strohm's shares of the Company's 
common stock, the Company's cancellation of Strohm's options to purchase additional shares of 
the Company's common stock, and the release of all claims that Strohm may have against the 
Company, all as more fully stated in Paragraphs 5, 6, and 9 below. The Parties also 
acknowledge and agree that the Company is not responsible for the withholding of any federal or 
state taxes from said payment and that Strohin is responsible for paying any taxes that may 
become due and owing as a result of her receipt of said payment. 
4. Resignation of Employment. Strohm hereby resigns her employment with 
ClearOne effective December 5,2003. 
5. Cancellation of Stock Options. As partial consideration for the payment specified 
in Paragraph 3 above, upon the expiration of the revocation period described in Paragraph 19 
below and the unrevoked signing of this Agreement by Strohm, all unexercised stock options 
acquired by Strohm during her employment with the Company, whether vested or unvested, shall 
immediately be deemed cancelled. Strohm represents and warrants that, immediately prior to the 
effective date of this Agreement, she holds vested and unvested stock options entitling her to 
purchase up to a total of 268,464 shares of the Company's common stock and that 171,963 of 
these options are vested. Strohm further agrees that all of her rights, entitlements, and benefits 
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under the 1990 Gentner Stock Option Plan and the 1998 ClearOne Stock Option Plan, including 
any agreements entered into in relation to the foregoing plans, are hereby terminated and 
cancelled. 
6. Transfer of Stock. As partial consideration for the payment specified in 
Paragraph 3 above, upon the expiration of the revocation period described in Paragraph 19 below 
and the unrevoked signing of this Agreement by Strohm, Strohm shall transfer, assign, and sell to 
the Company 15,500 shares of the Company's common stock. 
7. Cooperation in Related Proceedings. Strohm shall cooperate with the Company 
and its counsel in the defense and/or prosecution of the SEC Action and the Related Proceedings. 
Strohm's cooperation shall include, but shall not be limited to, voluntarily providing deposition 
and trial testimony, meeting with the Company and its counsel for the purpose of preparing for 
depositions or trial proceedings, and providing information and documents to the Company or its 
counsel in connection with the defense and/or prosecution of the SEC Action and the Related 
Proceedings. With respect to any request by the Company and/or its counsel for deposition or 
trial testimony, meetings, information, OF documents, the Company shall give reasonable notice 
to Strohm of its request, including the time and place of the deposition, trial, or meeting, and 
shall reimburse Strohm for all reasonable expenses incurred by her, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs? in providing the requested cooperation. 
8. Indemnification. Subject to the limitations imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
902 and the Company's articles of incorporation and bylaws, and also subject to the undertakings 
referred to in Recital F above, ClearOne shall indemnify Strohm for any liability and for all 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by her in connection with the SEC Action or any 
Related Proceedings, whether incuiTed before or after the effective date of this Agreement. The 
Company's duty to indemnify Strohm is further conditioned upon Strohm's fulfillment of her 
duty under Paragraph 7 above to cooperate with the Company and its counsel in connection with 
the SEC Action and Related Proceedings. 
9. Release of Claims by Strohm. Strohm, on behalf of herself and her heirs and 
assigns, hereby completely releases and discharges CleaiOne and all of ClearOne's predecessors, 
successors, parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates, and all of their respective present and former 
directors, officers, employees, attorneys and agents (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
''Releasees") from any and all existing claims and causes of action of every kind and nature, 
whether presently known or unknown by the Parties, including but not limited to any claims or 
causes of action for breach of implied or express contract, libel, slander, wrongful discharge or 
termination, discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and/or 
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the 
Utah Antidiscrimination Act, local laws prohibiting age, race, religion, sex, national origin, 
disability and other forms of discrimination, or any other federal or state law that may be 
applicable thereto, claims growing out of any legal restrictions on ClearOne's right to terminate 
its employees, any tort claim or other claim arising in any way out of the employment 
relationship between Strohm and ClearOne or the termination of that relationship. Strohm 
specifically waives any and all claims for back pay, front pay, or any other form of compensation 
for services, except as set forth herein. 
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Except as expressly stated in Paragraph 8 above, Strohm hereby waives any right to 
recover damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and any other relief in any proceeding or action brought 
against CleaiOne by any other party, including without limitation the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor Division, on Strohm's 
behalf asserting any claim, charge, demand, grievance, or cause of action released by Strohm as 
stated above. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Strohm does not waive rights, if any, Strohm may have to 
unemployment insurance benefits or workers1 compensation benefits. Nothing in this 
Paragraph 9 prohibits Strohm from paying COBRA premiums to maintain Strohm's 
participation, if any, in ClearOne's group health plan to the extent allowed by law and by the 
terms, conditions, and limitations of the health plan. 
10. Release of Claims by ClearOne, Except for any claim as to which 
indemnification is not allowed by Utah' Code Ann. § 16-10a-902 and any claim that may accrue 
under the undertakings referenced in Recital F above, ClearOne, on behalf of itself and its 
successors and assigns, hereby completely releases arid discharges Strohm from all existing 
claims and causes of action of any kind and nature, whether presently known or unknown by the 
Parties, including but not limited to any claims or causes of action arising out of or relating to 
Strohm's employment with ClearOne. 
11. No Assignment of Claims. Strohm represents and warrants that she has not 
previously assigned or transferred, or attempted to assign or transfer, to any third party, any of 
the claims waived and released herein. 
12. No Claim Piled. Strohm represents that she has not filed any claim, complaint, 
charge, or lawsuit against CleaiOne or any other Releasee with any governmental agency or any 
state or federal court, and covenants not to file any lawsuit at any time hereafter for any matter, 
claim, or incident known or unknown which occurred or arose out of occurrences prior to the 
date hereof, 
13. No Admission of liability. This Agreement does not constitute an admission of 
any fault, liability, or wrongdoing by any Releasee, nor an admission that Strohm has any claim 
whatsoever against ClearOne or any other Releasee. CleaiOne and all other Releasees 
specifically deny having any liability to Strohm or having committed any wrongful acts against 
Strohm. This Agreement does not constitute an admission of any fault, liability, or wrongdoing 
by Strohm, nor an admission that ClearOne has.any claim against Strohm. Strohm specifically 
denies having any liability to ClearOne or having committed any wrongful acts against 
ClearOne. 
14. Additional Consideration. Strohm acknowledges and agrees that as of the date 
she signs this Agreement, ClearOne has paid to Strohm (a) all compensation for wages earned, 
less normal payroll deductions, (b) all amounts due for earned vacation pay less normal payroll 
deductions, and (c) all other amounts due and owing to Strohm by ClearOne. Strohm agrees and 
acknowledges that the sums paid pursuant to this Agreement are in addition to any sums or 
payments to which Strohm would be entitled but for the signing of this Agreement. 
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15. Conditions Subsequent. This Agreement is conditioned upon Strohm signing 
settlement documents in the SEC Action by December 5, 2003, and upon the final approval of 
the settlement of the SEC Action, as it applies to Strohm, by January 31, 2004. If for any reason 
Strohm fails to satisfy either of these conditions, this Agreement will automatically become null 
and void, and the Parties shall forthwith return to each other any and all consideration received 
by them pursuant to this Agreement. 
16. Integration Clause. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and 
understanding of ClearOne and Strohm concerning the subject matter hereof, and except as 
expressly noted herein, this Agreement supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations, proposed 
agreements, agreements or representations whether written or oral concerning the subject matter 
hereof. CleaiOne and Strohm agree and acknowledge that neither CleaiOne or Strohm, nor any 
agent or attorney of either, has made any representation, warranty, promise or covenant 
whatsoever, express or implied, not contained in this Agreement, to induce the other to execute 
this Agreement. No amendment, alteration, or modification of this Agreement shall be effective 
unless made in writing and signed by both Parties. 
17. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, without giving effect to Utah's choice of law 
rules. 
18. Voluntary and Knowing Signing. Strohm acknowledges that she has read this 
Agreement carefully and fully understands this Agreement and that she has consulted with her 
attorney, BCP&C, prior to signing this Agreement. Strohm acknowledges that she has executed 
this Agreement voluntarily and of her own free will and that she is knowingly and voluntarily 
releasing and waiving all claims she may have against Releasees, including ClearOne. 
19. Revocation Period. Strohm has seven (7) days from the date on which she signs 
this Agreement to revoke this Agreement by providing written notice, by mail, hand delivery, or 
facsimile, of her revocation to: 
Raymond J. Etcheverry 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Counsel for ClearOne 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Facsimile: (801)536-6111 
Strohm's revocation, to be effective, must be received by the above-named person by the 
end of the seventh day after Strohm signs this Agreement. This Agreement becomes effective on 
the eighth day after Strohm signs this Agreement, providing that Strohm has not revoked this 
Agreement as provided above. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement on the dates 
indicated below. 
Dated: 
12, C/ O ^ 
CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
Dated: »4M A 3 
SUSIE S. STROHM 
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242 circle • circumstellar 
^ircle vb circled; circling Vk(3-)lirj\ v/ (14c)' 1 : to enclose in or as if 
in a circle 2 : to move or revolve around ~ yi 1 a : to move in or 
as if in a circle b : CIRCULATE 2 : to describe or extend in a circle — 
chvcler ykfc-MarV n -
circle graph n (1928) : a circular, chart cut by radiii into segments illus-
trating relative magnitudes or frequencies— called also pie chart 
circlet \'sar-kbt\ n (15c): a little.circle; esp: a circular ornament 
Jcir-cuit Vsar-k3t\ n. often attrib [ME, fr. MF circuite, fr. L circuitus, fr. 
' pp. of circumire,.circuire to go around, fr. circum- 4- ire to go — more 
. at ISSUE] (14c) 1 a : a usu. circular line encompassing an area b 
: the space enclosed within such a line 2 a : a course around a pe-
riphery b : a circuitous or indirect route 3 a : a regular tour (as by 
a traveling judge or preacher) around an assigned district or territory 
b : the route traveled c : a group of church congregations ministered 
to by one pastor 4 a : the complete path of an electric current in-
cluding usu. the source of electric energy b : an assemblage of elec-
tronic, elements : HOOKUP c : a two-way communication path between 
points (as in a computer) 5 a : an association of similar groups 
: LEAGUE b : a number or series of public outlets (as theaters, radio 
shows, or arenas) offering the same kind of presentation c : a number 
of similar social gatherings (cocktail ~ > — cir*cuitt«al \-kat-'l\ adj 
2circuit vt (15c): to make a circuit about "*' vi: to make a circuit 
circuit breaker n (1872) : a switch that automatically interrupts an 
electric circuit under an infrequent abnormal condition 
circuit court n (1708) : a court that sits at two or more places within 
One judicial district -
circuit judge n (1801) : a judge who holds a circuit court 
cir«cu«itous \Os3r-'kyu-3t-»s\ adj (1664) 1 : not being forthright or 
direct in language or action 2 : having a circular or winding course (a 
~ route) — cir*cu«itous«ly adv — cir*cu»itous<ness n 
circuit rider ri (1837): a clergyman assigned to a circuit esp. in a rural 
.area 
cir-cuit.ry \'s3r-k9-tre\ n. pi -rics (1946) 1 : the detailed plan of an 
electric circuit 2 : the components of an electric circuit 
cir-cu-ity XQsar-'kyu-st-eA n, pi -ities [irreg. h.,cirmt) (1626): lack of 
straightforwardness : INDIRECTION (mired so deeply In its Own compli-
cated ~ of words —C. O. Gregory) 
'cir^cu-lar Vsar-kv3-l3r\ adj [ME citculet, fr. MF, fr. LL circularis, fr. L 
circulus circle] (15c) 1 a : having the form of a circle : ROUND b 
: moving in or describing a circle or spiral 2 a : of or relating to a 
circle or its mathematical properties (a ~~ arc) b : having a circular 
base or bases (a ~ cylinder) 3 : CIRCUITOUS, INDIRECT (a. ~ explana-
tion) 4 : being or involving reasoning that .uses in the argument or 
proof a conclusion to be'proved'or one of its. unproved consequences 
5 : marked by or moving in a cycle 6 : intended for circulation — clr-
cu-Iar.i.ty \,s3r-ky3-Mar-3t-e\ n — cir.cu.lar*ly Vsar-ky3-br-le\ adv — 
cir«cu«lar«ness ri 
'circular n (1789): a paper (as a leaflet) intended for wide distribution 
circular dichroism n (ca. 1961) 1 :. the property (as of an optically 
active medium) of unequalabsorptioh of right and left plane-polarized 
light so that the emergent light is elliptically polarized . 2 : a spectro-
scopic technique that makes use of circular dienroism 
circular file n (1967): WASTEBASKET 
circular function n (1884): TRIGONOMETRIC FUNCTION 
cir*cu>lar*ize Vsar-kya-l3-,riz\ vt -ized; -iz.ing (1848) 1 a : to send 
circulars to b : to poll by questionnaire 2 : PUBLICIZE — cipcu-lar-
iza»tion \lS9r-kv?-la-r3-,za-sh3n\ n 
circular saw n (1817): a power saw with a circular cutting blade; also 
: the blade itself 
circulate \*S3r-ky^,lat\ vb -lat-ed; -lat'ing; [L circulatus, pp. of circulate. 
fr. circulus] vi (1650) 1 : to move in a circle, circuit, or orbit; esp : to 
. follow a course that returns to the starting point (blood ~s through 
the body) 2 : to pass from person to person or place to place:* as a 
: to flow without obstruction b : to become well-known or wide-
spread (rumors circulated through the town) c : to go from group to 
group at a social gathering d : to come into the hands of readers; 
specif i to become sold or distributed ~" vt: to cause to circulate — 
cir*cu*lat«able \-,lat-3-b9l\ adj — cir-cu-la-tive \-,lat-iv\ adj — cir-cu.la-
tor \-,lat-sr\ n 
circulatingdecimaln(1768): REPEATING DECIMAL 
cir«cu«la»tion \,ssr-ky3-'la-sh3n\ n (1654) 1 : orderly movement 
through a circuit; esp : the movement of blood through the vessels of 
the body induced by the pumping action of the heart 2 : FLOW 3 a 
: passage or transmission frbm person to person or place to place; esp 
: the interchange of currency (coins in ~ > b : the.extent of dissemina-
tion: as (1): the average number of copies of a publication sold over a 
given period (2) : the total number of items borrowed from a library 
cir«cu«la^o«ry Vssr-kys-la-.tSr-e, -,tor-\ adj (1605) : of or relating to 
circulation or the circulatory system ( ~ failure) 
circulatory system n (1862) : the system of blood, blood vessels, lym-
phatics, and heart concerned with the circulation of the blood and 
lymph 
circum- prefix [OF or L; OF, fr. L, fr. circum, fr. circus circle — more at 
CIRCLE]: around: about (circumpolar) 
cir«cum*am<bi»ent Vsar-ka-'mam-he-aritX adj [LL circumambient-, cir-
cumambiens, prp. of circumambire to surround in a circle) fr. Lcircum-
•+- ambire to go around — more at AMBIENT] (1633) : being on all sides 
: ENCOMPASSING — cir*cum*am>bi>enHy adv 
Cir-cunvam-bu-late \-bya-.lat\ vr -lat«ed; -lat.ing [LL circumambulatus. VII -vuuruiii-uu'iaiL \-ujr«,-.i«L\ vi -ia«'GW) - luring- ^<i j uiVHrnuiiivuiUiHj. pp. of circumambulate, fr. L circum- + ambulare to walk] (ca. 1656) 
: to circle on foot esp. ritualistically — cir*cum*am*bu-la>tioi 
bys-'la-shanX n 
tion \-,mam-
cir«cum*cen>ter X'sar-kam-.sent-arX n (ca. 1889) : the point at which the 
perpendicular bisectors of the sides of a triangle intersect and which is 
equidistant from the three vertices 
cir*cum*cir>cle V.sar-kslyn (1885): a circle which passes through all the 
vertices of a polygon (as a triangle) 
cir«cum«cise ysar-kam-.sizX vt -cised; -cls.ing [ME circumcisen, fr. L 
circumcisus, pp. of circumcidere, fr. circum- + caedere to cut — more 
at CONCISE] (13c) i to cut off the prepuce of (a male) or the clitoris of (a 
female) — cir-cum-cis«cr n 
clr.cum.ci.sion X.sar-kam-'sizh-an, 'ssr-kam-.X n (12c) 1 a : the act of 
circumcising; specif: a Jewish rite performed on male infants as a sign 
of inclusion in the Jewish religious community b : the condition of 
. being circumcised 2 cap : January 1 observed as a church f 
commemoration of the circumcision of Jesus C s c * v a l jj, 
cir.cum.fer.ence \sa(r)-'k3m(pM3m(t)s, -f(3-)rsn(t)s\ n [ME, fr w 
L circumferentia, fr. circumferre t o carry around , fr. circum- + f ' k 
carry — m o r e at B E A R ] (14c ) 1 : the perimeter of a circle * ^to 
external boundary o r surface of a figure or o b j e c t : PERIPHERY : ^ 
cum.fer*en«tial \ - 1 k 3 m ( p ) - f s - , r e n - c h s l \ adj cb. 
>cir<um.flex X'ssr-ksm-.fleksX adj [Lcircumflexus, pp. of circumn 
to bend around, mark wi th a circumflex, fr. circum- -f- flectereilu** 
( 1 5 7 7 ) 1 : characterized by the-p i tch , quant i ty , Or quality \nJ**§ 
by a circumflex 2 : m a r k e d with a circumflex nd,caiftJ 
C ircumf lex n ( 1 6 0 9 ) : a mark \ ", o r " orig. used in Greek oVP 
vowels to indicate a rising-falling tone and in other languages u! S 
length, contraction, or a particular vowel quality " M 
cirmum.flu^nt XOsar-'ksm-fls-want, .ssr-ksm-'flu-antV adj [fr. Lc-fluent-, circumftuens.prp. of circtimfluere to flow around, fr ciVi"^ "*' 
fluere to flow] (1577) : flowing round or surrounding in the man *+ 
a fluid — cir .cum.fIu.ous XQsar-'ksm-fta-wssX adj ner«i 
tir*cum.fuse Vssr -kam-fy i i zX vt -fused; -fus-ing [ L circumfusus, n 
circumfundere to pour around, fr. circum- + fundere to pour —. °* 
at FOUND] (1605) : SURROUND, ENVELOP — cir-cum.fu.sion Viyb.S.®* 
cipcum.ja.cent V.sar-kam-'jas-'ntX adj [L circumjacent-, circumia 
prp. of circumjacere to lie around, fr. circum- + jacere to lie — ^ 
ADJACENT] (15c): lying adjacent on all sides : SURROUNDING W 
cir«cum.lo*cu.tion X.sar-kam-lo-'kyu-shanX n [ L circumlocution-,
 c;m 
llf^llare, ft 
[ < to surrc 
^•i.shanX n 
A d e d witl 
k i t o b i t t e 
<K- +ye 
K m a k e a < 
I i i y or str; 
E f ^ T a g g 
fcu-tio; 
tE](15c: 
llj used esp. f< 
fhofsemanshi] 
Jiancesbycl 
focutio, fr. circum- + locutio speech , fr. locutus, pp. of loqui* to snean 
' * '
 x
 " the use of an unnecessarily large number of words to »v^' 
.... 2 : evasion in speech — cir.cum.loc.u-to*rv \-Mai-.v 
-,t6r-\ adj 
(15c) 1 :     il  l      exo  
an idea . y V'l k-yj. 15^ 
cir^um.lu.nar Vssr-ksm-Mu-nsrV adj (ca. 1909) : revolving about 
surrounding the moon 0r 
cir<um*nav.I .gate V'nav-s- .gatX vt [ L circumnavigatus. pp. of circum 
navigate to sail a r o u n d , fr. circum- + navigare- t o navigate] <1634) -7 
g o comple te ly a r o u n d (as the earth) e sp . by water; also • to go around 
instead of t h r o u g h , : BYPASS ( ~ a c o n g e s t e d area) — cirn:um«iiav>i.|H 
tion V.nav-a-'ga-shanX n — cir.cunvnav.f .ga«tor V'nav-3* tgat-3r\ n 
•ksm-'po-brX adj ( 1 6 8 6 ) 1 : continually vi visible 2 : surrounding or found in the vicinity 
cir*cum.po*lar X.ssr-
above the horizon (a T^ star) 
of a terrestrial pole 
clr«cum«scls«sile V'sis-al, -,il\ adj [L circumscissus, rip. of circumscindtn 
to tear around, fr. circum- + scindete to cut", split — more at SHED] 
(1835): dehiscing by fissure around the capsule of the fruit J 
cir*cum.scribe Vs^r-kam-.skrTbV vt [L citcumsctibere, fr. circum- + $c. 
bere to write, draw — more at SCRIBEJ (1835) l a : to constrict the 
range or activity of definitely and clearly b": to. define or mark off 
carefully 2 a: to draw a line around b : to surround by a boundar) 
3 : to construct or be constructed around (a geometrical figure) so aj 
to touch as many points as possible syiisee LIMIT 
clr^um.scrip.tidn AiSsr-kam-'skrip-shanX « [L circumscription*, circum-
scriptio, fr. circumscripta, pp. of circumscribere] (1531) 1 : the act ol 
circumscribing : the state or being circumscribed: as a : DEFINITION, 
DELIMITATION b : LIMITATION 2 : something that circumscribes: as 1 
: UMIT, BOUNDARY b : RESTRICTION 3 : a circumscribed area or dis-
trict • 
cincum.spect Vsar-ksm-.spektX adj [ME, fr. MF or L; MF circonspecl 
h.L citcumspectus, fr. pp. cif circumspicere to look around, be cautious, 
fr. circum- + specete to look — more at SPY] (15c): careful to consider 
all circumstances and possible conseouences : PRUDENT syn see CAU-
TIOUS — cir.cunvspec'tion Xissr-kam-'spek-shsnX n — cir-cum-specllr 
X*sar-k3m-,spek-tleX adv 
cir-cum«stance \'s3r-k9rh-,stan(t)s, -st3n(t)s\ n [ME, fr. OF, fr. L ar-
cumstantia. fr. circumstant-, circumstans, prp. of circumstare to stand 
around, fr. circum- + stare to stand — more at STAND] (13c) 1 a: 1 
condition, fact, or event accompanying, conditioning, or determining 
another : an essential or inevitable concomitant (the weather is a ~ lo 
be taken into consideration) b : a subordinate or accessory fact OT 
detail (cost is a minor ~ in this case) c : a piece of evidence that indi-
cates, the probability or .improbability of an event (as a crime) (the~ol 
the missing weapon told against him) (the ~s suggest murder) 2 1 
: the sum of essential and environmental factors (as of an event or 
situation) (constant and rapid change. in economic ~ —G. M. 
Trevelyan) b : state of affairs : EVENTUALITY (open rebellion was» 
rare ^ > -r- often used in pi; (a victim of ^vs) c pi: situation with re-
gard to wealth, (he was in easy ~ i > 3 : attendant formalities and cere-
monial (pride, pomp; and "— of glorious war—Shak.) 4 ran event 
that constitutes a detail (as of a narrative or course of events) (consid-
ering each ~ in turn) syn see OCCURRENCE 
circumstanced \-,stan(t)st, -stsn(t)st\ adj (1611) : placed in particular 
circumstances esp. in regard to property or income 
cir.cum.stan.tlal \,s3r-ksm-'stan-ch3l\ adj (1600) 1 : belonging «<J 
consisting in, or dependent on circumstances 2 : pertinent but not 
essential > INCIDENTAL 3 : marked by careful attention to deUJ 
: abounding in factual details (a ~ account of the fight) 4 : CEREMO 
N I A L — cir.cum-stan.ti.al.i-ty \-,stah-che-'ai-»t-e\i.ti — cir-cum-stan-tiii-
ly \-'stanch-(3-)le\ adv . 
syn CIRCUMSTANTIAL, MINUTE, PARTICULAR, DETAILED mean deainj 
with a matter fully and usu. point by point, CIRCUMSTANTIAL imp»o 
fullness of detail that fixes something described in time and spaced 
circumstantial account of our visit) MINUTE implies close and searcnini 
attention to the smallest details (a minwfe examination of a fossi 
PARTICULAR implies a precise attention to every detail (a />5rt' ., 
description of the scene of the crime).DETAILED stresses abundant 
completeness of detail (a detailed analysis of the event)
 b 
circumstantial evidence n (1736): evidence, that tends to provea lac uj 
proving other events or circumstances which afford a basis forar 
sonable inference of the occurrence of the fact at issue .,«] 
cir.cum.stan.ti.ate S,sbr-k3mr,stan-che-lat\ vt -at<^d; -at.ing (ca w 
: to supply with circumstantial evidence or support ... •. 
circum.stel.lar \,s3r-k3m-*stel-3r\ adj (1951): surrounding or occur™ 
in the vicinity of a star 
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LEXSEE 
KATHLEEN GATES, Individually, as Next of Kin and as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of RUFUS GATES; FREDERICK GATES and KEVIN GATES, as 
Next of Kin, through their Next Friend, KATHLEEN GATES; MARKEITH 
MCCOY, through his Next Friend, YVONNE MCCOY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. 
THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, CITY OF MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
WALTER J. WINFREY, Individually and in his official capacity as DIRECTOR OF 
THE CITY OF MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER ABDUL 
SHAFEEQ MUHAMMAD, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 98-5921 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6713 
April 6, 2000, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR 
FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 
28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUA-
TIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING 
IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED 
ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NO-
TICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF 
THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported in Table Case 
Format at: 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 13065. 
PRIOR HISTORY: ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 




PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, a deceased 
policeman's wife, challenged the Shelby County Circuit 
Court (Tennessee) judgment for appellee policeman on 
appellant's claims under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 and state 
claims arising out of the shooting death of her husband 
by appellee. 
OVERVIEW: Appellant's husband, a policeman, was 
killed by appellee policeman, during an incident while 
deceased was off-duty. Appellant challenged appellee's 
judgment on her state wrongful death and federal civil 
rights claims. The court affirmed. Exclusion of appel-
lant's expert witness testimony was not erroneous be-
cause his expertise was in crime scene reconstruction, 
but his proffered testimony was on trajectory analysis. 
The probative value of decedent's dying declarations was 
not substantially outweighed by prejudice or confusion 
because the issue at trial was whether appellee's use of 
deadly force was objectively reasonable and decedent's 
statements that it was decedent's fault and that appellee 
did not know decedent was a police officer were rele-
vant. Appellee's testimonial inconsistencies did not un-
dermine his consistent theme that he shot decedent in 
self-defense. Substantial evidence supported the findings 
of the jury and the trial court that appellee's use of deadly 
force was objectively reasonable. 
OUTCOME: Judgment was affirmed. Exclusion of ex-
pert testimony was not erroneous because witness's ex-
pertise was in crime scene reconstruction, not trajectory 
analysis; the probative value of relevant dying declara-
tions outweighed potential prejudice; and substantial 
evidence existed to support that appellee's use of deadly 
force was objectively reasonable. 
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Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
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Page 1 
A ~I A n- 4 C -7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6713, * 
Evidence > Testimony > Experts > Admissibility 
[HN1]A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert 
testimony is reviewed under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard. 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Jury Trials > Province of 
Court & Jury 
Evidence > Scientific Evidence > Daubert Standard 
Evidence > Testimony > Experts > Daubert Standard 
[HN2]Fed. R. Evid. 702 assigns to the trial judge the task 
of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a 
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. 
Evidence > Testimony > Experts > General Overview 
[HN3]The issue with regard to the admission of expert 
testimony is not the qualifications of a witness in the 
abstract, but whether those qualifications provide a foun-
dation for a witness to answer a specific question. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preserva-
tion for Review 
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Objections & 
Offers of Proof > Timeliness 
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on 
Evidence 
[HN4]Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected and a timely objection or motion to strike ap-
pears of record. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Abuse of Discretion 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of 
Review > Abuse of Discretion > Evidence 
Evidence > Relevance > Confusion, Prejudice & Waste 
of Time 
[HN5]Assuming the issue of admission of evidence is 
preserved for appeal, the court applies an abuse of dis-
cretion standard to the trial court's admission of the evi-
dence, to its determinations of relevancy, and to its bal-
ancing of the potentially unfair prejudicial impact of evi-
dence against its probative value. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Abuse of Discretion 
Evidence > Relevance > Confusion, Prejudice & Waste 
of Time 
[HN6]In reviewing the trial court's decision on the issue 
of the admission of dying declarations, the appellate 
court looks at the evidence in a light most favorable to its 
proponent, maximizing its probative value and, minimiz-
ing its effect of confusing the jury. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Substantial Evidence > General Overview 
[HN7]A jury's verdict on a federal civil rights claim is 
entitled to substantial deference. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Clearly Erroneous Review 
[HN8]The trial court's findings on a state wrongful death 
claim are entitled to substantial deference. A trial court's 
findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erro-
neous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). If the trial court's account 
of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed 
in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it 
even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier 
of fact it would have weighed the evidence differently. 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Substantial Evidence > General Overview 
[HN9]In reviewing an appeal based on insufficiency of 
the evidence the appellate court may neither weigh the 
evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, nor 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury or the trial 
court. Instead, the court must view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the appellees, drawing all reason-
able inferences in their favor. 
COUNSEL: For KATHLEEN GATES, FREDERICK 
GATES, KEVIN GATES, MARKEITH MCCOY, Plain-
tiffs - Appellants: Ernest L. Jarrett, Detroit, MI. 
For THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, CITY OF MEMPHIS 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, WALTER J. WINFREY, 
Defendants - Appellees: Henry L. Klein, Apperson, 
Crump & Maxwell, Memphis, TN. 
For ABDUL SHAFEEQ MUHAMMAD, Defendant -
Appellee: Alan Bryant Chambers, Handel R. Durham, 
Jr., Parson Khumalo Law Firm, Memphis, TN. 
JUDGES: BEFORE: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; 
BELL *, District Judge. 
* Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, United States 
District Judge for the Western District of Michi-
gan, sitting by designation. 
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PER CURIAM. This case arises out of the tragic fa-
tal shooting of an off-duty police officer [*2] by a fellow 
police officer. 
On November 4, 1994, Major Rufus Gates, an off-
duty member of the Memphis Police Department, 
dressed in civilian clothing, was driving east on McClure 
Street with his sons and nephew when his vehicle was 
struck by a Jeep ' occupied by several youths. The Jeep 
pulled up alongside Gates' vehicle, blocking the oncom-
ing traffic. An argument ensued between Gates and the 
occupants of the Jeep. Gates retrieved his gun from un-
der the seat and exited his car. As the Jeep began to drive 
away, Gates ran after it, carrying his gun. 
1 Although there was some dispute about the 
make of this vehicle, for ease of reference it will 
be referred to as a Jeep. 
At some point during this altercation, Memphis Po-
lice Officer Abdul Shafeeq Muhammad, who was driv-
ing a marked police vehicle, pulled up behind Gates' ve-
hicle. When the Jeep drove away, Gates rapidly ap-
proached the police vehicle with his gun in his hand. 
Muhammad fired his service revolver at Gates. Gates 
died from his wounds. 
The wife, sons, [*3] and nephew of Major Gates 
filed this action in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, 
Tennessee, against the City of Memphis, City of Mem-
phis Police Department, Police Director Walter J. Win-
frey and Officer Muhammad, seeking damages pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of rights secured by 
the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and state claims arising out of 
the shooting death of Gates. Defendants removed the 
action to the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Tennessee. Prior to trial, the district court 
dismissed Defendants City of Memphis Police Depart-
ment and Director Walter J. Winfrey from the case. The 
district court also dismissed Plaintiffs Frederick Gates, 
Kevin Gates and Markeith McCoy without prejudice 
pursuant to Plaintiffs' motion. 
Following an 11-day trial, the jury returned a verdict 
for Defendant Muhammad on Plaintiffs civil rights 
claims against him. In light of this finding the jury did 
not consider the derivative claims against the City. 
Thereafter the parties submitted findings of fact and con-
clusions of law on the state wrongful death claim for the 
district court's consideration. [*4] The district court 
found that Defendant Muhammad perceived Gates as 
presenting a threat sufficient to justify the use of deadly 
force, and that this perception was objectively reason-
able. Accordingly, the district court found for Defendant 
Muhammad on Plaintiffs state wrongful death claim, 
Having determined Defendant Muhammad's conduct was 
not negligent, the trial court also found for Defendant 
City of Memphis on Plaintiffs state wrongful death 
claim. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Kathleen Gates filed this appeal, 
requesting that the jury verdict on the civil rights claims 
be set aside and the matter remanded for a new trial, and 
that the trial court's judgment on the state law claims be 
vacated and judgment entered in her favor. 
I. 
Appellant's first assignment of error concerns the 
trial court's ruling that Appellant could not use leading 
questions on direct examination of a witness identified 
with an adverse party. Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence provides that leading questions should not 
be used on the direct examination of a witness except as 
may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony. 
FED. R. EVID. 611(c). However, the last sentence of 
Rule 611(c) provides [*5] that "when a party calls a hos-
tile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with 
an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading ques-
tions." Id. 
Appellant called Mary Overton Jackson on direct 
examination. When the district court objected to the use 
of leading questions, Appellant's counsel requested that 
she be deemed an adverse witness because she was a 
member of the police department and was the lead inves-
tigator responsible for making the departmental determi-
nation that the defendant's use of deadly force was justi-
fied, a position adverse to the Appellants. 
The district court initially declined to designate 
Jackson as an adverse witness. The district court noted 
that because Gates was a very well respected member of 
the police department, and because both sides of the case 
would be calling members of the police department, it 
did not make sense under the circumstances to designate 
every member of the police department as an adverse 
witness without evidence of their adverse position. After 
further testimony from Jackson regarding her role in au-
thoring the report of the internal investigation, the distinct 
court reexamined the issue and determined that Appel-
lant [*6] could use leading questions on her direct ex-
amination of Overton. 
Although the last sentence of Rule 611(c) provides 
that certain categories of witnesses can automatically be 
treated as hostile, the rule does not give the calling party 
an absolute right to ask leading questions even when the 
witness is identified with an adverse party. There may be 
instances where, although a witness is identified with the 
opposing party, he or she is also identified, because of 
sympathy or bias, with the calling party. In such cases 
the court has discretion to preclude the use of leading 
questions to avoid abuses of the rule. See WElNSTEfN'S 
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FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 2d ed. § 611.06[3], at 611-64 
Vol 4 (1999). The use of leading questions during direct 
examination remains within the trial court's sound discre-
tion, and we review that decision only to determine 
whether there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(citing Chonich v. Wayne County Community College, 
874 F.2d 359, 368 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's 
rulings regarding Appellant's method of questioning of 
Jackson, [*7] Where, as in this case, members of the 
police department were identified with both parties, the 
court properly favored the use of direct examination until 
such time as it became evident that a particular witness 
was in fact adverse. 
In addition to the finding that there was no abuse of 
discretion, this Court observes that Appellant has not 
shown any specific manner in which she was prejudiced 
by the trial court's rulings regarding this witness. Appel-
lant did eventually receive the ruling she requested and 
was permitted to question Jackson through leading ques-
tions. Appellant claims that by this time Jackson had 
been more evasive than she could have been, had she 
been required to answer leading questions, but Appellant 
has not suggested that the trial court prevented her from 
revisiting any particular line of questioning. 
II. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it 
granted Defendants' motion to disqualify her expert wit-
ness, Mr. Rocky S. Stone. 
[HN1]A trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony is reviewed under the abuse of discre-
tion standard. General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
138-39, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997); [*8] 
Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 151 F.3d 
500, 515 (6th Cir. 1998)(rejecting the three-part standard 
of review articulated in Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 
F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
Mr. Stone is a former police officer who is now self-
employed as a forensic consultant. He worked as a police 
officer for 19 years, the last 12 of which he was assigned 
to the criminalistic section, or crime lab, where he was 
assigned to the latent fingerprint and firearm tool mark 
units. He also participated in the reconstruction of shoot-
ing incidents. His education includes graduation from the 
police academy in 1973, some course work toward an 
unfinished degree in police science, and a number of 
courses and training seminars on crime scene investiga-
tion. He has had no post-secondary education in physics, 
anatomy or physiology. 
Appellant offered Mr. Stone as an expert witness on 
the subject of trajectory analysis, which Mr. Stone de-
fined as the examination of the path of a bullet. Mr. 
Stone testified that although he never received a block of 
training specifically devoted to trajectory analysis, trajec-
tory analysis was covered in his course work on shooting 
[*9] scene investigations. He explained that trajectory 
analysis is not a discipline in and of itself, but is merely 
one small component of the analysis needed to recon-
struct any shooting scene. 
Appellant contends that the trial court's finding that 
Mr. Stone was not an expert in trajectory analysis erro-
neously ignored Mr. Stone's knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training and education as a crime scene investigator 
and shooting reconstructionist, and his testimony that 
trajectory analysis was but one component of the overall 
area of his expertise. 
[HN2]Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as-
signs to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an ex-
pert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is 
relevant to the task at hand. Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 125 L. Ed. 2d 
469, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The objective of the 
Daubert gatekeeping requirement is "to make certain that 
an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional 
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom 
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field." Kumho Tire 
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 143 L. Ed. 
2d 238, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). [*10] As we noted in 
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 
1994). "[HN3]the issue with regard to expert testimony 
is not the qualifications of a witness in the abstract, but 
whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a 
witness to answer a specific question." 
In this case, the testimony Mr. Stone was prepared 
to give was not a general shooting scene reconstruction. 
As evidenced by Mr. Stone's Rule 26(a) expert report, he 
was being offered to give testimony on the specific sub-
ject of trajectory analysis. According to his report:, Mr. 
Stone was prepared to testify on the probability of threat 
to Officer Muhammad based upon trajectory analysis. 
Given the focus of his proposed opinion testimony, it 
was not error for the court to consider his expertise in 
trajectory analysis, rather than his expertise in the gen-
eral field of crime scene reconstruction. 
In light of the fact that Mr. Stone had never received 
formal training in trajectory analysis, he had no post-
secondary education in physics, anatomy or physiology, 
and he had made no measurements, and had done no 
scientific testing on this particular shooting scene, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion [* 11] in exclud-
ing Mr. Stone's proposed expert testimony. 
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III. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously 
admitted two purported dying declarations of Major 
Gates. 
Two off-duty Memphis Police Officers, Officer 
Harvey Edinborough, Jr., and Lieutenant Jerry A. Smith, 
came to Gates' side after the shooting. Edinborough testi-
fied that Gates asked who shot him, and then said "He 
didn't know I was an officer." On cross-examination Ed-
inborough expressed uncertainty as to whether this 
comment was in the form of a statement or a question. 
Smith testified that Gates told him that he had his pistol 
in his hand when he approached the officer. Although he 
could not quote Gates verbatim, he testified that Gates 
said several times that it was not the officer's fault, that it 
was his fault that the shooting occurred. 
Appellant does not dispute that these statements 
qualify under Rule 804(b)(2) as dying declarations. She 
contends, however, that the declarations should have 
been excluded from evidence because they were more 
prejudicial than probative. Appellant contends that the 
uncertainty about what Gates actually said, the uncer-
tainty about what he meant, the comments' susceptibility 
[* 12] to multiple interpretations and the fact that neither 
comment tends to support or refute the parties' positions 
relative to whether Gates ever pointed his gun at the De-
fendant, are all factors which prejudiced the Appellant, 
confused the issues, and misled the jury. [HN4]Error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits evi-
dence unless a substantial right of the party is affected 
and a timely objection or motion to strike appears of re-
cord. FED. R, EVID. 103(a)(1). Appellant did not object 
to the admission of these dying declarations at trial. They 
were, however, the subject of Appellant's pretrial motion 
in limine to exclude, which the trial court denied. 
Because the standard of review to be applied on ap-
peal is governed by whether the issue was preserved, this 
court must consider whether the motion in limine pre-
served the issue for appeal.2 
2 Evidentiary issues that are not preserved are 
reviewed only for "plain error." FED. R. EVID. 
103(d). 
In United States v. Kelly, 204 F.3d 652, 2000 WL 
205096 [*13] at *2 (6th Cir. 2000), we held that a mo-
tion in limine that was not ruled upon is not sufficient to 
preserve evidentiary questions for appeal. In contrast to 
Kelly, the trial court in this case did rule on the motion in 
limine prior to trial. Our analysis in Kelly, however, ap-
pears to be equally applicable, whether or not there has 
been a ruling on the motion in limine: 
As a matter of policy, the objection re-
quirement of Fed.R.Evid. 103 is intended 
to allow the trial court to fix errors in its 
decision to admit or exclude evidence on 
the spot, thus preventing errors that could 
easily be alleviated without recourse to 
the appellate courts. A pre-trial motion in 
limine is not as effective a means of alert-
ing the trial judge to evidentiary problems 
as a contemporaneous motion at trial. 
Id. at *2 (quoting Burger v. Western Kentucky Naviga-
tion, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 8268, No. 91-5221, 
1992 WL 75219, at *3 (6th Cir. 1992)). The pretrial mo-
tion in this case was undoubtedly less effective at alert-
ing the trial judge to evidentiary problems than a con-
temporaneous motion at trial would have been. 
Nevertheless, upon review, we conclude that we 
need not decide whether [*14] Appellant's motion in 
limine was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. It 
is clear in any event that the trial court's admission of the 
dying declarations meets the stricter standard of review 
that is applied to properly preserved evidentiary issues. 
[HN5]Assuming the issue of the dying declarations 
was preserved for appeal, we apply an abuse of discre-
tion standard to the district court's admission of the evi-
dence, to its determinations of relevancy, and to its bal-
ancing of the potentially unfair prejudicial impact of evi-
dence against its probative value. United States v. Nash, 
175 F.3d 429, 434 (6th Cir. 1999). [HN6]In reviewing 
the district court's decision on this issue, we look at the 
evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, 
maximizing its probative value and, minimizing its effect 
of confusing the jury. Clarksville-Montgomery County 
School System v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993, 999 
(6th Cir. 1991). 
The issue at trial was whether Defendant Muham-
mad's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. 
Gates' purported statements that it was his fault and that 
Muhammad did not know he was a police officer, are 
relevant to the issue of whether [*15] Muhammad rea-
sonably believed that Gates posed a threat necessitating 
the use of deadly force. Appellant had ample opportunity 
to minimize the prejudicial effect of this testimony by 
bringing before the jury Edinborough's lack of certainty 
as to whether the comment he heard was in the form of a 
statement or a question, and Smith's inability to quote 
Gates verbatim. Viewing this evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Defendants, we are satisfied that the 
district court's determination that the probative value of 
the statements was not substantially outweighed by 
prejudice or confusion was not an abuse of discretion. 
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IV. 
Finally, Appellant contends that the jury verdict on 
the federal claim and the trial court's determination on 
the state claim were against the great weight of the evi-
dence. 
[HN7]The jury's verdict on the federal civil rights 
claim is entitled to substantial deference. Jewell v. CSX 
Transp. Inc., 135 F.3d 361, 366 (6th Cir. 1998)(citing 
Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 
1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1193, 127 L. Ed. 2d 650, 
114 S. Ct. 1298 (1994)). So are [HN8]the trial court's 
findings on the [*16] state wrongful death claim. A trial 
court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of 
the witnesses." FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). "If the district 
court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 
record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may 
not reverse it even though convinced that had it been 
sitting as the trier of fact it would have weighed the evi-
dence differently." Simon v. City of Youngstown, 73 F.3d 
68, 71 (6th Cir. 1998)(quoting Anderson v. City of Bes-
semer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 565, 84 L. Ed. 
2d 518, 105 S. Ct. 1504(1985)). 
Reviewing the jury verdict and the trial court's find-
ings of fact in light of these standards, we conclude that 
there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
judgment in Defendants' favor. 
Appellant contends the findings defy both the physi-
cal and the testimonial evidence. Specifically, Appellant 
contrasts the conflicting and erroneous statements of 
Officer Muhammad with the consistent testimony of 
witnesses McCoy, Onry and Evans, and notes that bullet 
[*17] wound evidence tends to show that Gates was not 
facing Defendant Muhammad when he was shot. Appel-
lant also observes that Defendants themselves cannot 
agree on how the events occurred, but nevertheless both 
contend that the evidence supports the factual findings. 
[HN9]In reviewing an appeal based on insufficiency 
of the evidence we may neither weigh the evidence, pass 
on the credibility of the witnesses, nor substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury or the trial court. Instead, 
we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the appellees, drawing all reasonable inferences in their 
favor. Jewell, 135 F.3d at 366 (citing Davis v. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1993), cert, de-
nied, 510 U.S. 1193, 127 L. Ed. 2d 650, 114 S. Ct. 1298 
(1994)). 
Viewing the evidence in this light, we cannot say 
that the trial court's findings of fact were clearly errone-
ous or that the jury's verdict was against the great weight 
of the evidence. Although there was evidence in the re-
cord that Muhammad gave conflicting statements and 
statements at odds with the other witnesses regarding the 
direction the Jeep was traveling in, whether [*18] the 
Jeep came to a full stop when he spoke to the occupants, 
and the extent of his conversation with the occupants of 
the Jeep, Muhammad's inability to clearly reconstruct the 
exact sequence of events could, as the trial court found, 
be attributable to the fact that he was traumatized by the 
incident. Moreover, despite the inconsistencies, the Ap-
pellants concede that the common and consistent theme 
in all of Muhammad's statements was that he shot Gates 
in self-defense when Gates aimed his weapon at him. A 
reasonable jury could have believed this critical portion 
of Muhammad's testimony even if they found some as-
pects of his recollection to be at odds with the rest of the 
evidence. There was substantial evidence from several 
witnesses that after Gates exited his car, he ran after the 
Jeep, and then turned and approached Muhammad with 
his gun in his hand. The evidence of record was suffi-
cient to permit a reasonable person to find that Gates 
approached Muhammad rapidly and in an agitated man-
ner, that he had a gun in his hand, that the gun was 
pointed in Muhammad's general direction, and that under 
the circumstances Muhammad perceived Gates as a 
threat sufficient to justify the use of [* 19] deadly force. 
The shooting death of Major Gates, a well-respected 
member of the Memphis Police Department, was by all 
accounts a most unfortunate tragedy. Upon review of the 
record as a whole, however, we are satisfied that there 
was substantial and competent evidence in the record to 
support the findings of the jury and the district couit that 
Muhammad's use of deadly force was objectively rea-
sonable. 
V. 
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the ETA, is it thoroughly critical whether this letter, 
which may be a contract by way of indemnity, restates with 
clarity unequivocally the nature of the indemnity 
agreement? 
MR. COUSIN: Yeah, I think it is important to 
evaluate each of these contracts or at least on the one hand 
the letter agreements, and on the other hand the ETA 
separately. Because the considerations of that was 
exchanged with respect to entering into the ETA, is really a 
whole other ballpark. It's a separation agreement between 
an executive and her employer, which carries with it, not 
uncommonly, indemnification obligations that continue. 
But on the other hand, the letter agreements, the 
Bendeger and the Dorsey are completely different reads of 
the agreement in the sense that when Bendeger was first 
entered into, that was an existing, sitting executive where 
the company most likely, according to Mr. Marsden's 
papers — and I don't have any reason to disagree with it. 
At the time of the Bendeger agreement, the company 
is dealing with a sitting executive saying do we support 
you. And that document saying yes, we will pay your legal 
fees to defend you in connection with the SEC proceedings, 
we will do that. We will take that indemnity obligation. 
And then later, when Mr. Marsden moves firms to 
Dorsey, that Bendeger agreement, the spirit of that 
25 
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agreement is simply being updated. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. COUSIN: Exactly what Mr. Marsden says in the 
Dorsey letter, that it's being updated. He does not say in 
light of the ETA, as a result of the ETA. He doesn't say 
because of the ETA we don't need to update this. 
He's saying exactly the opposite. He's saying 
there's a preexisting obligation that preexisted the ETA. 
We need to update that because I've switched law firms. 
One other point about that is that Mr. Marsden is 
the attorney draftsperson. And so not only does the letter 
agreement have to be clear and unequivocal with respect to 
the scope of the requirement of what ClearOne has to pay, 
but piled onto that is the fact that Mr. Marsden, the 
attorney draftsperson himself, that agreement, any potential 
ambiguity must be construed against that attorney 
draftsperson. 
And just for the sake of argument, even if it were 
not an indemnity agreement or by way of an indemnity 
agreement, that principle still remains. The principal of 
attorney draftsperson and ambiguity being interpreted 
against the attorney draftsperson, that principle of 
contract construction still remains even if it's somehow not 
by way of an indemnity. . 
So that, you know, the best Mr. Marsden can do in 
26 
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case. So I have been working from the documents. 
The ETA is the only integrated document here as far 
as I'm aware. So that one I have to look at the document 
and only the document to determine ambiguity, which I have 
determined possibly as to scope. But as I agree with you, 
we may or may not get to that depending on other 
interpretations. 
The letter agreements I have found them to be 
ambiguous. And then my first duty is to find evidence if 
it's available to give me the intent of the parties. And I 
don't think that means I just construe it against because 
then every ambiguous contract would be construed against in 
the way least favorable to the drafting party, and that's 
not our first duty to determine what the parties, in fact, 
agreed. 
So that's the way I see it. Unless you've got 
anything more on this we should hear from Mr. Marsden, but 
if you do — but you will get the last word. Anything more 
on this issue, though? 
MR. COUSIN: I'm fine, your Honor, thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cousin. Mr. Marsden if 
you use the microphone you'll probably be heard, otherwise 
you need to come up closer. 
MR. MARSDEN: I'll use the microphone — 
THE COURT: If you talk right into it I don't think 
29 
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CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 080917500 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
Defendant ClearOne Communications, Inc. ("Defendant" or "ClearOne"), by and through 
counsel of record MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. and SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, hereby submits this 
reply memorandum of law in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Extrinsic evidence of the Dorsey engagement letter does not resolve its ambiguity and 
necessitates construing it against its attorney-draftsman. The Court should disregard Mr. Keough's 
testimony about his current understandings or speculation about what he "would have understood" 
NY1 26603808.1 
Add. D-1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
about the legal terms of the engagement letters as that testimony is outside the scope of 
Mr. Keough's 30(b)(6) designation and was elicited by objectionable leading questions likely to 
supply a false memory from a disgruntled witness. Any contention that Mr. Keough actually 
remembers what he understood about legal documents more than 5lA or 654 years ago is 
unbelievable as a matter of law. The extrinsic evidence establishes that ClearOne did not know 
Mr. Marsden's criminal trial experience or reputation, did not believe that a full-blown criminal trial 
was within the realm of possibility, and therefore did not consider that the Dorsey engagement letter 
would cover a federal criminal proceeding. Since Mr. Marsden could have, but failed to, clearly 
express an intent to cover a federal criminal proceeding, the Dorsey engagement letter should be 
construed against its drafter. 
The highly prejudicial and controversial attorneys' fees and 18% interest rate terms from the 
Bendinger engagement letter were not incorporated by reference into the Dorsey engagement letter. 
The mere reference to the Bendinger engagement letter did not reasonably apprise ClearOne that 
two controversial terms therefrom - but no other terms - were intended to be incorporated as part of 
the Dorsey engagement letter. In any event, as a matter of public policy, Utah law prohibits a law 
firm from recovering attorneys' fees when it uses its own attorneys in a collection action. 
Ms. Strohm's ETA claim should be dismissed as moot because it does not impose any 
obligation to indemnify Strohm for defense expenses beyond the Court's mandatory 
indemnification order. The current proceeding is not a "Related Proceeding" under the ETA 
because it does not involve allegations of ClearOne's improper revenue recognition. Moreover, the 
standards for determining fee reasonableness are the same under the mandatory indemnification 
statute and the ETA. 
Moreover, Ms. Strohm does not have a viable claim for permissive indemnification because 
ClearOne's Board has not authorized any indemnification as would be required. Plaintiffs' unjust 
2 
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enrichment claim also fails because an enforceable contract governs the same subject matter and 
ClearOne did not benefit from Dorsey's services for Ms. Strohm. Finally, since Plaintiffs have 
failed to cite any single promise not contained in the ETA, Ms. Strohm's promissory estoppel 
claims should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DORSEY ENGAGEMENT LETTER DOES NOT COVER MS. STROHM'S 
THEN NON-EXISTENT AND UNANTICIPATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDING 
A. The Court Should Disregard Mr. Keough's Testimonial 
Responses to Objectionable Leading Questions Allegedly Designed to 
Have Him Recall What He Understood Years Ago About Legal Documents 
Where the Risk of Supplying a False Memory for a Disgruntled Witness Is So Great 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to believe the unbelievable - namely, that ClearOne's former CEO 
Michael Keough actually remembered on October 7, 2009 (when his deposition was taken) what he 
originally understood the Bendinger and Dorsey engagement letters to mean on January 29, 2003 
and March 31, 2004 (when he originally signed them). It defies logic to believe that any witness -
much less a lay witness testifying about a legal interpretation without reference to notes or any 
recollection of discussions with anyone - can realistically recall what he actually understood more 
than 514 or 654 years ago about the terms of an agreement, or whether he actually ever had any 
understanding about such terms at all. 
In addition to this significant time gap, the dangers of accepting as true responses to leading 
questions from a "friendly" witness are well known: 
The "essential test of a leading question is whether it so suggests to 
the witness the specific tenor of the reply desired by counsel that such 
a reply is likely to be given irrespective of an actual memory. The 
evil to be avoided is that of supplying a false memory for the 
witness:' [UnitedStates v. Durham, 319 F.2d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 
1963).] The restrictions against leading questions are "designed to 
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friendly witnesses through the use of leading questions." [Ellis v. 
Chicago, 667 F.2d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 1981).] 
4 Weinstein 's Federal Evidence § 611.06[2][a], at 611-59 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis added) ("What 
Constitutes Leading Question / Tenor of Desired Reply"). Indeed, the dangers of leading questions 
are so great that the court always retains the discretion to limit their use: 
Leading questions must not be allowed in controverted substantive 
areas in which the jury must weigh the evidence and make credibility 
determinations.1 "[Alny good trial advocate who is allowed leading 
questions can both testify for the witness and argue the client's case 
by the use of leading questions. This practice must not be allowed" 
[Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254, 266 (5th Cir. 1992).] * * * * 
When the witness is biased in favor of the cross-examiner, the same 
danger of leading questions arises as on direct, and the court may, in 
its discretion, prohibit their use. [U.S. v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1117 
(7th Cir. 1999).] 
4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 611.06[4], at 611-64 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis added) ("Right to 
Ask Leading Questions Not Absolute"). 
Plaintiffs falsely contend that "the use of leading questions is absolutely appropriate with an 
adverse party" pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 611(c) and erroneously accuse ClearOne of citing 
only one unreported Sixth Circuit case for the proposition that the court has the discretion to 
preclude the use of leading questions to avoid abuses of the rule (Pis' Reply Br. 7 & n.9). However, 
Utah Rule of Evidence 611(c) is identical to its federal counterpart and both treat an "adverse party" 
and a "witness identified with an adverse party" the same. Indeed, ClearOne's opening brief quoted 
the Utah Supreme Court for the proposition that "Rule 611(c) is still framed in words of suggestion 
1
 While the proper interpretation of the Dorsey engagement letter is a legal question for the Court, 
Plaintiffs' leading questions were asked in the context of a hotly controverted substantive area 
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rather than command, and whether it will be applied is a matter ultimately left to the discretion of 
the trial judge." State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1143 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1989).2 
ClearOne urges that the Court exercise its discretion to disallow the use of leading questions 
on such consequential and controverted topics regarding the specifics of Mr. Keough's 514 and 614 
year old understandings about the legal terms of the letter agreements when the risk of supplying a 
false memory for the witness is so great. Plaintiffs dismiss any claim of animus or bias by 
Mr. Keough against ClearOne simply because Mr. Keough did not confess at his deposition to 
having any bias against ClearOne (Pis' Reply Br. 7). Although Mr. Keough was not asked at his 
deposition whether he had any animus or bias against ClearOne, he did, however, testify about the 
circumstances of his departure from ClearOne: 
Q. ... And how long did you remain as the CEO of ClearOne? 
A. Until about June of 2004. 
Q. And why did you - did you leave ClearOne? 
A. I was relieved by Dal Bagley, the chairman. 
Q. And when you say "relieved," was this something where you 
did not voluntarily step down? 
A. Oh, no, I did not voluntarily step down. 
Q. What was your understanding as to why you were relieved as 
the CEO by Dal Bagley? 
A. Well, you know, I was never specifically told, but I did know 
it revolved around my administrative assistant having returned after 
being on medical leave for six months. 
Q. And what-
A. Well, it was quite shocking to me, quite frankly, because I had 
never had an issue with my admin. And she, six months prior - since 
you asked, she called in one day at HR and said she had a death in the 
family and was going to San Diego and wouldn't be in. The 
following day she called in and said she was going into rehab. And 
on the last day of her six month leave that's apparently allowed, she 
2
 Plaintiffs' claim of waiver pursuant to Rule 32(c)(3)(B) is specious given ClearOne's ubiquitous 
objections to the form of Mr. Hancock's questions and expressed "leading" objections (Keough 
Dep. 118:8). ClearOne's "seasonable objection," however, did not deter Mr. Hancock from 
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surfaced and made some allegations. I was never actually told what 
they were. Never knew what it was about. But Dal decided that, 
okay, that was going to be that. 
Keough Dep. 27:11 -28:12. It does not take a rocket scientist to conclude - based on the foregoing 
testimony - that Mr. Keough still feels that he was wrongfully ousted from his CEO position at 
ClearOne. While business protocol may require that he address questions about letters he signed 
years earlier on behalf of the company, it does not require that he necessarily disagree with the legal 
position of a current claimant against the company that he views as having wrongfully ousted him. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, ClearOne submits that it has presented both evidence of 
Mr. Keough's animus and a proper basis for precluding the use of leading questions on controverted 
substantive issues. 
B. Mr. Keough Repeatedly Testified About His Current 
Interpretation of the Engagement Letters and Speculated 
About What He "Would Have" Understood When He Signed Them 
Significantly, Mr. Keough was not designated to testify about his current "interpretation" of 
the engagement letters, but rather about the circumstances surrounding the engagement letters' 
negotiation and execution and communications about such letters. While Plaintiffs attempt to deny 
that Mr. Keough testified about his current interpretation (Pis' Reply Br. 6, n.7), the deposition 
transcript reveals that Mr. Keough responded to a confusing mix of leading and hypothetical 
questions that he reasonably could have construed as designed to determine his current 
understanding of the legal terms of engagement letters in view of all that has occurred in the 
interim: 
Q. Did ClearOne agree [in the Bendinger engagement letter] to 
pay invoices from Mr. Marsden for the services he rendered in 
representing Ms. Strohm as they were billed within 30 days after 
receipt? 
A. Did they actually do that or is -
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Q. And did ClearOne also agree that any amount unpaid after the 
30 days would bear and accrue interest at a rate of 18 percent? 
A. If that was in the original draft as it is here, yes. 
Q. Okay. And is that your understanding of paragraph 3, the 
second paragraph where it says, "Any amount billed and unpaid after 
such thirty day period shall bear and accrue interest at the rate of 18 
percent per annum from the date billed until paid?" 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection to form. Are you asking what he 
thinks it means now? 
Mr. Hancock: I'm asking him with respect to when he signed 
this letter as ClearOne's CEO. Okay? 
Q. (By Mr. Hancock) Is that your understanding? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thank you. And in the first paragraph - before we get there, if 
I remember correctly, and I just want to confirm, you stated earlier 
that it was your understanding, at the time that Mr. Marsden was 
retained and then you signed Exhibit 9 [Bendinger engagement letter] 
on behalf of ClearOne, that the scope of his retention would be the 
SEC action? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It would include the DOJ action? 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection to form. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if I understand you, and you tell me if I'm wrong, it 
would include any criminal indictments; defending against those with 
respect to Ms. Strohm? 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. Nothing was excluded, as I remember. 
Q. Okay. I'm just trying to understand what your understanding 
was of what it included, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. And you understood at that time that, based on the DOJ action, 
there was the possibility of criminal indictments and a criminal action 
against Ms. Strohm; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And at the time you signed this agreement, you understood 
that Mr. Marsden's retention, as set forth in Exhibit 9, included 
representing Ms. Strohm in those actions. 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection to form. 
Q. Meaning the SEC action, the DOJ investigation, criminal 
indictments, and any criminal action against Ms. Strohm. Is that 
correct or not? 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the first paragraph states, "This letter will summarize and 
confirm the agreement for my firm, Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & 
Casey, to represent Susie Strohm's interests in connection with the 
SEC civil Complaint, referenced above, and in connection with 
further related investigation in the litigation." [sic] 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you read that paragraph prior to signing Exhibit 9? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your understanding as to what the term "further 
related investigations and litigation" meant? 
A. It was early on and I don't think anybody knew what would 
spawn from that. But effectively that as the CFO of the company, she 
was going to be indemnified. 
Q. Prior to signing this on January 29, 2003, you understood that 
there was a DOJ investigation, right? 
A. That was part of what was going on, yes. 
Q. Okay. And so you understood Mr. Marsden's representation 
when it talks about the SEC action referenced above, "and in 
connection with further related investigations and litigation," that 
"investigation," you understood to be the DOJ investigation? 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection to form. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you understand where it says "further related 
investigations and litigation," with your understanding that there was 
a DOJ investigation going on, that the term, "in connection with 
further related investigation and litigation," would include, if it 
happened, a criminal indictment and criminal action against 
Ms. Strohm? 
Mr. Capobianco: Objection to form. 
A. That would have been my understanding, yes. 
NY1 26603808.1 
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Keough Dep. 110:9-114:11 (emphasis added). Indeed, on key issues, Mr. Keough repeatedly used 
the conditional perfect ~ e.g., "would have been" - to indicate that he did not actually recall what 
his understanding was at the time he signed the engagement letters. See Keough Dep. 117:21 
('That would have been my expectation."); id. at 119:9-10 ("My assumption would be - do I 
remember that? No."); id. at 127:21 ("That would have been my expectation, yes."); id. at 128:22 
("I would have had no expectation that would change, no."); id. at 140:16-18 ("I would have found 
out probably at a board meeting at the same time as everybody else that was on the board."). 
Moreover, on other significant issues, Mr. Keough expressly testified about his current 
understanding regarding the engagement letters. See id. at 116:1-2 ("My understanding [regarding 
attorney's fees] /£ that it was as written here.") (emphasis added); id. at 129:18-20 ("So the only 
understanding that you have with respect to the enforcement of attorneys' fees ...") (emphasis 
added); id. at 130:23-25 ("Does Exhibit 10 [Dorsey engagement letter], as you understand it, 
amend that provision; update it to get rid of interest fees?") (emphasis added). 
C. Mr. Keough's Testimony is Not Binding Upon ClearOne 
Because It Was Outside the Scope of His Rule 30(b)(6) Designation 
Testimony outside the scope of Mr. Keough's Rule 30(b)(6) designation is not binding upon 
ClearOne. See Falchenberg v. New York State Dep't ofEduc, 567 F.Supp.2d 513, 521 (S.D.N. Y. 
2008) ("Questions and answers exceeding the scope of the 30(b)(6) notice will not bind the 
corporation"). Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Keough's testimony is within the scope of his designation 
because the parties' understanding of the terms of the engagement letters constitutes a 
"circumstance surrounding" the negotiation, execution, or communication regarding the 
engagement letters (Pis' Reply Br. 5). While Mr. Keough's actual understanding of the engagement 
letters at the time he signed them might constitute a circumstance within the scope of the 30(b)(6) 
designation, Mr. Keough repeatedly testified about his current understanding or his speculation 
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speculation about the engagement letters' legal terms simply cannot constitute a "circumstance 
surrounding" the negotiation, execution, or communication of those letters. Thus, Mr. Keough's 
testimony on this issue was outside the scope of his 30(b)(6) designation and is not binding upon 
ClearOne.3 
D. Mr. Keough's Testimony About What He "Would Have" Understood 
Years Ago is Unbelievable and Controverted By His Own Testimony 
Even if Mr. Keough's testimony was within the scope of Mr. Keough's 30(b)(6) 
designation, it may be controverted, impeached, or explained by ClearOne. See Indus. Hard 
Chrome^ Ltd v. Hetran, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 786, 791 (N.D. 111. 2000) ("testimony given at a Rule 
30(b)(6) deposition is evidence which, like any other deposition testimony, can be contradicted and 
used for impeachment purposes"); DeGrado v. Jefferson Pilot Financial Ins. Co., No. 02-cv-01533, 
2009 WL 279019, at *21 (D. Colo. Feb. 5,2009) ("As noted by several courts, the binding effect of 
the testimony of a Rule 30(b)(6) representative is merely as an evidentiary admission, which may be 
controverted or explained by a party."). 
Here, Mr. Keough controverts and impeaches his own testimony. On the one hand, 
Mr. Keough testified that his signing of the engagement letters was a mere rubber-stamping of a 
decision by ClearOne's Board - which, he concedes, never discussed the issue of the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's retention (ClearOne Facts ffl[ 10, 15). Indeed, Mr. Keough testified that he was 
authorized to sign the engagement letters because somebody - possibly a Board member - told him 
that Mr. Marsden would be representing Ms. Strohm (ClearOne Facts *[ 12). This testimony 
regarding Mr. Keough's authority and the basis for it directly contradicts his sycophantic agreement 
3
 To the extent Mr. Keough purported to testify about his actual recollection about what he 
understood 5/4 or 6lA years ago about the legal terms of the engagement letter, such testimony is 
unbelievable as a matter of law. Additionally, it is contradicted by Mr. Keough's testimony that his 
authority to sign the engagement letters derived solely from the Board and that the only 
conversation he can recall with any Board member involved only the statement that Steve Marsden 
would be representing Ms. Strohm without any mention of the scope of representation (ClearOne 
Facts ffi[ 10, 12-13). 
10 
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with Mr. Hancock's statements about what Dorsey desires the engagement letters to mean. Also, as 
argued above, it is simply unbelievable that anybody's memory about what he understood about a 
letter read 5Vi or 6/4 years ago could possibly be that good. In sum, even if Mr. Keough's 
testimony about what he understood the engagement letters to mean when he signed them was 
within the scope of his 30(b)(6) designation, such testimony has been contradicted by his own 
testimony and impeached by common sense. 
E. Since Discovery Has Not Definitively Resolved the Intent of Both Parties, 
The Dorsey Engagement Letter Must be Strictly Construed Against Dorsey 
Plaintiffs erroneously contend (Pis' Reply Br. 3) that this Court has already rejected Utah's 
"general principle that a court will strictly construe terms in a contract against one who is both the 
attorney draftsman of and a party to the instrument." Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449,451 (Utah 
Sup. Ct. 1989). While the Court has ordered discovery into extrinsic evidence, it has not explicitly 
or implicitly rejected the contra proferentem rule. In view of the extrinsic evidence establishing 
that a criminal proceeding against Ms. Strohm was then non-existent and unanticipated and the fact 
that Steve Marsden's criminal trial experience and reputation were unknown to ClearOne, ClearOne 
could not have reasonably intended for the Dorsey engagement letter to cover any hypothetical and 
entirely unanticipated criminal proceeding against Ms. Strohm. 
The official rationale for the contra proferentem rule amply demonstrates the 
appropriateness of its applicability in this case: 
Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to 
provide more carefully for the protection of his own interests than for 
those of the other party. He is also more likely than the other party to 
have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may 
leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a later 
date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt, therefore, so long as 
other factors are not decisive, there is substantial reason for preferring 
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 206, comment a (1981) (emphasis added). Here, if Steve 
Marsden intended for the Dorsey engagement letter to cover a full-blown federal criminal 
proceeding, it was incumbent upon him to make that intention clear before asking ClearOne to 
commit to it. Mr. Marsden's decision to deliberately obscure what he could have made clear 
warrants construing the engagement letter against Dorsey. 
In fact, given that the SEC Action and other related civil proceedings were then in the 
process of winding down when Mr. Marsden decided to switch firms, ClearOne only intended for 
the Dorsey engagement letter to cover the transfer to Dorsey of the legal work that still needed to 
get done on the then-pending civil litigations. When the Dorsey engagement letter was signed, 
Steve Marsden himself did not consider the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") investigation to be 
a "file[] on which [he] was currently representing" Ms. Strohm (ClearOne Facts K 29)4 and 
ClearOne believed that the DOJ investigation "had died" (ClearOne Facts f 35). 
Thus, even if the engagement letters are construed to cover the DOJ investigation (for which 
Bendinger performed minimal if any work (ClearOne Facts Tflf 24, 26-27)), there is no evidence that 
either party reasonably expected a full-blown federal criminal proceeding against Ms. Strohm by 
the time the Dorsey engagement letter was signed. Therefore, at a minimum, the extrinsic evidence 
of the surrounding facts and circumstances is ambiguous and requires - by virtue of the contra 
proferentem rule - the conclusion that the Dorsey engagement letter does not cover the federal 
criminal proceeding against Ms. Strohm. See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 
923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1996) ("The rule that doubts are to be resolved against the 
attorney comports with the general rule of contract interpretation that ambiguous language is to be 
4
 Although Plaintiffs cite Mr. Marsden's attempt to deny that he did not consider the DOJ 
investigation to be pending when he filled out the Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report (Pis' 
Reply Br. 14), Plaintiffs cannot deny that Mr. Marsden identified Ms. Strohm as a "major client" 
and the "Securities and Exchange Commission" as an adverse party, but failed to identify the U.S. 
Department of Justice as an "adverse part[y]" (ClearOne Facts ffl[ 29-31; ClearOne Moving Br. Ex. 
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construed against the drafter."); Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 352, 231 P.107, 110 
(Utah Sup. Ct 1924) ("when the evidence ... shows that a lawyer, who is an interested party, 
prepared the contract for the defendants, who are laymen, the [contra proferentem] rule has special 
application"). 
F. The Extrinsic Evidence Establishes that ClearOne Did Not 
Know Mr. Marsden's Criminal Trial Experience or Reputation, 
Did Not Believe That a Full-Blown Criminal Trial Was Within 
the Realm of Possibility, and Therefore Did Not Consider that the 
Dorsey Engagement Letter Would Cover a Federal Criminal Proceeding 
While Plaintiffs try to dismiss ClearOne's presentation of extrinsic evidence as "a series of 
marginally relevant misrepresentations" (Pis' Reply Br. 2), the facts presented by ClearOne 
constitute highly relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the "negotiation" and execution of 
the engagement letters at issue - as opposed to speculation by ClearOne's disgruntled former CE,0 
about what he "would have thought" more than 5Vi or 6J4 years earlier. Plaintiffs do not dispute 
that there was no negotiation of the engagement letters drafted by Steve Marsden (ClearOne Facts 
fflf 8, 19, 20) or that Mr. Keough recalls no discussion about the letters (ClearOne Facts 1fl| 9,21). 
Nor can they meaningfully contest the facts and circumstances surrounding the letters' execution. 
First, Plaintiffs admit that Steve Marsden did not hold himself out as a white collar criminal 
lawyer (ClearOne's Statement of Facts f 3). Nonetheless, they attempt to quibble about his alleged 
"handling of) criminal matters" (Plaintiffs' Response to f 1). The testimony cited, however, does 
not establish that Steve Marsden was a white collar criminal defense trial lawyer or, more 
importantly, that anyone at ClearOne had any knowledge of his alleged expertise such that they 
might have considered his handling Ms. Strohm's criminal defense, which was then non-existent 
and unanticipated. Mr. Marsden testified as follows: 
Q. At the time you switched from Bendinger to Dorsey, how 
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MarsdenDep. 150:18-21. 
Incredibly, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Marsden's lack of criminal trial experience or 
reputation is irrelevant to whether the parties intended the engagement letters to cover the criminal 
proceeding (Plaintiffs' Response to f 1). It is hard to conceive how ClearOne could have possibly 
intended the engagement letters to cover the criminal proceeding if it did not anticipate any such 
proceeding and knew nothing about Mr. Marsden's expertise or reputation in this area. 
Even Mr. Keough conceded that he did not and still does not know anything about 
Mr. Marsden's criminal defense experience (ClearOne Facts f 5). Plaintiffs ask the Court to draw 
the inference that since Mr. Keough testified that he understood the engagement letters to cover the 
criminal proceeding, Mr. Marsden's criminal experience must have been irrelevant (Pis' Reply Br. 
13-14). The most credible inference, however, is that since Mr. Keough had no knowledge of 
Mr. Marsden's criminal experience, he did not seriously consider whether the Dorsey engagement 
letter - transferring the work to Mr. Marsden at his new firm - would cover a criminal proceeding 
when he signed it. Indeed, this is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn given 
Mr. Keough's admission that he did not remember discussing the Bendinger engagement letter with 
anyone: 
[B]ecause in a lot of ways when I was signing here, it was what had 
already been decided by the board. So I'm not going to call it a 
formality, but there was nothing I was going to either really change or 
have a lot of input on. It was going to be decided by the board. 
(ClearOne Facts ^ 10). Mr. Keough also recalls no discussions with anyone about the Dorsey 
engagement letter (ClearOne Facts If 21). While Mr. Keough thus conceded that his authority was 
derived solely from ClearOne's Board, the only thing that he had been told by a Board member (or 
by someone from the Clyde, Snow law firm) about Steve Marsden was that Mr. Marsden would be 
representing Ms. Strohm (ClearOne Facts ^ 12), which - given Mr. Marsden's lack of criminal trial 
experience - says absolutely nothing about the scope of Mr. Marsden's representation including 
14 
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criminal defense.5 In sum, ClearOne's lack of knowledge about Mr. Marsden's white collar 
criminal trial experience or reputation demonstrates that ClearOne did not reasonably understand 
either engagement letter to cover a full-blown federal criminal proceeding. 
Plaintiffs attempt to dismiss the relevance of ClearOne's belief that a criminal proceeding 
was not a reasonable probability in the Fall of 2003 (ClearOne Facts fflf 33-35) on the grounds that 
such belief occurred after the Bendinger engagement letter was signed (Pis' Reply Br. 10). 
However, ClearOne's belief in the Fall of 2003 is highly relevant to its understanding of the Dorsey 
engagement letter, which was not signed until March 31, 2004 - after ClearOne formed this belief 
and had made a decision based upon that belief to sue ClearOne's Directors and Officers liability 
carriers (ClearOne Facts f 34).6 
Plaintiffs argue that ClearOne must have believed that the Dorsey engagement letter covered 
the federal criminal proceeding because ClearOne - a public company with fiduciary obligations to 
its shareholders - paid invoices in excess of $1.8 million for Ms. Strohm's criminal defense (Pis' 
Reply Br. 13). However, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that ClearOne paid said invoices pursuant to 
the Dorsey engagement letter. To the contrary, in the May 2007 E-mail exchange between 
Mr. Marsden and Ray Etcheverry, Mr. Marsden asked ClearOne to acknowledge that the grand jury 
proceeding was covered by Ms. Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement and the Dorsey 
engagement letter was not raised or discussed in this E-mail exchange (Pis' Br. Ex, 4). When the 
issue of the Dorsey engagement letter was first raised in William Michael's letter to Greg A. 
LeClaire dated November 8, 2007 (ClearOne Moving Br. Ex. D at p. 3), ClearOne responded that 
5
 While Plaintiffs repeatedly claim that the Board did not discuss limiting the scope of 
Mr. Marsden's representation, Mr. Keough testified that he did not recall any discussions at all 
about said scope (ClearOne Facts ^  15). 
6
 Mr. Keough's testimony that it was allegedly his expectation that a criminal action would be 
brought against Ms. Strohm is contradicted by Jeff Gross's testimony (ClearOne Facts ffl[ 33-35) 
and by Mr. Keough's own testimony that the proceedings related to the SEC Action "had pretty 
much been worked through on most fronts during 2003" (Keough Dep. 163:6-14) and "had pretty 
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"the retainer agreements governed the SEC complaint and not the current U.S. Department of 
Justice action" (ClearOne Moving Br. Ex. E at p. 3). 
Accordingly, ClearOne respectfully requests that the Court grant ClearOne's motion for 
summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff Dorsey's engagement letter claim (Third Claim for 
Relief in the Amended Complaint). 
POINT II 
CLEARONE is NOT LEGALLY OBLIGATED 
TO PAY DORSEY'S ATTORNEYS' FEES OR 18% 
INTEREST PURSUANT TO THE DORSEY ENGAGEMENT LETTER 
A. The Dorsey Engagement Letter Does Not Incorporate By Reference the 
Attorneys9 Fees or 18% Interest Rate Terms from the Bendinger Engagement Letter 
Plaintiffs continue to press their claim that the Dorsey engagement letter incorporates by 
reference just the attorneys' fees and 18% interest rate terms - but not any other terms - from the 
Bendinger engagement letter (Pis' Reply Br. 15-18). ClearOne previously showed that the 2 
engagement letters are stand-alone agreements - one setting forth the Bendinger terms and the other 
setting forth the Dorsey terms - without any incorporation by reference. Indeed, ClearOne 
demonstrated that no client would be reasonably apprised that just those 2 highly prejudicial and 
controversial terms would be incorporated by reference by Mr. Marsden's use of the term "update." 
Any attempt to incorporate terms from another document must clearly communicate both the 
express terms and the intent to incorporate them into the document at issue: 
To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify 
with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and 
clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents 
identified. In other words, the incorporating contract must use 
language that is express and clear, so as to leave no ambiguity about 
the identity of the document being referenced, nor any reasonable 
doubt about the fact that the referenced document is being 
incorporated into the contract. 
16 
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* * * * [T]he language used in a contract to incorporate extrinsic 
material by reference must explicitly, or at least precisely, identify the 
written material being incorporated and must clearly communicate 
that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced 
material into the contract (rather than merely to acknowledge that the 
referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g., as background law 
or negotiating history). 
Northrop Grumman Information Technology, Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d 1339,1344-45 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (emphasis added; quotation marks and citations omitted). While the Dorsey engagement 
letter references the Bendinger engagement letter, it does not clearly or expressly communicate that 
the purpose of the reference is to incorporate terms from the Bendinger engagement letter into the 
Dorsey engagement letter. Nor are the express terms that Dorsey claims are incorporated specified 
in any way. 
Plaintiffs argue that their legal interpretation should prevail primarily because Mr. Keough 
agreed with it at deposition. For all the reasons set forth in Point I, Mr. Keough's testimony on his 
current legal interpretation of the Dorsey engagement letter should be rejected as non-binding on 
ClearOne and wholly unbelievable in any event. To state the obvious: it defies common sense to 
believe that Mr. Keough remembered the attorneys' fees and 18% interest rate terms from the 
January 29, 2003 Bendinger engagement letter on March 31, 2004 (when he signed the Dorsey 
letter) and that he intended for just those 2 terms to be carried over into the Dorsey engagement 
letter. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention (Pis' Reply Br. 15), ClearOne's counsel never contended 
that the engagement letters "are intended to be treated as one agreement." At the cited pages of the 
July 1, 2009 hearing transcript, ClearOne argued the Dorsey engagement letter was an "update" of 
the Bendinger engagement letter - not of Ms. Strohm's ETA. ClearOne never represented that the 
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B. Utah Law Prohibits a Law Firm from Recovering Attorneys' 
Fees When It Uses Its Own Attorneys in a Collection Action 
In any event, under Utah law, a law firm is not entitled to attorneys' fees in a,pro se 
collection action even if the agreement includes an attorneys' fees provision. Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1996). In Jones, Waldo, 
the Utah Supreme Court was faced with a retainer agreement which stated that "the undersigned ... 
agrees to pay all collection costs, including attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of this 
agreement." Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1374. In holding that the law firm could not recover its 
own attorneys' fees in connection with its collection action, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned: 
In Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467,473 (Utah 1992), we recognized 
the "general rule that pro se litigants should not recover attorney fees 
for successful litigation." Although, as we acknowledged in 
Batchelor, the jurisdictions are divided in their treatment of the issue, 
we here reaffirm our view that the ability to competently present the 
claim without retained counsel is a sufficient advantage for a lawyer-
litigant. We remain "loath to enhance that advantage by giving the 
lawyer-litigant recovery not only as a successful party, but also as that 
party's attorney." Id. at 474. 
There are other compelling public policy reasons for holding that "pro 
se litigants should not recover attorney fees, regardless of their 
professional status." Id. "Financing litigation by fee awards provides 
a new incentive to lawyers to increase their fees. The adversary's 
response is to litigate the fee claim itself." Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding 
Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 
Duke LJ. 435, 438 [hereinafter Dobbs]. This gives rise to the danger 
of "creating a 'cottage industry' for claimants ... as a way to generate 
fees rather than to vindicate personal claims." Falcone v. Internal 
Revenue Serv., 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983)(declining to award 
attorney fees for pro se representation to prevailing plaintiffs under 
Freedom of Information Act). As the court in White v. Arlen Realty & 
Development Corp.,614 F.2d 387, 388 (4th Cir. 1980), observed: "It 
is axiomatic that effective legal representation is dependent not only 
on legal expertise, but also on detached and objective perspective. 
The lawyer who represents himself necessarily falls short of the 
latter" 
In addition, "in the case of a paying client, the lawyer who wants to 
retain client satisfaction will haive an incentive to limit the total fee. 
That incentive is not present in fee award cases." Dobbs, supra, at 
18 
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485. Although the case at hand provides a working illustration of all 
of the above problems, this last concern is probably the most serious. 
By way of example, [Attorney] Shaw sought to charge [Client] 
Dawson $900 for his time preparing for and appearing at trial as a 
witness. A captive client, such as Dawson became in this collection 
action, has no control over the amount of time the attorney will spend 
or how it will be spent. And plaintiff has no motivation to explore 
less expensive collection alternatives. 
Plaintiff points out that Batchelor treated an award of attorney fees 
under a statute rather than a written retainer agreement as in the 
instant case. We conclude that plaintiff is not aided by that 
difference. The retainer agreement states that the client is responsible 
for "attorneys' fees incurred in the enforcement of this agreement." It 
is by no means self-evident that the time a lawyer spends on his own 
case represents fees "incurred." In Swanson & Setzke, CHTD v. 
Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909, 910 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989), 
the Idaho court interpreted "attorney fee" as denoting "a monetary 
obligation (a fee) paid or owed from one person (a client) to another 
person who has provided legal representation (an attorney)." We 
agree that under such an interpretation, "an attorney's fee 
'presupposes a relationship of attorney and client' which does not 
exist in pro se situations." Id. (citing Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 
718 (8th Cir. 1979). It is our view that a law firm does not "incur" 
fees when it uses its own attorneys in a collection action. Therefore, 
we hold that the trial court was correct in ruling that plaintiff was not 
entitled to attorney fees in its pro se collection action against Dawson. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374-75 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1996). 
Therefore, pursuant to the Jones, Waldo rule, Dorsey is not entitled to collect attorneys' fees 
in connection with its pro se collection action against ClearOne. With respect to its Dorsey 
engagement letter claim, Dorsey is representing itself- not Ms. Strohm - and is therefore pro se. 
Since Dorsey is using only its own attorneys in the instant collection action against ClearOne, and is 
seeking to collect pursuant to an engagement letter which it claims has an attorneys' fees provision, 
Dorsey is not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the Dorsey engagement letter for public policy 
reasons. Moreover, the Bendinger engagement letter contains the following language on "Attorney 
Fees": 
In the event of termination of this Agreement, we shall be entitled to 
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matter. In addition, we shall be entitled to recover all reasonable 
costs expended in connection with collecting amounts due under this 
Agreement, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
ClearOne Moving Br. Ex. A at ^  7. Just as the Jones, Waldo court ruled that a law firm does not 
"incur" fees when it uses its own attorneys in a collection action, Dorsey has not "expended" 
attorneys' fees since it has used its own attorneys in this action. Therefore, ClearOne is entitled to 
summary judgment with respect to the Dorsey engagement letter's attorneys' fees claim. 
In sum, the Court should reject Plaintiffs' attempt to hold ClearOne responsible for Dorsey's 
attorneys' fees in this action or an 18% interest rate. 
POINT III 
STROHM'S EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AGREEMENT 
CLAIM SHOULD B E DISMISSED AS MOOT BECAUSE IT DOES NOT 
IMPOSE ANY OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY STROHM FOR DEFENSE 
EXPENSES BEYOND THE COURT'S MANDATORY INDEMNIFICATION RULING 
Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement ("ETA") (Second 
and Eighth Claims) entitle Strohm to more attorneys' fees and costs than the Court's mandatory 
indemnification ruling because the ETA somehow entitles Strohm to recover in the current 
proceeding and because a different reasonableness standard applies (Pis' Reply Br. 19). Plaintiffs 
are wrong on both counts. 
First, Ms. Strohm's ETA provides: 
Subject to the limitations imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
902 and the Company's articles of incorporation and bylaws, ... 
ClearOne shall indemnify Strohm for any liability and for all 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by her in connection 
with the SEC Action or any Related Proceedings .... 
Original Complaint Ex. A at \ 8 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not articulate their theory as to 
how this language somehow provides Ms. Strohm with a right to reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs in connection with the current proceeding - especially since the ETA itself does not contain an 
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attorneys' fees provision. To the extent that Plaintiffs may contend that the current proceeding is a 
"Related Proceeding," such a claim fails because the instant proceeding does not involve issues 
concerning ClearOne's improper revenue recognition that were at the heart of the SEC Action and 
the "Related Proceedings." The current proceeding arises out of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' 
fees and costs pursuant to the ETA, the Dorsey engagement letter, and certain provisions of the 
Utah indemnification statutes. These claims do not arise out of the transactions and occurrences 
relating to the company's improper revenue recognition. 
Moreover, the attorneys' fees and costs associated with the Dorsey engagement letter claim 
do not constitute fees and costs "incurred by [Strohm]." Therefore, attorneys' fees and costs 
associated with the current proceeding are not recoverable pursuant to the ETA. 
Second, Plaintiffs cite no authority for their contention that a different - presumably more 
generous - standard applies to fees awarded pursuant to contract verses pursuant to statute. In both 
cases, the entitlement is to "reasonable attorneys' fees and costs" or "reasonable expenses" 
(including counsel fees). In both cases, the standard of reasonableness is governed by Rule 1.5(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which identifies eight (8) factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee. Since reasonableness is governed by the same eight (8) 
factors whether it is awarded by contract or by statute, Ms. Strohm's ETA claim should be 
dismissed as moot in view of the Court's mandatory indemnification order. 
Furthermore, the ETA only allows indemnification "[s]ubject to the limitations imposed by 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-902 and the Company's ... bylaws." Specifically, payment of fees 
pursuant to ClearOne's bylaws must be authorized by the Board of Directors, and the Board has 
refused to authorize any further payment of Dorsey's fees. Additionally, Utah Code § 16-10a-902 
requires compliance with the requisite standard of conduct such as good faith. Ms. Strohm cannot 
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minimum, Ms. Strohm cannot recovery attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the ETA at least to the 
extent that such fees and costs are allocable to the perjury count on which she was convicted. Since 
the mandatory indemnification order similarly limits Ms. Strohm's recovery to "reasonable 
expenses incurred by [Ms. Strohm] in connection with the [federal criminal] proceeding or claims 
with respect to which she has been successful" (Order-Indemnification of Nov. 18, 2009 at <fl 1(a)), 
Ms. Strohm is subject to the same perjury-related exclusion under the ETA as well. 
Finally, the fact that ClearOne's Special Litigation Committee - on October 13, 2003 -
authorized ClearOne to enter into the ETA with Ms. Strohm (Original Complaint Ex. A at Recital 
G) does not constitute the one and only standard of conduct determination that ClearOne is required 
to make under its bylaws. Utah law expressly requires that those determinations be based on "the 
facts then known." Utah Code §16-10a-904. After Ms. Strohm was convicted of perjury, 
ClearOne's Board then knew facts establishing that Ms. Strohm did not act in good faith or 
otherwise satisfy the requisite standard of conduct - at least with respect to the conduct underlying 
her perjury conviction.7 While it is true that "[t]he termination of a proceeding by ... conviction ... 
is not, of itself, determinative that the director did not meet the [requisite] standard of conduct" 
(Utah Code § 16-10a-902(3)), ClearOne's Board has determined that the perjury conviction 
establishes to its satisfaction that Ms. Strohm did not act in good faith or otherwise satisfy the 
requisite standard. Plaintiffs have not advanced any evidence or otherwise shown how Ms. Strohm 
could commit perjury in good faith. To the extent that Plaintiffs insist on pointing to the seven (7) 
counts on which Ms. Strohm was acquitted, the Court has already ruled that Ms. Strohm is entitled 
to reasonable expenses to the extent of her success. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to show how 
Ms. Strohm could be entitled to any reasonable attorneys' fees or expenses in excess of what the 
Court has already ordered by mandatory indemnification. 
7
 Indeed, if the Special Litigation Committee's determination was the only one relevant, there 
would have been no need for the "subject to" limitations on indemnification at all. 
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Since Ms. Strohm's ETA claims cannot entitle her to anything in addition to what the Court 
has already ordered in connection with her mandatory indemnification claim, her ETA claims 
should be dismissed as moot. 
POINT IV 
STROHM'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF DUTY TO 
INDEMNIFY OFFICER STROHM FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM 
Almost incomprehensively, Plaintiffs seek to save their Sixth Claim - which seeks 
attorneys' fees as permissive indemnification pursuant to Utah Code §§ 16-10a-902 and 907(2) - in 
the event the Court rules that the ETA does not give Ms. Strohm any rights to permissive 
indemnification (Pis' Reply Br. 21), The cited Utah statutes merely authorize a corporation to 
indemnify an officer, but do not compel a corporation to do so. Plaintiffs obliquely claim that 
somehow Ms. Strohm could be entitled to relief under Section 902 since she "submitted the 
required undertakings." However, Section 902 does not require CiearOne to indemnify Ms. Strohm 
merely because she has submitted undertakings. Section 902 provides that "a corporation may 
indemnify" a director against liability incurred in a proceeding if the specified standard of conduct 
is satisfied. Since ClearOne's Board has determined that Ms. Strohm has not satisfied the requisite 
standard of conduct - at least with respect to her perjury conviction - and has otherwise decided not 
to indemnify Ms. Strohm, Ms. Strohm has no viable claim of entitlement pursuant to her Sixth 
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POINT V 
STROHM'S CLAIMS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL SHOULD B E DISMISSED 
A. Plaintiffs' Claim for Unjust Enrichment Fails Because an Enforceable 
Contract Governs the Subject Matter of the Unjust Enrichment Claim 
Plaintiffs concede that their unjust enrichment claim would not be viable "if the Court 
determines that either the Engagement Agreements or the ETA govern the subject matter of the 
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel claims" (Pis' Reply Br. 21). Implicitly, 
Plaintiffs appear to be contending that if the Court rules that they are not entitled to relief in excess 
of the mandatory indemnification order pursuant to the Dorsey engagement letter or the ETA, then 
they are entitled to relief on alternative equitable theories of unjust enrichment or promissory 
estoppel. This argument is belied by the caselaw cited in ClearOne's moving papers - which 
Plaintiffs do not attempt to rebut. 
Regardless of whether Plaintiffs are entitled to additional relief pursuant to the engagement 
letter or the ETA, however, their unjust enrichment claim must fail because the subject matter is 
addressed by enforceable contracts. There is no dispute that the Dorsey engagement letter is 
enforceable - only a dispute over whether it covers the federal criminal proceeding. Similarly, the 
ETA is indisputably enforceable. Either Plaintiffs are entitled to additional relief under those 
contracts, or they are not. If they are not, however, they do not get a second bite at the apple by 
way of alternative equitable claims. Essentially, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to give them 
something that they are not entitled to through the existing contracts. Where a contract governs the 
subject matter of the claim, an unjust enrichment claim would in effect be an improper "demand 
that defendants adjust the contract price." American Towers Owners Ass }n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 
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"At issue is not whether [there is] a valid breach of contract claim, but whether an 
enforceable contract exists that provides the possibility of a legal remedy. Unjust enrichment 
affords relief outside the context of a contractual relationship." William Stuart Anapoell, M.D. v. 
American Express Business Finance Corp., No. 07-CV-198, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88182, *18 (D. 
Utah Nov. 29, 2007). Since Plaintiffs' claims do not arise outside the context of a contractual 
relationship, they must be dismissed. 
Plaintiffs further contend that Dorsey's representation of Strohm in the federal criminal 
proceeding conferred a benefit upon ClearOne because ClearOne wanted to ensure that Ms. Strohm 
cooperated with ClearOne in the legal actions pending against them back in 2003 and 2004 (Pis' Br. 
22). Ms. Strohm's attorneys have already been paid for their 2003-04 services, however, and 
Plaintiffs do not contend - with one exception discussed below - that they conferred a benefit on 
ClearOne in 2008 or 2009, when the services at issue were performed. 
Plaintiffs additionally contend that Ms. Strohm's acquittal on seven of eight counts 
"conferred a benefit on ClearOne from a public perception standpoint" (Pis' Br. 22). ClearOne 
disputes that any public perception benefit was conferred by the jury's determination that both 
ClearOne's former CFO and CEO are now convicted felons. Indeed, from a public perception 
standpoint, it would have been much better for ClearOne if both of them simply pled guilty - since 
ClearOne had already been compelled to restate its financials for the years in question. By 
proceeding with a jury trial, ClearOne's name was bandied about in the local press during the entire 
course of the proceeding in a decidedly negative context from a public relations perspective. Given 
these facts, Plaintiffs certainly cannot show that ClearOne somehow accepted or retained a benefit 
under such circumstances that make it inequitable to retain the benefit without payment of its value. 
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1192 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1996). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' unjust 
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B. Strohm's Claim for Promissory Estoppel Fails Because an 
Enforceable Contract Exists that Contains the Promises at Issue 
Again, without contesting any of the caselaw cited by ClearOne, Plaintiff contend that the 
Amended Complaint sets forth "various promises to the Plaintiffs and not just those contained in a 
contract" (Pis' Reply Br. 22). However, Plaintiffs fail to cite even a single example of any promise 
not contained in the ETA or otherwise seeking to characterize the ETA's promises. 
Accordingly, ClearOne is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' Fifth 
Claim for promissory estoppel as well. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, ClearOne respectfully requests that the Court grant 
ClearOne's motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Claims for Relief, deny Plaintiffs' renewed motion for partial summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, and enter a briefing schedule regarding the 
reasonability of Ms. Strohm's criminal defense fees in order to fully and finally resolve the parties' 
dispute. 
DATED this 4th day of January 2010. 
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 
Brian S. Cousin 
Neil A. Capobianco 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
James E. Magleby 
Jennifer Fraser Parrish 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, 620 Eighth 
Avenue, Suite 3200, New York, New York 10018, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered to the 
following this 4th day of January 2010 by: 
[ ] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[X] Via Electronic Mail as indicated below 
Milo Steven Marsden 
marsden.steve@dorsev.com 
Cameron M. Hancock 
Hancock.cameron@dorsev.com 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
136 South Main Street, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Susie Strohm 
and Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
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